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THE UNITY SERIES. V

WESTERN RACES AND THE WORLD

ESSAYS ARRANGED AND EDITED

BY

F. S. MARVIN

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'Every one members one of another.'—ST. PAUL.

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PREFACE

THE issue of this—the fifth volume of the Unity Series—coincides with the re-issue, in a cheaper form, of the initial volume, 'The Unity of Western Civilization', which suggested the idea and the title of the whole. Each succeeding course of lectures, with its subsequent book, has been suggested by its one or more predecessors. The growth has been a natural one and welcomed as such by an increasing public. There was clearly a need for the persistent presentation of the synthetic aspects of history, for putting in their due prominence those factors in human evolution which have tended to build up a more united mankind.

In this volume we have for the first time extended our view beyond the limits of Western Civilization and considered the evolution of the world-relations of Western Races with their less progressive neighbours. The field is so vast and varied that it has been difficult to hold together, and make any statements applicable to, all the parts. Yet this was essential from the point of view of the series as a whole, and we can only plead in extenuation of any defects in detail that we have striven, while preserving the notion of one great human problem being solved throughout the world, to do full justice to all the agents in it of whatever race.

F. S. M.

BERKHAMSTED,
March 1922.

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I

INTRODUCTORY

AN EDUCATIONAL PROBLEM

F. S. MARVIN

ON any doctrine of progress some members of the human family must be more advanced than others, for we are not all gifted alike, nor have we all grown up under the same conditions. And we shall find that progress has been made in the past, and must be made in future, by developing unity in thought and action among both the separate parts of mankind and mankind as a whole. Hence the subject of this book, the relations of the more advanced and less progressive races of men, links up with both the great topics which inspired the first two volumes of this series: 'The Unity of Western Civilization' and 'Progress in History'.

In this volume, however, we are extending our vision beyond the range of the European civilization which mainly occupied us in the earlier courses. It has, of course, been assumed throughout that Western culture has sprung from roots common to all mankind. But earlier courses, and the subsequent books, directed attention mainly to the character and stages of development of that leading civilization itself; in this one we are turning back to study the reactions of the assumed vanguard on the rest of mankind.

How far this assumption is justified we shall consider in a moment; but the preliminary points, of Unity and Progress, are so important that it will be well to give at

once one or two illustrations of them in reference to the special subject now before us. For men dispute nowadays as to the reality of progress, and sometimes deny that we have made any real advance to greater unity in the world or ever can. It is best to test this question by an examination of definite cases ; and hence we may ask relevantly, Have the relations of Western Races and the rest of the world improved in historic times ?

In the middle of the fifteenth century the first ships of the Portuguese coasted down to Guinea, under the direction of Prince Henry the Navigator, ' to see if they could make capture of any man, or hunt down any woman or boy whereby the desire of their lord might be satisfied.' The Dutch, the French, the English, were soon hot in pursuit of the same game, and by a provision of the Treaty of Utrecht, not much more than two hundred years ago, the right to send a ship to convey slaves from West Africa to the Spanish colonies in the New World, was extorted by us from the French. Less than two hundred years later, in 1889, the European Powers, assembled at the Brussels Conference, determined jointly ' to put an end to the crimes and devastation engendered by the traffic in African slaves, to protect effectively the aboriginal populations of Africa and to ensure for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilization '.

Nor was this a vain pretence. It has been largely carried out, and is the basis of the wider organization recently set up under the League of Nations. The advance, surely an undoubted one, involves, it will be seen, a growth on both the two main lines from which we start. There is progress in the conception, now avowed if still faultily carried out, by the dominant Powers in the Black Continent, that their true rôle is that of trustees and not of spoilers ; and there is greater unity, shown in the fact that we are now all pledged to act collectively in

doing good instead of all trying to steal a march on one another in doing ill

Few examples could be given more decisive of a moral advance in the West, for whereas in the seventeenth century European nations were competing freely and shamelessly for trade in slaves, in our own times it has been extinguished by general consent, and a wider and more permanent organization has just been set up under the League of Nations for carrying out the objects proposed and pursued by the Conference at Brussels.

We start with this example because the theme of the series is Progress and Unity, and here, on the threshold of the special subject of this volume, one meets a testing case.

The relations of Western races and the World have clearly improved in recent historic times, and they have improved both by a real progress in men's ideas on the subject and by greater unity in Western action in dealing with it.

The omens are therefore good,¹ but the position gained is such a new one, the field is so vast and the difficulties so baffling, that a general survey of the problem such as we are attempting in this book, should be of service. There does not seem to be one in existence at present. There are libraries of travellers' tales, and accounts of the habits and customs of savage tribes; but no book known to us surveying and discussing the supreme problem, How have the dominant Western peoples attained their position, what does this involve, on what terms can all the diverse branches of the human race co-operate for the mutual good of all? There was a book, published in the 'sixties, by a group of writers acting under the inspiration of Auguste Comte, and called 'International Policy'. It contains much wise counsel and high ideals, but the

¹ See *Unity of Western Civilization*, Chapter XIV, p. 312.

facts are now largely out of date, and the international spirit of the present day is clearly, and happily, far in advance of the time when we forced opium on the Chinese at the cannon's mouth.

Our new survey may be a more hopeful one. Now the first question of all is, what do we mean by saying that the Western races are more advanced than the rest, what is the foundation for this bold assumption, and is it built on sand? The Dean of St. Paul's, associating himself recently with a book by Dr. Freeman,¹ declares that it is a vain pretence that the Western man, at any rate what he calls the 'British sub-man', is a finer creature, or even so good as an average negro. The British sub-man clamours for a government subsidy to build him a house. The negro would go into the forest, cut a few twigs, and produce a sufficient shelter for himself and his family with a smile of wonder and pity for the helpless member of the dominant race. The negro knows all the flora and fauna among which he lives and can recognize and name the principal constellations.

How many of us, even above the 'sub-man' class, can do as much? Such comments are a wholesome stimulus to us, and we all trust that the Dean may live long to administer them. But those who are concerned to sift carefully the doctrine of progress, and to present it in a scientific form, have to probe a little deeper. They cannot accept the wholesale writing down of our factory population because it was found that such and such a percentage of conscripts for the war had bad teeth or could not cook or, living in towns, did not know the names of common plants. These things no doubt are deplorable, but the experience of the war demonstrated that they, and more serious defects, were remediable, and are being remedied as popular education improves.

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, July 1921. Dr. Freeman.

But taking the sub-man as he is, it is a notable fact, which will shed, if we open our eyes, a flood of light on the problem, that any white man, thrown among blacks, even if he be quite ignorant of flora or of constellations, will promptly assume, and easily retain, a position of command. 'Him next to God,' say the negroes of Lagos at the present moment of a popular doctor who has won their confidence. This phrase implies sympathy, skill, and understanding on the part of the white ; but the relation established rests on something deeper and more instinctive. There is a prestige on the one side and a childlike reverence on the other, which, like all things on earth, have deep roots in the historical social evolution of the two races.

The Western man has behind him a tradition of a collective growth in power and knowledge for now nearly three thousand years, in which each individual has a share, however small in any one case it may be. That the 'sub-man' is so poor a representative of the West to which he belongs reflects more discredit on his community than on himself ; it was for his society as a whole to admit him fully to their membership. They have among them the richest stores of thought and the highest standards of capacity in the world ; they have not yet seen to it that these are equitably distributed among all their members. But every Westerner has some share in these riches, if only a glamour from them, when he faces the members of another race.

Now it must be clear from these reflections on fact, if they are accepted, that two or three main conclusions stand for our guidance in seeking a solution of the problem.

The first is, that the grounds of the superiority of the West which we assumed are primarily collective. It is not implied that every individual Western man is superior

to any member of another race ; often and obviously it is not so. But with equal certainty we may discern the collective advances that have been made by the West as a whole, which constitute it, for the present at least, the vanguard of the race. Among these the growth of knowledge must be given the first place, not of concrete knowledge, or recognition, of particular things, which, as Dr. Freeman tells us, the uncivilized man will often do much more easily than the civilized, but of scientific or abstract knowledge, which groups particulars together and seeks their causes or laws. For the origin of this type of knowledge we travel back to six or seven hundred B. C. and look to the Greeks. But there is much more than even scientific knowledge in the composition of Western civilization. There is the quality which we may best call / ' collective power ', and may connect it with the Romans, as we connect science with the Greeks. It is the capacity for acting together successfully in pursuit of a settled purpose, and making good the ground occupied. It is not unconnected with the Greek aptitude for correct reasoning, and how far Greek influenced Roman in this respect would be a fascinating and valuable line of inquiry. But it involves more than the faculty of abstract thought ; it is a capacity for united and consecutive action, in which the Romans at their best were conspicuous. They held together and they held on. This is the quality which comes out in their greatest creation, the system of Roman Law which forms the framework of Western society and the actual basis of all existing law except our own. When, towards the beginning of the Christian Era, the two streams coalesce, that of Greek philosophy and of Roman law and administration, the Western world comes visibly into being.

Yet there is something more, still connected with the Roman power of co-operation, yet larger and deeper than

that. This is the emotional side of human co-operation, which we may connect most properly with the Christian element in Western civilization, though it appears in every form of human association and was becoming very prominent in Western thought just before Christianity appeared. Call it sympathy or the sense of humanity, the impulse within us to find common ground with every other human being, to love the kindred soul and help the suffering. This is pre-eminently the Christian spirit, though, as we shall see in a later chapter, it did not become a world-force till quite recent times.

Now to those who would deny the reality of Western advance, compared with the rest of the world, one has to put the simple question, Is it or is it not the case that the West, i.e. the greater part of Europe, and its offshoots in the New World and elsewhere, possesses a far larger share than the rest of mankind of these qualities, knowledge, collective power and organization, and sympathy? There can be no doubt as to the answer. But it seems necessary expressly to exclude one or two misconceptions which prejudice the minds of many generous and some critical people against the frank acceptance and the wise application of an obvious sociological truth. It does not involve any personal comparison of individuals. It may, or it may not, be the case that the average Englishman is a stronger, more intelligent, or more moral person than the average Chinaman. We do not know; we have no means of making such a calculation; it is quite irrelevant to our argument. What we are concerned to maintain is that England, as a part of the West, is at present in possession of a larger store of ordered knowledge and its resultant power, is more strongly organized, and has also a keener and more adequate consciousness of the whole of mankind than China possesses as a whole, in spite of the eminent endowment of many individual

Chinese. Extend your field of comparison, and that is the argument as to the West as a whole, compared with the rest of mankind as a whole. It has been retorted that in making a comparison on these grounds we are arbitrarily choosing a standard favourable to ourselves; that if, for example, we chose art or mystic philosophy, China or India might easily surpass us. It might well be so, and a comparison on the basis of art would be an extremely interesting one. But it is undoubtedly the other qualities, and not his art or his insight into the other world, that have given the white man his pre-eminent place, that prestige which caused the West African native, and thousands before him, to put the soldier who can kill, the doctor who can cure, the governor who can rule, 'next to God.'

But a graver misconception remains; the clearing of which will open the way to the moral of our tale. A dangerous frame of mind has often prevailed in the past, and is naturally feared by good people in the present, a consciousness of progress by those who share it, with pride of place, and a claim to overlordship in the interests of the overlord and the detriment of others. The danger is real; such ill-used strength has wrought devastation for centuries, but is by no means inherent in the enlightened consciousness of progress or power. It is power without enlightenment and without responsibility that works evil and may ruin a race as it has often ruined a family. The enlightenment needed here concerns the source of Western power; the responsibility arises from any fair consideration of its proper use. We are ready to say that the West must be trustee for the rest of mankind; this book, in fact, sets out to be a variation on that theme. But such sound and high doctrine needs for its full force the realization of the social and historic truth on which it rests. The West should be the world-trustee, not because of any

inherent right, still less because of its temporary power, but because the riches and resources which it holds, have come to it, directly or indirectly, at near or far remove, from the whole race of man. The gifts of Humanity, all Humanity must enjoy and thrive on them, or it will be impoverished and decay, including the vanguard which has, at the moment, the largest share.

If this seems merely the language of exhortation, describing rather an ideal laid up in heaven than the possibilities of a sinful world, it will be well to consider how profound is the common basis of all human culture, how deep the debt of the most advanced sections of mankind to all their predecessors, perhaps most of all to the earliest and simplest. Art, numeration, all the most indispensable inventions, fire, the wheel, the loom, the bow, the knife, are due to races of mankind struggling against natural hardships which we soft Westerners can now barely imagine, and certainly with their equipment could never face. These men, were they now alive, would rank with the most backward of existing races.

Let us now look at our problem in the light of this historical perspective, which anthropology has opened up to us in recent years. Our first analogy was that of a family, and we shall find that we come back to that as the nearest and most helpful guide. All the races of mankind, in view of their common origin and common qualities, may be regarded as one family, with one home and one Father, however we may conceive that greatest and highest of Beings who embraces and sustains us.

We, therefore, as one family, owe affection and service to one another, and all of us feel and recognize this tie according to our powers of sympathy and understanding. But like all analogies, this one is not complete ; there is something less on the one side, and something more on the other. The family of nations is far less united by love and

constant association, and the various members in too many cases have never even heard of one another. But, on the other hand, there is something more in the wider relation which history and sociology have lately revealed to us.

Every member in the great family, even the strongest and most advanced, owes the essentials of social life to races of men similar in civilization to those whom we now regard as backward, and whom we are called upon, as our kindred, to help on their upward path.

Now this educational aspect of the relation of Western races to the world is a necessary, perhaps the principal part of the work of trustees. Trustees have to conserve the property of their wards, they have to hand it on to them, not deteriorated, but, if possible, improved, they have to see that their wards themselves are preserved sound in life and limb, but, above all, they have the duty of developing their human powers to the utmost; and this is education. The question then arises, how far the less developed races are capable of such educational influence as the West can provide, and on what lines this education should proceed.

There is one great difficulty before us in this volume, in treating of this or any other part of our subject, and that is the scope which we have permitted ourselves, in order to see the problem as a whole. Hence we have chapters on China and India as well as references to Japan, besides treating at some length the negro question, which is the supreme test for Western skill and Western honour. Now it is obvious at once that these cases differ widely, and it is impossible, except in the general terms which we have stated above, to treat them together. But it is, we think, true that Western races are still, and will for long be, distinguished from all the rest by higher achievements in knowledge and collective power, and

their superior world-organization and consciousness. When we come to consider the educability and the various degrees of advancement of the rest, the diversity is infinite.

Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of eternity.

We have the Japanese, now fit to be called the Westerns of the East. We have the rich historic civilizations of China and India, preserving much of their ancient order, but absorbing by a thousand channels more and more of the spirit of the West. Clearly all these differ almost by the heaven's breadth from the African tribes which have always been nearer to our door, and which have for that very reason—such is the evil of unmoralized strength—been preyed upon for centuries, and are now the chief object of our humanitarian concern.

Now all of these are, on the universal testimony of those who know them, eminently educable. It is true that certain weaker races or tribes have disappeared, or show signs of disappearance. The black men of Tasmania have gone; those of Australia seem to be following in their wake. But it cannot be said that they were incapable of civilization. They fell, partly by the violence of the white immigrants, partly through the disturbance to their habits caused by the invasion. They were physically unable to withstand the strain, not mentally incapable of development. Those who thrive physically can grow mentally; and the black and yellow races are on the whole strong and prolific. The negro especially has proved in the hands of all who know how to treat him, a man with many of the traits of a teachable child, affectionate, easily attached, quick to learn things that appeal to him, capable in favouring circumstances of a high degree of achievement as preacher, lawyer, man of business.

All this is matter of common knowledge ; it will repay us better to discuss what is implied in this proposed education, what are the historic precedents for it, on what lines we should proceed if the work is to correspond to our ideal of a generally progressive humanity, united but not uniform. The thorough-going sceptic declares that we, i. e. the West, had much better leave them, i. e. the rest of the world, alone altogether, or, as this is plainly impossible, interfere as little as we can. The attitude reminds one forcibly of a book published some years since under the title of 'What social classes owe one another' ; it gave the answer, 'Above all to keep apart.' Socially and internationally, we know that this answer is not only impossible but wrong in conception. Socially and internationally, progress lies in the opposite direction, in seeking a form of co-operation which will be mutually helpful, without encroaching on healthy freedom and difference.

Happily in the sphere of educational thought itself similar ideas are now in the ascendant. We no longer expect our schools to turn out uniform scholars stamped with the hall-mark of a traditional culture. And just as we expect them to study the individual and encourage initiative, so in the larger sphere our action should be not of the stamping but of the stimulating order. The West has done ill in the past, not only by sheer brutality and devastations, but by the imposition of alien models and the suffocation of native industries and art.

But is this inherent in the process of Western trusteeship ? Must the action of the stronger and better-organized Powers necessarily take the form of putting all the races whom they influence through the same mill ? Opinions differ on this point, and any answer is a speculation. Mr. Lowes Dickinson, in a suggestive book published after his travels as a Kahn Fellow, held that the

East at any rate was destined to run through the Western course. They would live through it, though perhaps they might take the disease in a milder form and escape some of the worst crises. True to the more hopeful tenor of our way in these volumes, we would lay stress rather on the possible qualifications than on the main conclusion in this opinion. Looking at the analogy of the ordinary education of the young by their older contemporaries, we know the efforts made to spare the rising generation the pain and mistakes suffered by their seniors. The same idea applies with even greater force to our collective action on backward races. Take the industrial system. We have now outgrown the worst horrors of its earlier days. We have tried countless experiments in avoiding them and improving our procedure. Nothing but the most culpable negligence, or positive wickedness, would allow us to inflict on a new and weaker race, just entering on their course, the evils from which we have escaped with so much difficulty ourselves.

But there is another point of view even more decisive. What did we find were the qualities in the West on which we could base a just claim to eminence and influence? Not on our art or our ways of doing particular things. We do not pretend to paint better than the Chinese in their own manner, or to execute finer work than the Indians or the Moors or Persians with their inherited skill and age-long methods. We have acquired in fuller measure than they, science, or accurate and well-ordered knowledge, and collective power largely based on this, with its accompanying organization and superior consciousness of the world and of mankind. Now these are general qualities and do not in the least conflict with the utmost variety and freedom in particulars. Our more perfect consciousness of world-conditions and world-problems should make us the readier to admit the added strength

and beauty of variety ; and our great collective power enables us, if we will, to give effect to our convictions. We can understand and we can protect. The right direction of our efforts clearly is, to increase the knowledge of those whom we influence, to cultivate in them the power of union and self-development, and to arouse in them, what is the most precious thing we have ourselves, the sense and dignity of human life as a whole.

The earlier chapters of this book deal with the historic stages in the growth of a consciousness of difference between advanced and less progressive peoples, and the forms which this consciousness assumed in action.

It will be noticed that this consciousness of a superior culture carries with it a determination on the part of the assumed superiors to educate their young members to the high standard which they had reached themselves. At first this takes the form of a sectional education, the training of a 'guardian' class or race, which merges gradually into the notion of a world-education for all mankind.

In the next chapter we have the first appearance of this notion, and we find it, as we find the beginnings of so many things, among the ancient Greeks. They were the first to distinguish between themselves, the city-founding, freedom-loving, philosophizing Hellenes and the other races whom they met with, who did not possess these qualities and uttered a strange and unintelligible speech, and were hence called 'Barbaroi' or stammerers. The Romans, as they came into the same Greek system of city-states and civilized life, were admitted within the pale. We thus gain from the quick, questioning, analytic mind of Greece the first division between Western Races and the World. It will be remembered that abstract science flowed from the same fountain-head. But note specially that, side by side with the birth of this conscious-

ness of a superior civilization, comes the first deliberate effort to train up each generation of fresh members of the community in the traditions, the habits, and the meaning of the civilization which they had inherited. It is a Greek who gives us the first treatise on an ideal education, i. e. the first philosophical treatment of the question, how the more advanced members of any community are to treat the less. Plato's argument follows the aristocratic turn of classical Greek thought. So far from considering the education of all mankind he confines his deeply thought-out and closely-knit scheme to the *élite* of the city-state itself. The chosen few are to be the 'guardians'—protectors and guides—of the mass of the citizens, and for those outside the pale there is no thought at all. But it is important as marking the will of the vanguard to maintain and to improve its standard, in the interest, not indeed of all mankind, but of the whole civic community to which it belongs. It is thus a milestone on our way. The Romans did not greatly extend or deepen this conception : indeed they tended, in Greco-Roman times, to make it more rhetorical, more a mere training for the courts and the senate. But with the Stoics there appeared a real sense of service and the idea of a wider sphere for its exercise. The Stoic Emperor gave the purest and noblest example of self-devotion on a throne ; but he had no conception of his myriad subjects advancing under his enlightened guidance towards a higher state of civilization. That was a notion for which mankind had to wait till after the Christian incorporation of the Middle Ages. The Church was cosmopolitan, it had a strong humanitarian strain and an international education, it had a gospel for all ; but that gospel did not emphasize the idea of progress on earth. Spiritual progress there was, a purification of the soul to fit it for Divine communion here and hereafter, but not progress of the human communities on earth in

knowledge and skill and happiness, which is the root-idea of the new humanitarianism of the eighteenth century.

This conception, which has been the strongest formative influence in the West for over a hundred years, rests on the Christian principle of love; it could not have arisen without the teaching which said, 'Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature,' and 'we are every one members one of another'. But it is equally vital to remember that by itself this passion for brotherhood is not enough, there must be also an ideal of progress, a goal towards which our loving brotherhood should advance, and some knowledge of the laws which govern its individual and collective being; this was the gift of science which made its formal entry on the stage at the end of the sixteenth century. Science gave this notion of an ordered process; it inspired hope; it fortified immeasurably the sense of unity in mankind. And while scientific inquiry was thus enlarging the paths of thought, the sailor and the explorer were completing our knowledge of the inhabited globe and bringing into the fold of humanity, at first with rods of iron, the hitherto unknown members of the flock.

If we pursued in detail the advance of the West on these two lines—the extension of knowledge and colonial expansion—we should find that they converge at a point towards the end of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century, when at last the leading spirits of the West conceived the great idea of all mankind advancing, as one army, though at various rates, towards an end of growing perfection; and of this advance the West, through its geographical position and its historic advantages, becomes for the time the natural leader.

Some people talk as if a consciousness of superior knowledge and power were in itself an evil thing. No one ought to think himself any better than his neighbours. But

this is a perverted form of the Christian virtue of humility: better than this would be to fall back on the Aristotelian conception of a noble soul, though adding to it always the guiding ideas that our advance, though great, is but a little part of what we have to rise, and that our gifts, great or small, should be as social in their use as they have been social in their origin. Hence there is no cause to grieve that the men of the Renaissance revived the paeans of the Greeks on the wonders of man's nature, the triumphs of his past and the glories of his future. They did not yet know how to make the best use of those powers, but they did well to realize them and to believe in themselves. The necessary check came in the eighteenth century when the misery of the disinherited—the earth-bowed serf of Europe, the murdered slave of Africa—began to burn its mark upon the conscience of the West. It was a check to selfish pride; it was a complement to the conception of human duty.

This duty, as it now began to dawn on men's minds, was also their highest interest, to bring up the whole body of their fellow men to the level reached by the most advanced, or to put the problem in a more practical form, to take the whole forward as far at each remove as their capacities would allow. Viewed thus broadly, it is seen that the problem is essentially the same both within each community in dealing with its own citizens and in the world at large in dealing with the backward races. And this identity is borne out by the parallel development of educational effort at home and civilizing work abroad. In 1833 the first grants were voted by the British Parliament for popular education, almost at the same moment that Guizot was beginning the establishment of universal elementary schools in France; and in the same year slavery was abolished throughout the British Empire. So on throughout the century which followed; at each stage the con-

ception of the duty widens and the machinery to effect it is made more complete, though it would be easy to point out also in the same period a series of lapses, especially in the action of the West on backward races. There have been, even near to our own days, hideous crimes committed, but they are now recognized as crimes, and as such investigated, and—though often too mildly—punished.

In our later chapters we approach the present time, when, in the Covenant of the League of Nations, provision has been made for the systematic review of the relations of Protecting Powers with the backward races in their care. The mandatory system which is described in the concluding chapter is in effect merely a development, under the League, of the principles which we noticed were laid down at the Brussels Conference of 1889, when the West bound itself 'to protect effectively the aboriginal populations of Africa and to ensure for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilization'. It will be seen that, by the time the League is reached, a differentiation has taken place among the states and races which for the purpose of this book we have treated as non-Western. In the councils of the League, China and Japan sit in their own right, and in the case of Japan play one of the predominant rôles, while India appears with rights equal to those of any part of the British Commonwealth. This follows naturally from the conception which we have tried to develop in this chapter, that the whole process is an educational one; states come to maturity, from the world point of view, at various stages according to their internal strength and coherence, their geographical position, their aptitude for learning. So it is with individuals in life, though for legal purposes we have to impose certain uniform rules of minority and self-maintenance. Of the new-comers to the comity of the West,

Japan is obviously the best equipped and most competent : the resources of China, though ultimately far greater, being more difficult to quicken and to mobilize, while India has gained, and suffered, from her internal divisions and her subjection to foreign conquerors. Among the countries under a mandate, similar distinctions have been set up, which are discussed fully in the last chapter.

The education of mankind is thus no uniform, machine-made process, but a long adaptation of the organism to its environment, helped in the case of humanity by the transmitted wisdom and the deliberate efforts at amelioration put forth by the more advanced members of the world-community. The education we speak of here is not the systematic instruction afforded by schools and colleges, though that may be a part of it ; we are thinking of all the influences which play upon a growing nation to develop its powers, and in particular of those exercised by the more mature peoples in their relations with the less mature. Trade is an education, and the settlement of wandering tribes in more fixed habitations. The tax-collector, the judge, the engineer, are all schoolmasters as truly and often more effectively than the missionary or those who hold the title by right. How far the intervention of all these ' civilizing ' agents is in any case necessary, must be determined by the circumstances of the case ; how it should be exercised is not in doubt. The judge, the engineer, the planter must be paid : he would not go to work, in exile, often in danger, without a reasonable profit. A Livingstone will do it, perhaps once in a decade. But the profit must be reasonable, and the aim, not exploitation but training. The native is there and will remain. The climate suits him and does not permanently suit us. It is to the interest of all that in the long run the resources of the tropics, on which our civilization increasingly depends, should be worked and traded by those

whose home is in the countries which produce them ; and Chapter X gives ample evidence of the capacity of the African native to do this, if we will allow him. We are his trustee, not his exploiter, still less his slave-master.

The subject is so vast and complex that one hesitates to put out, in the compass of one small volume, essays attempting to deal comprehensively with it. '*Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem* : ' and our task is the foundation of a happy, co-operative, and progressive community of all mankind. The West has played a dominating part in this great work for over three centuries ; it has often erred grievously and soiled its record with blood. Yet on the whole the judgement, common to all the authors of this book, will hold its own ; the world is better, even in its backward places, for Western energy and Western light. The voice of the past forbids despair, but it calls out still more loudly for improvement in the future.

II

LANGUAGE AS A LINK

J. A. SMITH

OF all the forces that work against the realization of the unity of mankind, none seems so obvious, so deep-seated, so persistent or inevitable as the diversity of human language. The thought is familiar from those ancient Hebrew legends which supply to most of us the imaginary background of the earliest history of our race. In primitive fashion the idea of that unity which is still the governing conception of our mind, is represented by that of a group of human beings, the forefathers of all the innumerable nations then and now inhabiting the earth, one in blood and kinship, united by the fact and memory of a common origin, united also by the possession of one language employing a common vocabulary of names for the same things and the same acts or happenings without variety of pronunciation ('of one lip'). It is interesting to observe that the author (or authors) of the legend do not represent this as a condition of unqualified good, but rather, on the contrary, as a cause of serious evil, and the subsequent diversity of languages—'the confusion of tongues'—as a divinely devised remedy for a threatened mischief. The expansion of mankind over the surface of the earth, the division of mankind into tribes or nations, on this view called in the course of the Divine government of the world for a diversification of the common speech into many mutually unintelligible dialects in order to prevent a common understanding and a gigantic co-operation perilous to the designs of Providence for man's future

estate in the world. The actual existence of such disabling diversity is thus presented as mixed with evil as well as good, as on the surface a source of severance and disintegration, yet, as it were, when more deeply considered, big with the promise of a higher and richer fulfilment of the potentialities of human life.

The ideas embedded in this legendary account of the origins of human civilization still colour and shape our present imaginations, perhaps even after we believe ourselves to have outgrown them and to have passed from mythology to science and credible history. Certainly our tendency is, as I have said, to view the extant diversity of human speech as a misfortune: we still in seasons of dreaming idealism look back to a golden age in the past when all the earth was of one language and one speech, and forward to a golden age in the future when it will be so once more, regarding the present as a time of transition and struggle towards a restoration of the lost unity of primæval speech. These dreamlike speculations haunt our waking hours and traces of them are to be found in that new book of *Genesis* in which critical science and history is daily setting down its guarded hypotheses concerning the origins of human civilization. There too—in that Book—we are sometimes offered a faint or dim picture of a scattered population of human animals using a scant vocabulary of rudimentary words scarcely removed from the natural cries and signals of the brute creation, signifying in a manner intelligible over a wide area the same elementary objects, actions, needs, dangers, &c., &c., and gradually perfecting this stock as their circumstances become more and more complex, until they achieve something approaching what observers now find in existence among the lowest or least progressive of living races. Even if the account so offered of the first steps in the evolution of human language were better established than as a matter of

fact it is, we should still have to recognize that it was soon followed—or rather from the outset accompanied—by an equally strong tendency to differentiation, the original homogeneity breaking up into distinct segments, mutual understanding and communication becoming first difficult, and then impossible, between the locally-severed groups. The history of human speech as opposed to its conjectural prehistory shows a course—and are we not bound to call it a progress?—to greater and greater diversity, larger groups constantly dividing into smaller and smaller groups unintelligible to their neighbours, talkative humanity splitting more and more minutely into coteries each (one might almost say) with a private or secret slang of its own.

Certainly at present the whole earth is covered with such groups cut off from one another by barriers of mutually unintelligible forms of speech. To the student of language this is indeed the most obvious phenomenon and in the explanation of it the divisive or disintegrating tendency is the clearest and most persistently operative of causes. Hence as the student now looks backward he no longer desecrates the original unity, and it may be said that he has ceased to believe that it ever existed. Even when he now indulges in speculation he no longer pictures the primitive condition of talking mankind as essentially different from the present. At no date in the past was it the case that mankind constituted a single community of speakers mutually intelligible. This change has brought with it the growing conviction that such a condition is neither possible nor—some would add—desirable for man. Here as elsewhere we have learned that it is unprofitable to think much of primitive origins or ultimate results, and that wisdom lies in confining ourselves to what is accessible to us, what in a large sense may be called contemporary facts, the changes that occupy the mid-period of recorded history. Only after a painstaking examination of

that are we justified in making some cautious conjectures as to what preceded it and what will or may follow it. Let us dismiss fantastic guesses as to remote past and equally remote future.

To our survey of the present facts I would prefix two articles of what I venture to call our confession of faith—faith for which I am prepared to render reasons. The first is that mankind constitutes a real unity, that there is an identity of nature running through and present in all mankind. This is not, or not merely, a natural unity. It does not lie in, or arise from, singleness of ancestry or kinship of blood; it is not merely the result of historic accident or physical causes. I cannot think of it as less than a spiritual unity which can neither be produced nor destroyed from without. All men can say 'We' with a truth and significance incommunicable to other beings than men: they share in a complex but single type of experience. And with this goes a mutual or reciprocal communion in which no other beings participate; they are all literally one with one another—they form one 'community'. They do actually and in fact communicate with one another, actually understand, and co-operate with one another. The whole human world is, despite all appearances to the contrary, in act and fact, not merely in potency or promise, an intercommunicating and interacting and co-operating whole. And, if we take the word 'language' widely enough, we may with truth say that the whole human race commands and employs a single language by means of which it maintains this world-wide intercommunication, and that of this language all forms of extant human speech are but varieties differing in degree of perfection, while the brutes have no corresponding language shared either with one another or with us. Were this not so the spiritual unity of mankind would be non-existent, or what is the same, ineffectual and in-

operative. This radical identity underlying all diversity of human speech is difficult to grasp, but it is there at the basis—difficult to grasp because, as I have said, it is a spiritual not a natural or physical unity. It is not really even what is called a psychological identity, though so to conceive it helps us to avoid certain misconceptions of it. Certainly it does not consist in similarity of vocabulary or again of syntactical form, but, did it not exist, what is said in one variety of it would not even be translatable into another, and so the possibility of mutual understanding between the two speakers would be cut at the root. Let us be content for the moment with saying that for A and B to be mutually intelligible to one another each must at least have the same sort of 'ideas' as one another and the same general ways of ordering and linking their several 'ideas'—in both respects totally different from those beings who can never come to understand one another. The further qualifications necessary I defer till later.

In the second place—this is the other article of my confession—during the whole recorded course of the history of man there has been a constant course of improvement. With many occasional set-backs and reversions it has been upon the whole a progress. Yes, upon the whole, human language has advanced, grown or been made ever fitter for its purposes, has become and now is a better means of communication than it ever was before, and that in spite of, or rather, as we shall see, because of, its greater diversity.

But to understand how this can be—and it is a paradox—we must consider its known course of development more closely than we have done. I spoke above of its purposes, for communication is only one of them and perhaps neither the most original nor even the most important of them. If we reflect we shall see that a whole swarm of human purposes is aimed at, subserved, and more or less success-

fully achieved by the single activity of speaking. I call it single, though again a very little reflection will convince us that it is a very complex business. In fact we talk not only with our so-called vocal organs but with all kinds of gestures and movements; nothing much short of our whole body is the real organ or organism of speech—the medium of communication of what is within us to others of our kind outside. So much is this the case that the special organs of speech are not indispensable to the talker: he speaks with his eyes, his hands, even with his legs. Any one who has watched a conversation in the streets of Naples needs no further evidence of this, and it is very important to remember when we are considering our present topic. It is one of the first observations which we make when we endeavour to enter into communications with foreigners, and in a more marked way when travellers encounter strange peoples: the conventional limitation of language to vocal or audible signs almost vanishes.

Now extending the word 'language' or speech to all such movements or agitations of the bodily organs, let us ask why it is that human beings act thus, why do we (or men) talk? It is not always or primarily in order to communicate something to others: we often talk when no one is by or marking what we do. No, primarily we talk, as we say, to express ourselves, literally to 'squeeze or press out' what is within us. We are moved in certain ways, excited, disturbed, made uncomfortable or uneasy, and talking, as we say, relieves our feelings. Talking discharges us of a burden, diverts the tide of emotion, explodes the surcharged system: we break into ejaculations or exclamations. If there is any origin of language, this is it, and some theorists of the origin of language have found here its whole explanation (this is what is called the Pooh-pooh theory of the origin of language). There is truth in this, and it would lead us to the view that human language was at the outset a perhaps very

complex stream of cries naturally excited by changes in the emotional condition of the speaker—alarm, desire, satisfaction, &c., &c. We might perhaps call this the natural but deeply-hidden basis of language. But even at this low or early stage language is expressive in another way—it expresses not what is in the speaker but what is outside or around him, it signifies an *object*. The cry means not merely alarm but the presence or particular source of it, e. g. a special enemy, and the noise or original may be made even when no actual alarm is felt. The most obvious way of doing this is by imitation of the sound made by the enemy or by some other object of painful or pleasurable interest. Hence arise what are called the onomatopoeic elements in language. The bulk of this contributory element has been greatly exaggerated. Its existence has given rise to the so-called Bow-wow theory of the origin of human speech. But at any rate in historic times purely imitative names for things and actions form but a small part of the vocabulary of any human group and, were we restricted to such, our means of expression and communication would be limited indeed. The two sources of natural ejaculation and imitative denomination yield but scanty tributaries to the full flood of human utterance. For the large part of our vocabulary cannot be traced to these springs, and they utterly fail to account for the more complicated phenomena of language, above all for the arrangement and ordering of the separate words in phrases and sentences.

How are these to be accounted for? It would appear—and has appeared—that for them no merely natural origin will suffice. We are led back for their explanation to custom, fashion, convention. Behind their use for expression, and communication lies a common agreement, an arbitrary and shifting agreement as to what this or that sound, this or that arrangement of sounds or group of

sounds, shall mean. Viewing the facts of any language we are struck by the absence of natural or necessary connexion between the sounds or other signs and what in practice and use they stand for, represent, or signify. How such a convention can be established, maintained, and extended, it is difficult to imagine, but that in some sense it underlies all use of language is certain. At the bottom of language lies an agreement of human wills, a unity of aims and purposes, a consensus even as to the general ways of attaining them. Here too there has been exaggeration, and the origin of language—as a whole and in every part—has been ascribed to some primitive convention among those who use it. Such a view is quite unscientific, and the original convention is mere mythology and miracle—simply false history, an occurrence which never happened because it never could have happened.

The fact is that language as it exists and is used is everywhere and always the result of a great number of concurrent, co-operating but also conflicting, tendencies; it is an unstable and shifting compromise between them, or rather, for so I venture to maintain, a progressive or perpetually-amended compromise. And the consequence of this may be put, perhaps over simply, in this way. Language is created in the constant endeavour to express in the most natural manner the varying experiences of the speaker, to distinguish and characterize whatever in his changing environment disquiets, excites, interests him—to do so in a manner which clarifies and tranquillizes his inward condition—which satisfies him, while at the same time it is controlled and directed by the aim of causing a secondary or sympathetic participation by others in just those experiences. To do the former it must vary from individual speaker to individual speaker and from individual moment to moment of his life: to do the other it must become conventional, general, common. We are thus led

to the paradoxical conclusion that all living language pursues at once a double aim : it aims at once at expressing just the essentially peculiar features of the speaker's experience and also at being intelligible to another in terms of his, or a common, experience. And these aims appear incompatible : if I say what I really mean I shall not be understood by another, and if I make myself intelligible what another understands will not be what I mean, so to speak, to myself. We are all—at all times and often most painfully—aware of this conflict, especially aware of it when we attempt to enter into intercourse with speakers and hearers widely separated from us by space or time, by race or history or difference of stage in progress, individual or collective. In a sense the better I speak my own language the less shall I be understood, and the same applies to my would-be partner in the colloquy, and if evidence of this were needed it lies in the incessant degradation or debasement of highly developed languages to serve as media of communication between one race and another. The vocabulary at command has to be reduced and impoverished, the sounds distorted, the rules of combination simplified to all but nothing ; the language common to both expresses and communicates only what is most trivial, commonplace, superficial. 'Pidgin English' and the various forms of *lingua franca* that prevail over wide surfaces of the globe are scarcely languages at all. They fail to convey from mind to mind anything of spiritual value or importance—anything that deeply interests or permanently moulds and guides the users of the common speech. We might not unfairly say that instead of uniting—and certainly instead of progressively uniting—those who use such form of speech, they sever and isolate them, acting as barriers to a deeper mutual understanding and a closer co-operation. One lesson we can learn from this is that it is the idlest of dreams

to suppose that such higher or deeper unity can come about or be promoted by the extension of such lingoes. No, for that either one party must abandon his own language, adopting that of the other, or each must learn the language of the other. Thus vanishes from possibility the ideal of a world-language—of a day when all the earth will be of one language or one speech. Such a language, could it *per impossibile* exist, would be one in which no man could utter what he really meant or express to himself or to others the characteristic features of his personal experience or of the world that surrounded him.

The two alternatives momentarily distinguished above are not two but one. The only plan that will enable men to speak so as at once to express their several meanings and to communicate these to one another is that each, each group and indeed each individual, should learn his neighbours' speech and his neighbours his, that each should make his neighbours' language also his own. The human world is and never can be otherwise than multilingual, and it is well that we should recognize that not only is and must this be so, but that it is best that it should be so, that progress in language consists not in unification or levelling of differences of speech but just as much in multiplication and increased differentiation and diversification of it. Only so will it serve as a potent instrument for linking men together in the higher experiences and activities proper to Man and in the advance towards genuine and effective unity. I do not think it is the mere interest of students that makes us welcome the almost endlessly rich variety to be discovered in the world of human speech. There is nothing to be ashamed of in such interest, and what excites it is the outward sign of a hidden source of spiritual power and wealth. Consider how infinitely poorer human experience would be were it no longer the case that each group of us

had a mother tongue of its own and even a personal version of that! Think of the passion begotten by the peculiar terms and phrases endeared to us by long and private or local usage. These have power to move us like the sight of our homestead or the faces of our kinsmen and friends, and endeavours to deprive men of them are resented and resisted like assaults upon the central fortresses of their being. Yes, the varieties of speech in their separateness and distinction are as the immediate jewels of our souls.

The facts present to us not merely the spectacle of a world-wide contemporary variegation of the linguistic map. There are not merely different orders, groups, genera, species of human language, co-ordinate or level with one another. There are among extant languages differences of level—high and low languages, developed and undeveloped languages, advanced and degenerate languages, progressive and retrogressive or decaying languages. In fact, the languages of the world form not an aggregate but a hierarchy, the orders of which differ in degree of perfection as languages. It is a difficult and delicate matter to determine the rank to be assigned to this or that language and mistakes are frequent, but the existence of such differences should not be denied or belittled. Some languages can clearly do what others cannot and in many respects fail as languages. And, oddly enough, the differences in rank among languages do not always or exactly correspond to differences in degree of general civilization, and high rank in the one cannot be taken as a certain clue to rank in the other. Thus when Rome was at the height of its political power and efficiency its language was at the outset rude enough and before the end in dissolution and decay, while the Greek tongue was still in relative perfection when its form of civilization was stricken at the root. Still it may be said that there

was a rough parallelism in the two gradations. The precise fact appears to be that language rises and falls with the artistic and imaginative life of its speakers—where that is full, rich and beautiful language approaches perfection. Where it is thin, turbid or ugly, language decays and degrades.

This observation is of the first importance and that for our special topic. For what language expresses and communicates is not—or not primarily and specially and directly—the whole mind of its speakers and users—it is only that part of it which exists in the medium and form of imagination. It is not directly feelings and emotions nor desires, wishes, commands, nor on the other hand conceptions, judgements, theories—what are properly called ‘thoughts’—such stuff as science and history and philosophy, and to a large extent religion, are made of. What speech or language primarily expresses, utters, conveys or communicates is what I have called some way back ‘ideas’, separate or linked in groups and trains according to their natures—‘associations of ideas’. All else is indirectly experienced and conveyed. By ‘ideas’ I mean sights, sounds, smells, &c., either perceived or recollected, ‘data of sense’ or the fading or recurrent images of those, linked or associated together in bundles or series in manners apparent but not, strictly speaking, intelligible to us. It is only in so far as by speech we can make these clear and distinct to ourselves or by utterance cause a reproduction of them in our neighbours that we can lay the basis for the promotion of mutual understanding and reciprocal assistance. Beyond that, language largely and patently fails us, and we can only trust that on that foundation each for and within himself may build the higher structures which make up civilized experience. We have grounds for trust that that will be done by each for himself; for one another we can do

little to guide or enforce it. We can but supply the best conditions for its doing, but in the end no man can do it for another, each must do it for himself. Education in the main can go no further, at least by 'word of mouth', than to give the pupil the best chance of acting and thinking for himself.

If this be true and an observation well grounded in the very nature of man and his speech, it follows that where we would foster communication and so unity between the members of a more advanced and the members of a less advanced or less progressive race we must endeavour to cultivate and extend in the first instance similarity in respect of the imaginative furniture of our several minds, to recognize initial dissimilarities, labouring to reduce them (not by levelling but by raising the lower to the higher). Initial dissimilarities there are: could we see into another's mind we should be struck and discouraged by the magnitude of the difference between the way in which the whole world looks and sounds—in general 'seems'—to him and to us. And in the very condition of the case the lower imagination requires to be improved for and in the process of intercommunication: compared with our own—which I am assuming to be the higher—it is probably, here confused with irrelevant and unimportant detail, there vague, blurred, evanescent, and everywhere ill-ordered and ill-arranged, at best deficient in beauty but more likely characterized by a positive ugliness. Over against it the higher imagination shows clear, distinct, orderly, a waking vision contrasted with a disordered dream or even a nightmare. As language is the instrument by which each for himself clarifies his vision of himself and his world, so it is that by which we can and do assist others to do the same, and so to bring before both parties a common seeming world with no difference save that of perspective. If we succeed in this, we shall have

established a system of common reference which will enable us to proceed with confidence further on the road to mutual understanding and fruitful co-operation.

I do not wish to conceal but openly to avow the disconcerting corollary of this doctrine, viz. that it encourages no hope that these mental contents which we rightly account of the highest value in and to man can by language be directly conveyed out of one mind into another, can by any linguistic device be directly transmitted or communicated. Clearly there is at any rate a much greater difficulty in the communication of such contents. We are familiar with the phrase 'thought-transference', but there is little evidence of the transmission of what can fairly be called 'thoughts': all that crosses the inter-space between mind and mind seems never to rise above the level of a simple diagram or rudimentary picture. What is propagated throughout a crowd or tribe as by a sort of contagion is scarcely more than a dim and formless sentiment; at most, and that rarely, a blurred and hallucinatory mass of imagery. The half-magical *rapport* which exists among the members of a crowd seldom generates a real community of thought or articulate design. Nor does language go far to produce anything higher. The moral is not, however, that participation in such higher thoughts and plans or designs is beyond our hope and reach; it is rather that we must abate our expectations of producing it directly by the use of language on any great scale or over any wide extent. In aiming at it we must acknowledge that here we have to take account of a much greater and more embarrassing variety of experiences than in the establishment of its indispensable foundations. It is surely almost a truism that the higher or more valuable the mental contents we have in mind, the more initially does one group of men differ from another in regard to them, the longer and more difficult is our

journey to mutual understanding, common enjoyment, effective unity. At times—and the more as our knowledge increases—it seems as if the distances at which we stand from the goal of one science, one history, one religion for all mankind were so enormous as to forbid any hope of all ever reaching them together. They appear to be chasms between us, differences of kind or immeasurable degree across which no bridges can be thrown, and as the mass-advance takes place we become not less but more severed from one another. Yet, for all this, we do not and must not—as we need not—abandon all hope, but still attempt to signal to one another the results of our several voyages in search of what is true and good, recording and uttering the results of our explorations and directions to our fellow-travellers and successors. Scattered as we move we still endeavour to maintain and avail ourselves of such means of communication as we possess or can contrive. And of all our devices the best is still language.

Yes, that is so. But does not language here fail us—at our, that is, mankind's utmost need? Does it not markedly and specially fail us as a means of communication between the forward and the backward, the courageous explorers in front and the stragglers behind? Are not the linguistic lines of communication cut between the vanguard and the rear? No; they still subsist, and if they are only kept in repair the liaison remains unbroken.

What we have learned is that mere nature will no longer serve our turn. The direct methods of communication have now been exhausted, and to secure the transmission of the more important messages we must turn the natural provision by new ways to new ends. The old lines will indeed transmit nothing but what it is their nature to transmit: that we cannot alter, but we can avail ourselves even of their limitations, provided we know and acknowledge them. We can achieve indirectly what

we cannot achieve directly, and it is that indirect employment of the natural resources of language to which I now wish to call attention. We are as it were in the position of persons who have to send messages in a code where the direct significance is one thing and the indirect another, where secret intelligence is conveyed as it were under cover.

The task seems at first as hopeless as ever : the natural or set conditions seem to forbid its accomplishment. But they only seem so. The way out of the difficulty is really quite simple. Take any two would-be communicators—widely enough separated—and the problem appears insoluble. But we need only interpolate a third and in principle it is solved. We have forgotten the existence and office of the interpreter, or rather of a chain of interpreters. What is required is the construction of lines out of human beings—of living links between mind and mind. The existence of such links is what differentiates the intercommunication of mankind from that of all other beings, and it is this that gives us a well-grounded confidence that there is no limit to the possibility of mutual understanding and co-operation between the members of our race. Such links are not provided by Nature. Where they exist they do so as the results of human will, and I feel I am justified in speaking of what exists as a device due to the ingenuity and the energy of man. The escape from the natural 'confusion of tongues' is not through a desperate endeavour to ignore or destroy the variety of human speech, but by the multiplication of interpreters, covering the whole earth with a network of them. This is one of the triumphs of human wit in overcoming the difficulties of nature—so does man counterwork the dividing and disintegrating forces within and without, subduing them to his purposes and achieving by his control over them a richer and more potent unity.

The ideal promised to our hopes and desires is that of

a unity achieved, not through simplification and obliteration of differences, but through articulation and organization. We may be quite sure that as time goes on—as man progresses—the diversity of his speech will not diminish but increase, for only so can man express better and better what is within and without him. And at first sight this may seem to mean that as mankind moves onward and upward it will be ever more and more parcelled out into groups communicating only with greater and greater difficulty, some rising and others falling so far as to snap all links of communication. Had Nature her way so indeed it would be, but Mind and Will cannot suffer it so to rule the whole movement. Out of their inexhaustible resources they provide the remedy and weave new cords to bind the whole ever more and more together, until there rises the prospect of a time when the whole earth shall be what may be called one Community of Interpretation, the same spiritual life circulating throughout all its members, not vaguely diffused but with an articulate structure and an organic function.

To many this may seem a remote and chimerical ideal, but perhaps even from its distance it may cast some light and supply some guidance. It dictates to us the form of our own—individual, sectional, national—duty, viz. to make ourselves fit interpreters and mediators between those whom we find divided by diversity of speech and so exposed to the constant risks of disabling or dangerous misunderstandings. Each would-be interpreter or set of interpreters should conceive of himself and act as standing between a higher and lower pair of comrades or groups of comrades, or, if he be either more gifted or more ambitious, as standing at the centre of others separated from one another but linked through him. With this environment he must live in a perpetual give-and-take of speech, minting and circulating new modes of it and

welcoming the coinages of others around him. This is in fact the way in which languages are formed and grow and live, and of the operation of this law the history of our own language is perhaps the best and most convincing instance. It is well, indeed, to endeavour to maintain what is called the purity of a language—that is, its idiosyncrasy or individual character—but it is futile and foolish to regard all borrowings as sources of contamination. If the character—the idiom—of a language is worth preserving it can assimilate to itself such foreign contributions. Advancing in this way it improves *pari passu* as a means of self-expression and a medium of communication: it achieves at once both its inherent aims.

The prospect or project which these considerations set before us is not that of a single language without local or racial diversity of pronunciation, vocabulary, grammar or syntax—such as some philosophers and many unreflecting reformers vainly dream of—but rather on the contrary that of a multitudinous league of languages respectful in word and act of what may not unfairly be called each other's personalities. *Lingua omnium lingua nullius*. The right to a language of one's own is as indefeasible as that to any other property of one's own and the title to it as elsewhere is the title of a creator. No man can make another's language for him, and he does wrong if he ever attempts it. Genuine language is a joint or social product—is created, vivified, maintained by a common spirit, a common mind or will, and once in being strengthens these authors of its being, and so progresses to further and further intrinsic perfection.

In works on the Science of Language there is to be noted a shrinking, as it were, from the ranking of languages as higher and lower, in degree of perfection as languages. These works generally confine themselves to a mere classification of their manifold varieties in orders, families,

genera, and species. I do not undervalue that : it is an indispensable preliminary to a scientific survey of the field. But we cannot stop there, and at any rate those who speak of progress cannot evade the somewhat invidious business of grading or ranking the different languages, dialects, &c., which they have discriminated. It is an undoubted fact that languages rise and fall, develop and advance or retreat and decay, and also that the various languages which are contemporary with one another are at different stages on the same scale of evolution. It is idle from mere politeness to ignore these differences of degree. In a word, some languages are better or higher languages than others, and the same language is at one time a better or a worse language than it was at another. It is better that the grading should be done by men of science than left to the ignoramus or the sciolist, who are particularly fond of making pronouncements in the matter under the influence of prejudice and pseudo-patriotism. In fact we all have our opinions about the matter, and we had better have sound rather than groundless opinions. By what criteria or marks should our judgements be guided ? It is perhaps easier to say by what they should not than by what they should. On almost every occasion that I have put the question I have in the first instance been offered, as the test or sign of superiority, richness and variety of vocabulary, as if the mere size of the dictionary could determine the matter. Doubtless a very limited vocabulary is evidence of low rank in the hierarchy of language, but the converse is by no means the case, and mere increase in number of words does not necessarily spell advance. This is even more the case when weight is attached to a luxuriant wealth of grammatical forms or of syntactical arrangements. It is rather the lower than the higher languages that abound in number of words and inflections, and one language advances beyond itself and

others by an economic simplification as much as or more than by a multiplication of its resources. This may seem surprising, for fewer distinctions are capable of expression, and simplification appears almost synonymous with impoverishment. We are gradually realizing that one of the defects of primitive or low languages is that they endeavour to express too much—too much of what is trivial, superficial, irrelevant. They are too cumbrous, too wasteful of energy. To put it otherwise, they generate and convey too much sensuous and imaginative detail, are too picturesque, too concrete, too particular. They cannot emancipate themselves from the often fortuitous and insignificant relations of space and time and generally of accidents and circumstances; they follow and reproduce chance associations, groupings, and trains. Mental progress just consists in the deliverance of the mind from the tyranny of such orderings and arrangements as language imposes upon it. Intelligence, and with it Will, are developed in the measure that these are broken up, and a rational order takes the place of inherited or externally suggested associations.

The higher languages are characterized by an increase of words and combinations of words which are themselves mere signs or symbols, not natural likenesses of anything and without any relation of likeness between themselves and their meanings. Both they and their meanings are abstract and general, and for that reason elude observation and by careless observers are pronounced to be absent. The fact is that they are, so to speak, indirectly present and manifest their presence only by and in their effects, and that not to observation, but to reflection. To use a phrase which I have employed before, they are spiritual presences and are only spiritually discerned. To sight or hearing, in what is seen or heard, imagined or remembered, they are not explicitly present. With a certain exaggera-

tion we may say that they are not expressed, are marked absences from the phenomena or appearances of speech. Nevertheless they are intended and they are imparted, conveyed, communicated. It is almost a commonplace that modes of connexion, e. g. causal relations between elements of experience, cannot be expressed or conveyed from mind to mind, and the same is true of what is so related. What we connect and how we connect it we can say neither to ourselves nor to another, we can only think it, each for himself and each in his own way. Yet there is nothing in which we are more closely at one with ourselves and with one another, and it is in our highest and best thinking and willing that we realize and enjoy and make use of the spiritual unity of mankind.

Once more we reach our old conclusion that if we are to make any way towards this consummation we must acknowledge the set conditions of its attainment, viz. that all our communication with one another must pass through the medium of our sensuous and imaginative experience. The commerce in spiritual goods is not directly from intelligence and will to intelligence and will ; it passes as it were from basement to basement, not from upper story to upper story. Less figuratively, our highest thoughts and plans must first be translated into sensuous and imaginative forms ; these must be adapted to the imaginations of others and again by them translated in order to be apprehended and availed of for their own ends. And once more I repeat that this complicated transaction requires the existence and operation of interpreters who realize and cope with its difficulties. Into such an interpreter each of us who would play a man's part in the business must convert himself, and so alone can he help himself and others to the common end of mutual understanding and fruitful co-operation, extending the boundaries of the kingdom of Goodness and Truth.

III

GREEKS AND BARBARIANS

EDWYN BEVAN

EVERY people, or set of peoples, which has a distinctive character and form of culture, tends to regard its own ways of thought and conduct as the normal and sensible ones and to lump all the rest of humanity together under some depreciatory term. So for the ancient Hindu men of other races were Mlecchas ; whilst the peoples of European culture to-day contrast themselves as ' white men ' with all the rest of mankind described as brown, black, or yellow. As soon as the Hellenic tribes round the coast-lands of the Eastern Mediterranean became conscious, some centuries before the Christian era, of having a common distinctive culture, they classed all the rest of mankind together as *barbaroi*. The term carried with it the suggestion that other peoples were not only different from the Hellenes, but that they were somehow inferior. And we can see, looking back, that with Hellenic civilization a new thing of value had come into the world ; the Greeks really did possess something which other peoples had not. In reference to that peculiar thing there was a lack in the rest of mankind, which Hellenism was come to supply, just as in reference to the peculiar heritage of the Hebrew people there was a lack of another kind in the rest of the world which might be implied by calling them Gentiles.

One must notice that whereas the term ' Hellene ' connoted something positive—all that went to constitute the distinctive Greek culture—the term ' barbarian '

connoted nothing positive ; it was applied to the whole mass of heterogeneous peoples who had only this in common, that they were not Hellenes. Plato for this very reason in one passage regards the division of the human race into Greeks and barbarians as an instance of popular confusion of thought. On the one side you have the Hellenes, a unity, and on the other side all other peoples, an indefinite multitude whose different groups are often wholly strange or hostile to each other. And then people imagine that 'barbarians' are all people of one sort!¹ This might seem too obvious a mistake to be worth pointing out, were it not that popular writers continually make a similar mistake to-day, when they base some pretentious theory or other on the opposition of the 'Western' and the 'Oriental'. The term 'Western' has a positive meaning because there is a distinctive Western culture, but Oriental peoples have in common only the negative quality of not being Western. There is no such person as 'the Oriental', just as there was no such person as 'the barbarian'.

We to-day are able to see Hellenic culture in the context of a long stretch of human history, and especially in its connexion with our modern Western civilization, and so can discern, better than the ancient Greeks themselves could do, what Hellenism stood for in the world. But it is interesting to see how the ancient Greeks described the characteristics which they felt marked them off from 'barbarians'. One characteristic which would probably be prominent in any account given to-day of Hellenic

¹ Ολον εἴ τις τάνθρώπων ἐπιχειρήσας δίχα διελέσθαι γένος διαιροῖ καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε διανέμονσι· τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν ὡς ἐν ἀπὸ πάντων ἀφαιρούντες χωρὶς, σύμπασι δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσιν, ἀπείρους οὔσι καὶ ἀμίκτοις καὶ ἀσυμφώνοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, βάρβαρον μὲν κλήσει προσειπόντες αὐτό, διὰ ταύτην τὴν μίαν κλήσιν καὶ γένος ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι προσδοκῶσιν. *Politicus* 262 c-d.

culture is, so far as I know, not put forward in the Greek writers—the aesthetic. An art of a peculiar beauty and power is at once called up in our imagination by the word ‘Hellenic’—an art which contrasts with the older and contemporary art of Egypt, Babylonia, and Persia by a splendid freedom. But the old Greek books do not speak of Hellenic art when they contrast Hellene and barbarian. The differences they insist upon are moral and intellectual.

The moral difference they habitually expressed by saying that barbarians had the nature of slaves and the Hellenes the nature of free men. ‘They are not the slaves nor the subjects of any man,’¹ says the messenger to the Persian queen in the play of Aeschylus, to mark that which distinguished the Greek armies from those of the Great King. ‘In the case of the barbarians all, except one man, are slaves,’ says an often-quoted line in Euripides.² The poets, Aristotle observes, speak as if a ‘slave’ and a ‘barbarian’ were really the same thing, and he accepts such utterances as stating a serious scientific fact. ‘Persons with the natural faculty of command are wanting amongst the barbarians.’³

Of course, when Greek writers speak in this way of ‘barbarians’ they are not thinking of all non-Hellenic races, but of the subject people in the Asiatic monarchies—the people who carried on the tradition of old unprogressive civilizations, tilling the ground after the way of their fathers in hot enervating plains or furnishing to the Persian King’s armies great passive conglomerates of humanity which he could roll at will upon the Greek cities of the coast-lands. It was the less warlike races of the Persian Empire whom the Greeks often meant when they used the

¹ οὕτινος δοῦλοι κέκληνται φωτὸς οὐδ’ ὑπήκοοι. *Persae*, 242.

² τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἐνός. *Helena*, 276.

³ τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν. *Politics* i. 1252 b.

general term 'barbarian', just as to-day any one who talks about 'Orientals' will be found, if pressed, to have some particular Oriental people in mind—the Turks or the Indians or the Chinese.

Aristotle was quite aware that when the barbarians were described as servile, this was not true of the more primitive fighting races. In contrast with the inhabitants of the hot regions of Asia, he declares that the inhabitants of the cold parts of the earth—the Balkan mountaineers, for instance, to the north of Greece—were by no means wanting in manly spirit, were free enough as far as that went. But what gave the Greeks their pre-eminence, he held, was that they combined the moral quality of free men with intellectual ability. Without this, the brave barbarian highlanders might preserve their own liberty, but they could never become an imperial people. They had not the wit to devise a system of rule over others. They had the free spirit without the brains, just as the Asiatics had the brains without the free spirit. The Greeks had both. Hence if the Greeks could ever unite their forces in a single political organization they might rule the world.¹

So far it might seem as if in the *intellectual* sphere the Greeks felt the Asiatics to have the same faculties as their own. But from other Greek writers we gather that in the intellectual sphere itself the Greeks believed themselves to have marked characteristics, which differentiated them, not only from rude primitive races, but from civilized Asiatics. And here, too, it is interesting to see how the Greeks themselves described the difference which they felt. In a passage of Plato which agrees with Aristotle in recognizing the fighting spirit as the thing most characteristic of the Balkan mountaineers and the Scythians, and which gives the interest in making money as the thing characteristic of Phoenicians and Egyptians, the special

¹ *Politics* iv. 1327 b.

characteristic of the Greeks is said to be intellectual curiosity (*τὸ φιλομαθές*).¹ 'The qualities in virtue of which mankind is superior to the other animals,' wrote Plato's contemporary Isocrates, 'are the same qualities in virtue of which the Hellenes, as a race, are superior to the barbarians, that is, they have minds better trained for intelligence and for the expression of thought in words.'²

Perhaps to-day we can better describe the peculiar thing which Greek culture introduced into the world as a new rationalism. Both in thought and in conduct the world hitherto had been governed by tradition and custom; it still was governed by tradition and custom outside the Hellenic sphere. It was enough justification for believing anything, that former generations had believed it, and for doing anything, to say 'Our fathers did so before us'. The Greeks, of course, did not break away altogether from tradition and custom, but they began to break down the dominion of custom and tradition by referring this or that belief, this or that practice, to a rational standard, by asking whether the belief agreed logically with what was otherwise known to be true, whether the practice was good according to some reasonable scale of values. This was the habit of mind which Plato pointed at as intellectual curiosity. It was this which gives its immense importance to the coming of Hellenism into the world, because in this were the germs of that rationalist civilization which has expanded to such power in modern Europe.

And this intellectual energy went, as the Greek writers say, with a certain moral quality. There was no doubt an element of national vanity in the Greek phrase, that all barbarians were slaves; Asia was not without brave men;

¹ *Republic* iv. 435.

² *τῇ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄμεινον πεπαιδευῆσθαι τῶν ἄλλων. Or. xv. 294.*

but it must be true that the citizen of a Greek republic had generally a feeling of personal dignity, which made him fight better, as a free man, than the unwilling recruits drafted by masses into the armies of the Persian king. Even the Greek's intellectual activity was probably to some extent the outcome of his greater vitality and zest in life. The Asiatic acquiescence in custom and tradition had partly, we may believe, a physical basis; the old civilizations developed in hot plains produced a type of man little disposed to individual effort, for whom life was a burden, and fatalistic acquiescence in things as they were, the natural proclivity. In India, indeed, some men had displayed, in spite of the continuous depressing weight of the climate, mental activities no less remarkable in their way than the activities of the Greeks in theirs; but they were the activities which went with a withdrawal from active life into brooding meditation upon the uniform One behind the vain appearances of variety in the world, whereas it was just upon the manifold phenomena that the Greek mind in its characteristic mood played with eager interest and curiosity.

By the fifth century B. C., if not before, the Greeks had come generally to take it for granted that their culture was superior to anything found outside the sphere of Hellenism. This belief in the inferiority of barbarians was, however, qualified or questioned in certain quarters. Thucydides, who had himself an admixture of Thracian blood, pointed out that the differentiation of Hellenes from barbarians was of rather recent date, and that there had been little to distinguish Hellenes a few generations before from the barbarians of his own day.¹ Xenophon, soldier and sportsman, found in the Persian nobility, devoted as it was to horsemanship and hunting,

¹ πολλὰ δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδείξει τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοίωτροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διατρώμεναν. i. 6, 6.

a great deal that appealed to him. He had a warm admiration for the younger Cyrus, with whom he had come into personal relations, and he framed his moral and political ideals in a romance which professed to exhibit the life of Persian princely families in the days of Cyrus the Great.

Another qualification to the general contempt of barbarian culture amongst the Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. is to be seen in a certain awe which was felt at the antiquity of the Eastern and Egyptian civilizations. There is the often-quoted story told by Plato, and probably invented by him, which represents Solon visiting the Egyptian town of Saïs and, while there, seeking to gain from an aged priest such knowledge of the remote past as was embodied in the priestly tradition of the land. 'O Solon, Solon,' the priest is made to say, 'you Greeks are always children; there is no such thing as a Greek old man. Children you are, all of you, in your souls. They enshrine no ancient belief, come down orally from long ago, no teaching hoary with time.'¹ The Greeks were ready to believe that their own religious myths and practices had been transmitted to their ancestor from Egypt or the East. Herodotus thought that the names of most of the Greek gods had come from Egypt. The worship of Poseidon had come from the Libyans.² There was a very old secret ritual in honour of Demeter kept up by women in Arcadia in the fifth century B. C.; Herodotus believed that it had been brought from Egypt hundreds of years before.³ It was currently held, too, that the lore of various mystic sects which had spread recently through

¹ Ὁ Σόλων, Σόλων, "Ἕλληνες δὲ παῖδες ἐστέ, γέρων δὲ Ἕλληνα οὐκ ἔστιν . . . νέοι ἐστέ τὰς ψυχὰς πάντες" οὐδεμίαν γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς ἔχετε δι' ἀρχαίαν ἀκοὴν παλαιὰν δόξαν οὐδὲ μάθημα χρόνῳ πολλῷ οὐδέν. *Timaeus*, 22.

² Herodotus ii. 49, 50.

³ Herodotus ii. 171.

the Greek world and taught the transmigration of the soul had been derived from Egypt.¹ The belief that Pythagoras had visited Egypt and learnt his philosophy as a disciple of the native sages is found as early as Isocrates.²

It may seem strange that if the Greeks were so convinced of the superiority of their own culture they should have felt this awe with regard to barbarian tradition. But perhaps there is no psychological incompatibility between despising people in the common relations of life and feeling that they have some uncanny power or knowledge. The men in primitive communities seem often to have felt that in woman there was some uncanny power or knowledge of this kind, even though woman was in a state of social subjection to the stronger male. We have seen in our own day a contempt of the Asiatic races on the part of white men side by side with a credulous readiness to accept the claims of Oriental charlatans to occult powers and the possession of ancient secrets. I think we may see the same sort of mixed feelings in the Greeks.

Considering their culture as the highest type, what did the Greeks consider that their relation in practice should be to the barbarian world? That is tersely stated in the poets. The Greeks had a natural prerogative to rule over barbarians.³

The belief that this was the ideal and normal thing

¹ Herodotus ii. 81; ii. 123.

² *Or.* xi. 28. Later legends in Hellenistic times made the travels of Pythagoras much more extensive. Even in modern times the view that the teaching of Pythagoras shows Indian influence has found supporters. The question has been examined by Prof. A. Berriedale Keith, who speaks with an authority which few can claim in this field. He shows that there is no evidence at all for the supposed Indian influence. Contact between Indian and Greek thought in the sixth century B. C. is highly improbable.

³ Βαρβάρων δ' Ἑλλήνας ἀρχεῖν εἰκός, ἀλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους, μήτερ, Ἑλλήνων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι. Euripides, *Iphigenia in Aulis*, 1400.

became common in the Greek world before it was a fact in the real world. In the middle of the fourth century B. C. there were more Greeks politically subject to the Persian Empire than there were barbarians ruled by Greeks. But the idea was already current that this was a monstrous reversal of what ought to be, and definite plans were put forward for establishing a Hellenic dominion in the East. The great exponent of this Panhellenic imperialism was the orator and publicist Isocrates, who, if not a great original thinker, like his contemporaries Plato and Aristotle, gives in a notable way the general Greek outlook of his time. Isocrates, in his Letter to the Macedonian king Philip, calls upon him to lead the Greeks to the conquest of Asia. We have already quoted a passage of Aristotle, in which he says that if only the Greek race were united it could dominate all others.

The Greeks were to establish their power by military conquest. Yet even at that date, when the rule of the European in Asia was still only a project, not a reality, it is curious to note that Europeans hit upon the plea that the conquered peoples would be better off under European rule than they had been before. Isocrates says in a pregnant phrase that they will exchange the barbaric system of despotism—the system in which the ruler thinks only of his ease and pleasure—for that of Hellenic *epimeleia*, care, guardianship—the system in which the ruler uses rational thought to promote the welfare of the ruled, as the shepherd of a well-cared-for flock.¹

The idea of spreading Greek culture by peaceful propaganda does not come up. That Greek rule, however, was expected to entail the propagation of Greek culture may perhaps be gathered from the case of Euágoras, who established a dominion over a largely barbarian popula-

¹ ἦν διὰ σὲ βαρβαρικῆς δεσποτείας ἀπαλλαγέντες Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπιμελείας τύχασιν. *Letter to Philip*, § 154.

tion in Cyprus. Isocrates praises him because he changed his people from barbarians into Greeks.¹ We may notice, too, that the native princes of the countries bordering on the Greek world in Phoenicia, Asia Minor, and South Russia, in many cases gave their courts a more or less Hellenistic character. Individuals amongst the barbarians were attracted to Hellenism. Even amongst the great Persian barons who had castles in Asia Minor we hear of an Ariobarzanes and a Mithradates who were granted the citizenship of Athens, and this or another Mithradates presented the Academy with a bust of Plato. Clearchus, a disciple of Aristotle's, in one of his philosophical dialogues put into the mouth of his master an account of his meeting a Jew from Palestine who had become Hellenized 'not in his speech only but in his soul'.² This particular Jew may, of course, be only a fiction in an imaginary conversation; yet we may gather that individual Orientals who had become genuinely Hellenized were a species of men known to the writer.

With the conquests of Alexander the Great more than the dream of Isocrates became actual fact. A Hellene was now lord over a vast tract of Asia. What attitude would the Hellene in these new circumstances take up to the barbarian? It is interesting that Aristotle had advised Alexander to adopt a markedly different attitude towards Greeks and towards Asiatics. To the Greeks he was to show himself a leader (*ἡγεμῶν*), but to the Asiatics a despotic master (*δεσπότης*). That, according to Aristotle, we may gather, was the only suitable way of treating people who were adapted by their nature to be slaves. It is interesting, too, to observe that Alexander adopted a policy definitely contrary to this advice. Whatever his ideas may have been when he first invaded Asia, by the time that he was secure in the seat of the

¹ *Or.* ix, § 66.

² Josephus, *Contra Apion*, i. 177-82.

Great King, he formed the design of a fusion between East and West. His idea was apparently to initiate a systematic mixing of races—a mode of unifying the inhabitants of his Empire in one Eurasian amalgam. When he died prematurely he had hardly begun to carry out his plan. He had only brought about a number of marriages between his Macedonian marshals and Persian princesses. The issue of one of these marriages (Antiochus I) succeeded later on to the greater part of Alexander's empire.

It does not, of course, follow from Alexander's desire to merge the Greeks in a racial amalgam that he wished their culture to be similarly merged in a nondescript syncretism. It is conceivable that while he wanted the races mixed, he wished Hellenism as a culture to be predominant. The indications rather point to this being in his mind. The cities of Greek type which he founded all over the empire were to be nurseries of Hellenic life. In a tract attributed to Plutarch, and written at any rate many centuries after Alexander, he is lauded as the belligerent missionary of a higher culture in the backward East.

'He trained the Hyrcanians in the laws of marriage and taught agriculture to the Arachosians (Afghans). He induced the people of Sogdiana (Bokhara) to maintain their fathers and not kill them, and the Persians to reverence their mothers, and not marry them. An admirable type of philosophy! Thanks to this, the Indians worship Hellenic gods, the Scythians bury their dead and do not eat them. Whilst Alexander was civilizing Asia, Homer was his reading; the sons of Persis and Susiana and Gedrosia chanted the tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles.'

There is a great deal more in the same strain. The rhetorical exaggeration is obvious. We cannot regard it as evidence of what Alexander did or meant to do, but it

does show us that in the Greek world after Alexander there was the conception of Hellenism as a culture in which all the world could share. After Alexander was gone, the barbarian countries he had conquered remained largely under the rule of dynasties Macedonian or Hellenic in blood, or at any rate more or less assimilated to the Hellenistic type. The native peoples had in their midst cities largely Greek in speech, Greek in their customs and mode of building. Large numbers of people of Asiatic race learnt to speak in Greek, and write in Greek, and think in Greek. When a new barbarian Power arose in the West to dominate the Greek world with a political supremacy far stronger than that of the Persian Empire, there was not the same antagonism between Greeks and Romans as there had been between Greeks and Persians. For the Roman character, like the Greek, had been developed in the free city-state, and later on in the sphere of thought and literature and art the Romans bowed to the Hellenic supremacy.¹

Thus in the Mediterranean and Near Eastern world, after the Macedonian and Roman conquests, Hellenistic civilization bore rule. The old barbarian traditions—Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Syrian, Asian—survived only as the traditions of subject races, in the country districts, not in the cities, or, if in the cities, only amongst the lower strata of the population. For the literary and educated class everywhere Greek was the medium of thought and writing—or, in the West, Latin. The old native literatures lost all prestige and gradually perished.

The Greek confidence in the supreme worth of their own culture was greater than ever after the dream of

¹ The Romans at first recognized that they were barbarians from the Greek point of view. Plautus in the Prologue to his '*Asinaria*', translated from a Greek play, says '*Demophilus scripsit, Maccus vortit barbāre*'.

Isocrates had come true. We never, so far as I know, hear of Greeks thinking it worth while to learn barbarian languages or study the antiquities of Egypt and Babylonia in the original documents. What knowledge of them they gathered was from natives who had learnt Greek and embodied the stories preserved in hieroglyphs or in cuneiform, the priestly traditions of their race, in Greek books—the Egyptian Manetho, the Babylonian Berossus. This absence in Hellenistic times of the scientific interest which leads Western scholars in modern times to study Oriental languages and records was certainly in part due to the feeling of the Greeks that Greek culture was the only culture which counted. It was also, no doubt, due to the scientific sense of the value of precise facts not having been yet developed as in modern times. Hellenistic civilization was vitiated by rhetoric. The Greeks liked statements which sounded logical and effective, and if they got that they did not bother much to examine the facts. Hence if Manetho and Berossus gave them readable and interesting accounts of what was contained in old Egyptian and Babylonian records, they were quite satisfied and had no desire to verify what they were told by first-hand research.

We must beware of confounding this cultural pride of the Greeks with racial intolerance. The Greeks thought poorly of barbarian culture, but, provided a barbarian took on the Hellenistic character, they do not seem to have subjected him to any social exclusion on account of his blood. There is an interesting protest recorded on the part of the great Alexandrine geographer Eratosthenes (born 276 B. C.) against the racial intolerance involved in Aristotle's advice to Alexander as to his attitude to Greeks and barbarians respectively. The division between men, he said, should not go by race but by moral character ; there were many undesirable sorts of Greeks and many

civilized (*ἀστέλοι*) kinds of barbarians, such as the Indians and Persians. Just so in the Plutarchian tract referred to above it is said that the distinction of Hellene and barbarian was not to be taken as depending on race or on fashion of dress, but upon virtue and vice. There is, even so, a noteworthy assumption implicit in this identification of virtue with Hellenism.

The educated class all over Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt during the centuries succeeding Alexander became 'Greeks'. There can have been no very clear line of demarcation between the Greeks of barbarian origin and the Greeks of Hellenic blood. In the New Testament we find the antithesis of Jew and Greek, where Greek has come to denote indistinguishably the Gentile world of the Levant. Even the Syro-Phoenician woman of the Gospels, although belonging probably to the humbler stratum of the population of Tyre, is called by St. Mark a 'Greek'. If we look through Susemihl's history of Greek literature in the last two centuries B. C. we may note how many of the writers are of barbarian origin—especially Phoenicians. One Carthaginian, called Hasdrubal, actually became in 125 B. C. President of the School of Plato at Athens. In his Hellenistic character he bore the name of Clitomachus. Besides writing voluminously in Greek, he wrote Hellenistic philosophy in his mother-tongue, Punic—a language closely akin to Hebrew. Zeno of Citium, who founded the Stoic school in Athens soon after the death of Alexander, was a Phoenician from Cyprus. Diogenes, who was President of the Stoic School in the earlier part of the 2nd century B. C., came from Babylonia and was, according to the Plutarchian tract, a native. Lucian of Samosata, the cleverest man of letters in later classical antiquity—his life falls in the second century A. D.—was of Syrian race and had apparently spoken Aramaic as a child.

In this combination of cultural exclusiveness and racial tolerance the Greeks seem to have resembled the French of to-day. The French, we are told, regard French culture as the valid culture for everybody, and where they have Oriental subjects like to turn them as much as possible into Frenchmen. But the colour-feeling, we are told, is not found in any noticeable degree amongst the French, and when an Oriental takes on French culture he is accepted as a Frenchman, on an equal social footing. If this account of the French attitude is true, it makes them like the Greeks of the Hellenistic age, and it seems almost the opposite of the British attitude. The British have larger cultural tolerance, in the sense that they do not try to make the Oriental peoples under British government give up their national modes of life and become Englishmen; on the other hand they have less racial tolerance, since they hardly ever accept a man of Oriental race as one of themselves, however much he may assimilate himself to the English pattern. There seems, indeed, recently to have been some change in the British attitude in this respect, but we may still say that the colour bar exists much more amongst the British than amongst the French. And if the French resemble the ancient Greeks, the British seem to resemble the Romans. In Juvenal, who represents the feeling of the old Roman aristocracy at the end of the first century A. D., you find pronounced racial intolerance. He is full of complaints of the influx of Greeks and Hellenized Orientals into Rome. 'The Orontes', says his well-known line, 'has flowed into the Tiber.'

The Greek contempt of barbarian culture had been qualified, as we have seen, in the days before Alexander by a certain awe at the antiquity of the Egyptian and Oriental civilizations and a readiness to accept the idea of religious practices and philosophic doctrines being

derived from barbarians. This tendency was still stronger in the centuries after Alexander. It was a commonly current view that Greek philosophy was of barbarian origin, the carrying on of a tradition communicated at the outset by Persians or Babylonians or Indians or Celtic Druids. Diogenes Laertius begins his work on the lives of the Greek philosophers (early third century A. D.) by combating this view. He maintains that philosophy was a purely Greek product. But the energy of his polemic shows that the other view was widely held. Of Indian culture especially the Greeks seem to have had a high opinion. Megasthenes (third century B. C.) represented the morality of the Indians as remarkable in the matter of truthfulness and honesty. As long before as the end of the sixth century B. C. Hecataeus of Miletus has described the Indians as the most righteous of mankind. The prevalence of this view may be partly due to the fact that India was very far away. It was one of the ideas come down from old Aryan mythology that a people dwelt at the extremities of the earth who were singularly righteous and blessed. Indian mythology called them 'Uttara (Northern) Kurus', and Greek mythology 'Hyperboreans'. Homer's 'blameless Ethiopians', with whom the gods feast, are an analogous conception. And these ideas may not impossibly have coloured the Greek view of the Indians.

With regard to the receiving of Oriental religions, it is well known that their spread through the Greco-Roman world was one of the characteristic features of the centuries after Alexander. The worship of the Egyptian Isis and Anubis, of the Asian deities, Attis and the Great Mother, and later on of Mithras, an old Aryan god, whose cult had become mixed up with various strange elements in its passage through Asia Minor, penetrated far through the Greek and Latin countries during the centuries just before

and just after the Christian era. This was the reaction of the East to the Greek conquest; if Greek culture had everywhere victorious ascendancy, the barbarians found in a way their *revanche* by inoculating Hellenism with their religions.

One Oriental religion which leavened the Greco-Roman world stands in a category by itself—the Hebrew. This religion was distinguished from the others by one characteristic which even those are bound to recognize who do not accept the Christian and Jewish view of its divine quality. It was the religion of a book. The cults of Isis and Attis and Mithras no doubt circulated among the initiated literature of a kind—books of ritual and magical formulas. But the Hebrew religion came to the Greek world with a book which was a corpus of literature of the highest human value. It seems that alone among the races of the Mediterranean and the Near East the small people of the Hebrews had produced a literature which in permanent value and power was not inferior to the Hellenic. It is true that in making such a statement we should remember that the ancient Phœnician and Aramaean literatures have completely perished, but it seems unlikely that they were of a higher order than the Babylonian and Egyptian literatures of which we have recovered enough in modern times to be able to estimate their quality. As literature, what has been recovered from Babylon and Egypt stands a long way below the Old Testament. And if it seems strange that one small people should have produced a literature so much greater than the literatures of its neighbours, even though its neighbours were nations of great worldly power and splendour, one may consider that Greece, too, was a small country. Thus in the Hellenistic age, when the Old Testament was translated into Greek—some time in the second century B. C.—Hellenism came into contact with

the one other body of literature which could challenge its prerogative. (The great Aryan literature of India was quite unknown to the Greek world.)

The Septuagint translation of the Old Testament was unfortunately not of a kind to enable an ordinary educated Greek to appreciate the literary quality of the Hebrew scriptures. Keeping close to the Hebrew idiom, the Septuagint set all rules of Greek composition at defiance. A great deal of it would probably have appeared, to any Greek who took up a roll of it for the first time, barbarian gibberish. A study of the Greek papyri which have been found in recent years in Egypt has indeed shown that to some extent where the language of the Septuagint differed from classical Greek it conformed to the living spoken Greek of the time, and one scholar, Adolf Deissmann, has worked this discovery for far more than it is worth, going so far as to maintain that the Septuagint was a book which would make a strong appeal to the Greek public. But because some forms of speech were once wrongly supposed to be Hebraisms, one must not overlook the mass of real Hebraisms of which the Septuagint is full. There is, as far as I know, no evidence to show that any Greek or Latin writer known to us, before Christian times, had read the Septuagint or been influenced directly by the Septuagint.¹ It was, no doubt, largely read by the Greek-speaking Jews of the Dispersion.

Still the fact remains that with the Septuagint the one other literature which could challenge Hellenic literature makes its appearance in the Greco-Roman field. We know that in the times before Christianity there was very active

¹ Some people have supposed that the fourth Eclogue of Virgil shows the influence of the Septuagint. If there is any Hebrew influence (as there may well be) it would have reached Virgil, not directly from the Septuagint, but through the Sibylline oracles fabricated by Jews in the Greek Epic style for the purposes of propaganda. The Eclogue actually refers to the Sibyl.

Jewish propaganda. Large numbers of Greeks learnt something of Judaism and became attached more or less loosely to the synagogues. Even in Horace we see how individuals in Roman society might conform to Jewish practices. Already a breach had been made in the wall which fenced-off the exclusive pretensions of Hellenic literary culture.

The Hebraic counter-attack took a still more powerful form, when the Jewish propaganda was succeeded by the Christian. The Christians, too, were people of the book. They, too, put before their converts the corpus of old Hebrew literature contained in the Septuagint. But fresh writings were now added to it. In the Christian writings there was a fusion of Hebrew and Hellenistic elements. The Synoptic Gospels were quite as Hebraic as the Septuagint; the letters of Paul were in style Hellenistic, not Hebrew, written, however, not in Attic Greek, but in the living idiom of the day. These new Christian books, whether more Hebraic or more Hellenistic, were great literature; in their freshness and originality they were greater than anything produced in the Hellenic world since Plato.

' One may therefore say about Christianity what has just been said about Jewish proselytism, that in it the barbarian world gets a *revanche* upon Hellenism. And if one says that, one is only saying what was said by a Christian writer, Tatian, about A. D. 150. Tatian was himself an ' Assyrian ', a native of Mesopotamia. He begins his appeal ' To the Hellenes ' on behalf of Christianity :

' Do not take up so hostile an attitude towards the barbarians, Hellenes, nor regard their ideas so jealously. What practice or craft amongst you was not first contrived by barbarians? The Telmessians discovered the art of divination by dreams, the Carians prediction by means of the stars, the Phrygians and ancient Isaurians augury by birds, the Cypriots the rules of sacrifice, the Babylonians

astronomy, the Persians Magian lore, the Egyptians geometry, the Phoenicians letters.'

Tatian calls Moses 'the founder of all barbarian wisdom' (*πρώτης βαρβάρου σοφίας ἀρχηγόν*). He describes how when he himself was searching for the truth he came across 'certain barbarian writings, ancient as compared with Hellenic wisdom, divine as compared with Hellenic delusion. Conviction laid hold on me—the absence of any vain pretentiousness in the diction, the unaffected naturalness of the writers, the disposition of the whole so as to be clear and understandable, the foreknowledge shown of the future, the unconventionality of the commands, the note of undivided authority in the whole.'¹ He goes on to tell how he 'bade farewell to the haughtiness of Rome and the intellectual priggishness (*ψυχρολογία*) of Athens, and applied himself to the barbarian philosophy of our [Christian] community (*τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας*). . . . Do not be angry with our teaching; do not attack it with foolish and vulgar abuse, saying, "Tatian wants to be wiser than the Greeks, wiser than all the great host of philosophers, and so takes up with barbarian notions as a novel freak."'² At the conclusion of his oration Tatian glories in his defiance of Hellenic pretensions.

'This is what I had to say to you, Hellenes, I, Tatian, the adherent of a philosophy according to the barbarians (*ὁ κατὰ βαρβάρους φιλοσοφῶν Τατιανός*), born in the land of the Assyrians, educated first in your culture, and afterwards taught the things of which I now profess to be the preacher.'

One may repeat, the incursion made by Judaism and Christianity into the field of Hellenistic culture made a much greater difference than the infiltration of other Oriental religions, because the Jews and Christians brought

¹ § 29.

² § 35.

with them a great literature. Upon that literature, no less than upon Hellenic or Roman literature, the modern world has been built up.

In yet another way the spread of Christianity brought about a *revanche* of the barbarians. It broke the monopoly of Greek as a literary language. The spread of Hellenic culture had caused the older barbarian literatures—Babylonian, Egyptian, Syrian, Phoenician—to perish; the spread of Christianity revived the use of the vernaculars for purposes of a new Christian literature. This was partly, no doubt, because Christianity was concerned to supply the spiritual needs of the poorer and less educated strata of society who needed religious books in their own tongue. Hence in what had been the central seat of the Hellenistic Seleucid empire, in Syria, there grew up a Syriac Christian literature, in Egypt a Coptic Christian literature, in Armenia an Armenian Christian literature, in Abyssinia an Abyssinian Christian literature. Later on a national and racial element entered into the theological controversies of the Church. If Egypt or Syria broke away from the Orthodox Church, there was in this an element of national self-assertion against the predominance of the Greek metropolis.

We may see behind theological controversies the old antagonism of Hellene and barbarian go on in a form strangely altered from the form in which it started a thousand years before.

But we must beware of thinking that the two sides represent a clear distinction of Hellene and barbarian. In the Orthodox Church very large Hebraic, that is barbarian, elements were compounded with the Hellenistic tradition, and where, on the other hand, the barbarian languages were used for the production of native literatures, the thoughts and ideas expressed (in Syriac or Coptic) were largely Greek. Syriac literature did not even

contain Christian books only. A large number of the Greek works of the older classical age—especially the scientific works, books on logic, geometry, astronomy, geography, physics, philosophy—were translated into Syriac. And later on, when Syria became Mohammedan, it was mainly through this channel that the old scientific tradition of Hellenism became embodied in Islam. Here, indeed, we may see the *revanche* which Hellenism in its turn gets upon barbarian conquest. Hellenism now asserted itself in the East not, as with Alexander, in the outward military and political way, but in the sphere of ideas. The Arabic scientific literature produced in the golden age of Islam was quite professedly based on Greek books, a carrying on of the Hellenistic tradition. Conceptions derived from Greek philosophic thought have even gone to the making of Mohammedan, as they have to the making of Christian, theology.

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IV

THE ROMAN EMPIRE

H. STUART JONES

It has recently been said that the Roman Empire was 'essentially a Greek institution'.¹ The statement is meant primarily in a political sense; namely, that it was at bottom a federation of city-states, and thus embodied, or at any rate worked out to its logical conclusion, the Greek solution of the problem of government; and that this congeries of civic communities was overspread by a network of bureaucratic organization derived from the administrative experience gained by the Greek ministers of the Hellenistic monarchies, notably that of the Ptolemies. But the writer whom I have quoted goes further than this, and develops his theme in relation to the question which more directly concerns us. 'The Greek core of the Roman Empire', he says, 'played the part of Western Europe in the modern world. Latinized Spain and Africa were the South America, Latinized Gaul and Britain the Russia of the ancient Greek world. The pulse of the Empire was driven by a Greek heart.'² I think that these striking sentences somewhat overstate the case, and that we shall find that Rome was something more than a carrier of Greek ideas and an exploiter of Greek administrative aptitudes. Yet it may be well to remind ourselves that the application of reason to social and political, as well as to moral and metaphysical, problems, was the work of Greek thinkers in whose day the young Republic by the

¹ A. J. Toynbee, *The Tragedy of Greece* (Oxford, 1921), p. 18.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

Tiber was forging with blood and iron the power which was needful for their realization by practical rulers.

The finer spirits of Rome were well aware that their countrymen had been late in taking their seats at the banquet of civilization. 'Barbarians' they had been, and they did not scruple to apply the word, at any rate in jest, to their native culture. This is a standing joke with Plautus, who speaks of himself as turning Greek comedy 'into a barbarous tongue'; and in the strictly linguistic sense, the word is so used by Cicero himself.¹ This is not the place to trace the fluctuations of educated and half-educated taste in Rome; ² let it suffice to say that in the closing years of the Republic the more enlightened of the governing class, however carefully they might disguise the fact by an affectation of ignorance, were under no illusions as to the whereabouts of their spiritual home. Cicero the advocate of course speaks with two voices, attuning his language to the ears of the listener; but we cannot doubt which utterance rings the truer. To his brother Quintus, who was governor of Asia in 60 B.C., he wrote a letter which is really a pamphlet on the *Duties of a Proconsul*, and evidently served as a grateful acknowledgement of the *Hints to Candidates for the Consulship* which Quintus had addressed to him four years before. In this letter³ we find a remarkable passage which deserves to be translated in full:

'Had the lot (he writes) made you a ruler over Africans, Spaniards, and Gauls—savage and barbarous peoples—still it would have been your duty as a man of civilized feeling to study their good and to serve their interest and security. But seeing that we are set over a race of men who not only possess the higher culture, but are held to be the source from which it has spread to others, we are above all things bound to repay to them that which we

¹ *Orator*, 160.

² See on this Colin, *Rome et la Grèce*.

³ *Ad Q. Fr.* i. 1, 27.

have received at their hands. For I am not ashamed to confess—the more so, since my life and achievements have been such as to place me above all suspicion of laziness and frivolity—that whatever I have accomplished has been attained by the principles and methods handed down to us by Greek teachers and their works. And so, beside the general good faith which we owe to all men, we are, I think, under a special obligation to that race, to put into practice the lessons which we have learnt amongst the very people by whose maxims we have been instructed.'

This is well said and, I believe, sincerely meant.¹ But even here there is a hint that the intellectual pre-eminence of Greece was compatible with less admirable moral qualities. The laziness and frivolity which Cicero thinks it necessary to disclaim were precisely the traits which the Roman of his time recognized as the distinguishing marks of the Greek. In the speech which Cicero delivered a few months later in defence of Flaccus, the predecessor of Quintus in the government of Asia, the 'frivolity of the Greeks' furnishes the advocate with a barbed weapon of which he makes repeated use. In the *De oratore*² he finds it necessary to adduce the testimony of his family and his own early recollections in order to prove that Crassus and Antonius, the twin stars of Roman oratory in the generation before his own, had drunk deeply of the fount of Greek learning; the former, he says, spoke Greek as perfectly as though it had been his only tongue. But both Crassus and Antonius were careful to conceal their knowledge from the Roman public. 'Crassus', says Cicero, 'wished it to be thought, not so much that he had never studied Greek as that he despised such studies, and preferred the wisdom of his countrymen in all respects to

¹ Pliny the Younger writes in the same strain to his friend Maximus on his appointment by Trajan as High Commissioner in Greece: it can hardly be doubted that the passage quoted from Cicero was present to his mind.

² ii, 1, 2.

that of the Greeks ; while Antonius considered that, the Roman people being what it was, his oratory would gain in persuasiveness if he were thought never to have studied at all ; and thus each thought that he would carry greater weight, the one if he were believed to despise the Greeks, the other if he were thought to be ignorant of their works.' This passage shows clearly that the divorce between uninstructed public opinion and the views of the more enlightened part of the governing class was as marked in ancient Rome as it is in the modern world. The accepted belief, which statesmen thought it politic to encourage, was that the *gravitas* of the true Roman gave him a title to rule which was lacking in the shallow, frivolous, and slothful Levantine Greek ; the contrast was much the same as that which the German of 1870 drew between *Deutscher Ernst* and the moral laxity which he ascribed to the France of Napoleon III.

Yet if the educated Roman recognized that the springs of his intellectual life were to be sought in Greece, there were not wanting on the other hand Greek statesmen who could appreciate the practical genius of Rome. Polybius, realizing the trend of Mediterranean history towards the universal dominion of Rome, and explaining the phenomenon by an application of Greek political categories to the Roman constitution, is a figure well known to students. Fewer, perhaps, are familiar with the letter written in 214 B.C.—only two years after the disaster of Cannae—by Philip V of Macedon to the magistrates and people of Thessalian Larissa, who had been slow to give effect to his royal pleasure in the matter of admitting resident aliens to their citizen body.¹

'Not one of you (writes the King) will, I imagine, dispute that it is an excellent thing that as many as possible should share in the rights of citizenship, so that

¹ Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. 3, No. 543

your city may be strong and not lie waste as it does now ; and you have only to look at other communities who freely enroll fresh citizens, amongst whom are the Romans. They even admit their slaves, when they set them free, into the citizen body and give them a share in the offices of state ; and by such means they have not only caused their own community to increase, but have been enabled to send out colonies to about seventy places.'

Whatever may be said as to the historical accuracy of Philip's last statement, there can be no dispute as to his recognition of the secret of Rome's expansive power. Half a century later Antiochus Epiphanes, returning to Syria after fourteen years of exile spent in the highest society of Rome, introduced into his kingdom Roman forms and customs—some, it must be admitted, which he would have done well to forget, such as the gladiatorial games ; he planned, but did not live to build, a temple to Jupiter Capitolinus at Antioch, whose walls were to be faced with plates of beaten gold ; and it is evident that he conceived it to be his mission to Hellenize the East after the manner in which Rome had Latinized Italy. But this was not to be. Antiochus the God Manifest went down to posterity as Antiochus the Madman, a caricature drawn by Jewish pens.

In the generation which followed his death the reaction of East against West gathered strength. In Egypt Ptolemy Euergetes II, nicknamed the 'Pot-belly', though he toyed with Greek learning as a dilettante—and also, it may be remembered, made a proposal of marriage to the mother of the Gracchi—encouraged for his private ends the aspirations of the native population of Egypt to equality with the Hellenic or Hellenized immigrants. But this was of small importance compared with the challenge to Hellenic and therefore to western civilization which proceeded from Mithradates the Great. No doubt he was something more than the 'Oriental of the ordinary

stamp', destitute of higher ideas, which Mommsen dubs him; but it is clearly true that although he posed as the heir both of Alexander and Darius, the Graeco-Iranian monarchy which he sought to found in the Near East represented in reality the reaction of nomadism against the city-state. Half a century of strife not only ended in the downfall of the kingdom and its ruler, but left Rome mistress of Hither Asia, and thus placed upon her shoulders the responsibility for reclaiming for Hellenism the areas which Orientalism threatened to submerge. The settlement brought about by Pompey in 62-1 B.C. has been described by Mommsen in one of his most brilliant pages, and compared with the Holy Roman Empire. The greater vassals who kept ward on the crossings of the Euphrates, the lesser dynasts on the fringes of the desert and the coast-strips of the Euxine, the spiritual potentates whom Mommsen equates with the prince-bishops of the Middle Ages, reigning in Jerusalem or on the holy sites of the Anatolian plateau—all these ruled, under the suzerainty of Rome, over populations diverse in race, religion, and degree of culture. And beside these monarchical or quasi-monarchical states there were the cities founded on the Hellenic model by the rulers of Pergamon or Antioch both as military garrisons and as outposts of the higher civilization; to the number of these Pompey himself had made important additions, especially in those districts which (like the newly-acquired province of Pontus) were to come under direct Roman rule, placing more than one Pompeiopolis beside the Antiochs, the Seleucias, the Apameas, and the Laodiceas. But this was only a provisional settlement; and Caesar the Dictator was not permitted by destiny to bring order out of the chaos left by four years of civil war in West and East. That his ideal was a cosmopolitan world-state ruled by himself is clear enough. The institutions of the Roman Republic he

treated with disdain as municipal: its citizenship he bestowed broadcast on Gaul and Spaniard, Greek and Oriental. But he fell before he had even given to his own authority its final form; and another thirteen years of fitful peace and devastating strife had to pass before his heir achieved undisputed control of the Roman world.

Augustus was therefore the first ruler to whom the problem of Rome's relation to her subject-races of all degrees of culture presented itself in all its complexity. That he recognized that the time was ripe for the application of Roman administrative ability to the realization of the conditions under which the civilizing ideas of Greece could bear full fruit we cannot doubt. That he found, or even foresaw, a final solution of the problem we cannot pretend. He saw clearly that peace was the prime interest of the Roman world; and the most typical of his monuments is that Altar of the Peace-goddess which recent discoveries have enabled us to reconstruct. Until the *pax Romana* was established, it was impossible for the foundations of the new order to be truly laid; and this end was hardly attained in the forty-five years of his reign, although during that time the doors of Janus were thrice closed, 'when', as he says in the Monumentum Ancyranum, 'peace had been won through victory by sea and land throughout the Empire of the Roman people.' His closing years were darkened by the great revolt of the Illyrian provinces, described by a Roman historian as 'the most serious foreign war waged by Rome since the struggle with Carthage', and by the crowning disaster of Varus; and it was left for Strabo to write the first panegyric on the new era of Peace and Plenty under the rule of his successor. Augustus was a consummate opportunist, in the sense which denotes one who is the master of his opportunities and not the slave of his circumstances; seeking for safe expedients rather than bold experiments;

ingenious in adapting old forms to new ends ; tolerant of all diversity which left the essential unity of the Empire unbroken ; content to sow the seed and wait in patience for the green blade to sprout, knowing that it would be for his successors to put in the sickle ; a repairer of the old waste places rather than a builder of New Jerusalems. Practising economy in speech as well as in action, he leaves unsaid in his political testament just what we most wish to hear ; and we have to divine his intentions from a minute study of the institutions which he created or adapted, remembering always that with his infinite capacity for taking pains he spared no effort to make even a makeshift perfect of its kind. What can we say of his work when we consider it in this light ?

We must first of all remember that in one respect his outlook was narrower than that of the great Dictator Augustus was not only a Roman but an Italian, sprung on his father's side from the wealthy and respectable municipal aristocracy which in the last century of the Republic was steadily forcing its way upwards into the governing order. Of the Oclavii we know little, and there was probably little to be known. We may reject the taunt of Antony that his great-grandfather had once been a slave with as little hesitation as the fictitious pedigree, tracing a descent from the Kings of Rome, which was invented when the Octavii were raised to the patriciate by Julius Caesar. To his municipal ancestry he owed his cautious conservatism, his respect for the claims of private property, his belief in the virtue of municipal institutions and his conviction that the Italian stock was marked out to furnish the Western world with a ruling race. Thus we shall neither expect nor find that he took any decisive or dramatic step in the direction of turning a loosely-federated congeries of communities into a compact world-state. The Dictator's experiment of introducing Gauls

directly into the Senate and so giving it something of the appearance of a representative Council of the Empire was not repeated ; it had given bitter offence to the prejudices of the ruling order, and those prejudices Augustus not only respected but to some extent shared. To the infiltration of alien blood into the citizen body by the wholesale manumission of slaves he put a check by restricting the rights of individual slave-owners in this matter. Caesar had not merely incorporated freedmen in his settlements of Roman colonists overseas, notably in the New Corinth, but had allowed them to hold municipal office. Augustus restored the disability attaching to those who had once been in slavery and restricted the tenure of local magistracies to the free-born. Under his rule, moreover, and that of his immediate successors, service in the legions, implying the full Roman citizenship (which was conferred upon those not already possessed thereof on enlistment) was in the main confined to Italians, or to members of the extra-Italian communities of Roman right, which were not as yet numerous. The exceptions to this rule are nearly always found to be survivals from the wholesale enrolments of non-Romans made by the contending leaders in the life-and-death struggle of the Civil wars or else due to the incorporation in the Roman army of forces raised, equipped, and trained on the Roman model by client-kings. The legions, then, were not to afford the normal avenue by which the subjects of Rome might attain to a place in the ranks of her citizens : rather did they furnish a visible token of the primacy of Italy.

But on the other hand Augustus was firm in his grasp of the sound principle that service should form the pathway to citizenship. This was shown by his reorganization of the 'auxiliary' regiments, formed by levies of unenfranchised provincials. It has recently become clear that in this particular he was developing in his characteristic

fashion an idea which had existed in germ in the days of the free state. In the professional army of the last century of the Republic the cavalry and lighter arms had been furnished by the subject-communities. Moorish horsemen from Numidia, slingers from the Balearic Isles and archers from Crete served in the force with which Julius Caesar set forth to the conquest of Gaul. We should not have gathered from our historians that it was customary for a commander to confer the citizenship upon such troops as a reward for meritorious service, and the practice was doubtless exceptional; but a remarkable inscription found at Rome in 1908¹ records the fact that Pompeius Strabo, the father of Pompey the Great, conferred citizen rights upon a whole squadron of Spanish horsemen of Iberian race, who had served under him at the siege of Asculum during the social war of 89-8 B.C. This action it seems was taken (after a formal conference with the staff-officers) in pursuance of the Lex Julia, which had been passed in order to check the spread of revolt among Rome's allies by granting citizen rights to those who remained loyal, and (as we now see) gave wide powers of enfranchisement to commanders in the field—powers which Pompeius had probably strained to the limit. A like privilege was given by law to his son, Pompey the Great, when he was carrying on war in Spain sixteen years later; and such precedents were no doubt present to the mind of Augustus, who, when reducing to order the chaotic military system of the dying Republic, supplemented the citizen army of the legions by a non-citizen force of *auxilia* organized in tribal regiments and about equal to the legionaries in number—say 150,000 men. These troops, after discharging their term of service with the colours, which Augustus fixed at twenty-five years, received the Roman citizenship for themselves and the legalization of

¹ Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, No 8888.

any matrimonial union into which they might have entered (or might in future enter), which carried with it the full Roman right for their wives and descendants. The so-called 'military diplomas', or small bronze tablets issued to individual soldiers on discharge, which give the full text of the Imperial decree in virtue of which the discharge was granted, and at the same time enumerate the regiments stationed in the same province or grouped under a single command to whom the grant was made,¹ are of immense value to us as illustrations of the extent to which Rome relied for defence on the subject-communities in all quarters of the Empire whence good fighting material could be drawn.² For our purposes what is important to note is the fact that from the latter part of Augustus's reign onwards a steady stream of some thousands of Rome's barbarian subjects from East and West, together with their families, were placed year by year on an equality with the free-born natives of Rome and Italy. Brigaded with the legions, trained in Roman tactics, subjected to Roman discipline, made familiar with the Latin tongue and taught to worship Roman gods, they must have played a very important part in the building-up of the new nationality. It was a bold step, not wholly in keeping with the habitual caution of Augustus, and the dangers which it entailed soon became patent. The serious menace of the great revolt in Pannonia and Dalmatia in A. D. 6-9 was due, as we are told by Velleius Paterculus, who served in the war, to the fact that the rebels and their leaders were familiar with Roman military methods and with the

¹ More than a hundred of these have been discovered up to the present; for interesting examples see Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, Nos. 1986-2010, and 9052-9.

² Mommsen believed that recruiting for the *Auxilia* was confined to the 'Imperial' provinces; but it is now known that the 'Senatorial' provinces also furnished contingents.

Latin language. Under Tiberius the Numidian Tacfarinas, who had served in an auxiliary regiment, raised a revolt in North Africa, formed a nucleus of tribesmen armed and organized after the Roman fashion, and kept up a guerrilla warfare for seven years. In the same reign two Romanized Gauls, Julius Florus and Julius Sacrovir, endeavoured, not without some success, to seduce from their allegiance the auxiliary units of the army of the Rhine and to enlist their support for a short-lived rising in Gaul. Far more serious, however, was the mutiny of the Rhine in A.D. 69-70, once more headed by the tribal chiefs to whom Rome had given her citizenship and committed the charge of native contingents. A year's stubborn fighting was needed to re-establish the authority of the central government, and Vespasian was obliged to make drastic changes in the organization of the auxiliary forces. The tribal chieftains were no longer employed in command of native levies, and their place was taken by Roman *præfecti*, usually young men at the beginning of their military career, assisted by officers who were almost all promoted from the ranks. Mr. Cheesman, in his admirable study of the system, remarks that these regiments contained, in the second century, far fewer representatives of the governing class than the native corps in our own Indian Army; but, as he says, 'to the Roman Empire, in which rulers and ruled, never separated by any deep racial or religious gulf, were gradually made closer akin by the bond of a common civilization, our rule in India affords in this respect no real parallel.'¹ It must be added that the auxiliary regiments, under the new system, soon lost their tribal character, although they retained their national nomenclature; for, as a careful collation of the inscriptions and *diplomata* shows, the gaps in their ranks

¹ Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army* (Oxford, 1914), p. 94.

were filled by local recruiting in the various provinces in which they were from time to time quartered. At Adam-Klissi, in the Dobrudja, hard by the great trophy erected by Trajan, stands a mysterious monument in the form of a rectangular altar set up in memory of some hundreds of soldiers—legionaries, auxiliaries, and household troops—whom the fragmentary inscription describes as ‘men of the bravest, who died for the Republic’, when and how is still a matter of dispute. But of twenty-one of these who served in the same auxiliary unit twelve came from the lower Rhine, three from Spain, two from Gallia Lugdunensis, and one each from the two Alpine provinces of Rhaetia and Noricum, Britain and Africa.¹ It is easy to see that this method of recruiting not only secured the Roman government against national uprisings, but promoted the fusion of the subject-races to whom the doors of Rome’s citizenship were so freely thrown open. By the end of the first century the equipment and tactics of the auxiliary units—with a few exceptions, such as the corps of Oriental archers—had become practically uniform, and the tribal system was tentatively reintroduced. A fresh series of irregular corps was raised amongst the more backward peoples, who retained their national methods of fighting. On the reliefs of Trajan’s column we see German clubmen, naked to the waist, Palmyrene archers with long skirts, slingers and stone-throwers (perhaps from the Balearic Isles) without defensive armour, and, most interesting of all, Moorish horsemen with long ringlets, riding without saddle or bridle. We know from our historians that these Moors were under the command of Lusius Quietus, an African chief, who, having served in the Roman cavalry in his youth and been cashiered for misconduct, regained the

¹ For the inscription see Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, No. 9107. .

favour of Trajan by raising a corps of irregular horse which was successful in overcoming the resistance of the Dacians in the Southern Carpathians. Such corps appear in the inscriptions under the title of *numeri*, and their service was not rewarded with the grant of citizenship on discharge. Certainly it was not every barbarian who carried in his knapsack the *bâton* of a Lusius Quietus, who attained to a seat in the Senate and a high command in the Army of the East ; but it is likely enough that those who served with distinction in the irregular corps passed into one or another branch of the regular army and so were absorbed into the ruling race.

We must now turn our attention to the administrative measures taken by Augustus to organize and consolidate his Empire, and ask what future they foreshadowed for the subject races. Here it is important to treat East and West separately. Augustus tells us in the Monumentum Ancyranum that he found the Eastern provinces¹ 'largely in the hands of kings' and that he recovered them for Rome. This is a veiled allusion to the Oriental monarchy set up by Antony with Cleopatra as his consort : its capital was at Alexandria, where he ruled as 'king of kings' and she (to quote the legend on her coins) as 'queen of kings who are the sons of kings'. To this monarchy the child of Caesar and Cleopatra was the destined heir, and appanages were found in Armenia, Syria, and Cyrene for Cleopatra's other children, while a bevy of vassal-princes such as Herod in Judaea, Archelaus in Cappadocia and others, did homage for their lesser kingdoms. It was small wonder that Rome and Italy swore allegiance to Augustus when he set forth to uproot these monstrous growths ; but he soon showed that in face of

¹ *Provincias quae trans Hadrianum mare ad Orientem vergunt* (Mon. Anc. cap. 27) ; in ordinary parlance these were called *transmarinae provinciae*, or 'the Dominions overseas'.

the urgent need for economy of blood and treasure, and the difficulty of the frontier problem in the East, the system of client-princes, which the Republic had made a keystone of its policy, might yet serve its turn for a generation or more—for how long, it would be for his successors to determine. There is a remarkable chapter in Suetonius's *Life of Augustus*¹ which sums up his policy in this matter.

'Augustus (says Suetonius) almost always restored the kingdoms which he subdued in war to those from whom he had taken them, or else bestowed them upon rulers of another stock. The allied kings he united among themselves by mutual ties, and was always ready to further and to foster all such relationships and friendships; and he treated them one and all as members of and sharers in the Empire, studying their interests and assigning to them advisers when they were minors in age or had lost their reason until they grew up or recovered their sanity; most of their children he brought up and educated together with his own.'

The discoveries of epigraphists and numismatists in recent years have furnished material for a lengthy commentary on this chapter; and a review of the facts makes it clear that Augustus, in carrying out this policy, had two ends in view—the fusion of the ruling stocks of various nationalities in the Near East, and the use of these princely families, with their Roman education, to introduce Roman methods of government and the higher civilization among their subjects. In one such family three diverse strains were represented—the Iranian stem of Mithradates the Great by his grand-daughter Dynamis, who ruled over the semi-Scythian kingdom of Bosphorus in the Crimea, having as her consort Asander, one of Mithradates' Greek generals; the native Thracian stock by the ruling house of the Odrysae, in which Augustus had found faithful allies during the Illyrian revolt; and the Greeks of Asia Minor by

¹ Cap. 48.

Polemo, installed by Antony in the old kingdom of Mithradates. Polemo was the son of a Greek rhetorician, Zeno of Laodicea, who had shown himself to be a man of deeds as well as of words by his defence of his native city against Labienus and his Parthian allies in 40 B. C. ; and when a crisis was brought about in South Russia by the death of Asander in 17 B. C. and the ill-starred marriage of his widow with an adventurer who was soon killed by his subjects, Agrippa, then co-regent with Augustus and Viceroy of the Eastern provinces, ordered Polemo to sail to the Crimea and become the husband of Dynamis. A few years later (we do not know what had happened) we find him married to Pythodoris, the daughter of a Levantine Greek of immense wealth, Pythodorus of Tralles, whose mother bore the name Antonia and was believed by Mommsen to have been the daughter of Mark Antony himself.¹ A daughter of this marriage, Antonia Tryphaena, became the wife of Cotys, king of Thrace, and a son, Zeno, who had been educated in Rome, was placed on the throne of Armenia by Tiberius and reigned there for seventeen years. The three sons of Cotys and Tryphaena, who were brought up at court as the playmates of Caligula, were rewarded by him with the principalities of Pontus and Bosporus, Thrace and Lesser Armenia ; and Pythodoris herself, after the murder of Polemo in 8 B. C., became the wife of Archelaus, Antony's vassal king of Cappadocia. It was the function of these Hellenized Orientals and Thracians to introduce Roman methods of government, taxation, and military organization into the vast territories for which Rome could as yet supply no adequate staff of administrators from among her own citizens, and at the same time to further the spread of that Hellenic culture

¹ The criticisms to which this brilliant conjecture has recently been subjected (by Dessau, *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, ix. 691) do not seem conclusive.

which she recognized as being, at any rate for the time, the civilizing instrument best fitted for the Eastern half of the Empire. Tacitus does less than justice to this system of protectorates when, in a well-known passage of the *Agricola*, he dismisses it with the sneer that 'it was an ancient and recognized practice of the Roman people to treat even kings as instruments of enslavement'. But Augustus, though he lavished pains on the selection, training, and control of these native rulers, never intended the system to be permanent. He annexed the kingdom of Galatia in 25 B. C., and on the death of Herod the Great in 4 B. C. his kingdom was split up into tetrarchies, which Augustus clearly intended to incorporate, one by one, in the Empire; it was only the astute intrigues of the two Agrippas, father and son, which secured the shadow of royalty for the family until the period of the Flavian dynasty. In the second century the system of protectorates came to an end, except in South Russia.

We must now pass on to a far more important institution. In the West Augustus was the first citizen of a free state; but the East from the outset regarded him as a sovereign. The title of 'King' is given to him in a Greek epigram by Antipater of Thessalonica; it was no doubt common in popular parlance, and when we read in the Synoptic Gospels in the prophecy of the last days the words 'Ye shall be haled before kings and rulers for my sake', we cannot doubt that the reference is to emperors and provincial governors. The term βασιλεύς is applied without hesitation to the emperors by Josephus and Dio Chrysostom, and was currently used in the second century. Now the East, whether Hellenized or not, had by now come to regard kings, as a matter of course, as something more than human. This is not the place to discuss the psychological meaning of the deification of men in whom the power of the State was visibly embodied;

we must take the practice for granted. To the Greek cities of the Hellenistic world the deification of a ruler was just the constitutional form under which a political protectorate was conferred upon him. It is well known that even the provincial governors in whom the majesty of Rome seemed incarnate were the objects of worship in the East ; it was only natural that Julius Caesar should be honoured (as the Seleucids before him) with the title of ' God Manifest ' (*θεὸς ἐπιφανής*) by the senate and people of Ephesus and other Greek cities of Asia ;¹ and Augustus received the like worship after the victory of Actium. It was in the Hellenized provinces of Asia and Bithynia that he was first recognized as God in human form ; but even here his steps were measured, and he was careful to insist that his divinity should be linked with that of Rome, to which worship had been paid by Greeks—who perhaps associated the name with their own word for power—since the second century B. C. Augustus foresaw the great possibilities which this institution held in germ. The worship of Rome and of the ruler of Rome was quite clearly, in the conditions of the time, the natural form in which a new patriotism and a new loyalty could find expression, as well among the Greeks and Hellenized Orientals as among the more backward peoples of the West. Nor was this all. The cities of Hellenistic Greece had found loosely-knit leagues or *κοινά* for the promotion of common interests, which were less ambitious experiments in Federal Government than the Aetolian and Achaean Confederations, with their aspirations after a place among the great powers. Towards these *κοινά* the Republican Government had pursued an undecided policy, varying between suppression and toleration. Augustus discerned their possibilities. He saw that they might be used to direct such common aspirations as a Roman

¹ Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. 3, No. 760.

province might possess into safe courses. They might perhaps ventilate a grievance; they would certainly form a convenient channel for conveying Imperial messages to scattered communities; above all, they could lend the glamour of pomp and ceremony to the new Imperial religion. Hence the *κοινά* of Asia and Bithynia furnished a model which was in due time copied throughout the Eastern provinces. The priestly college to which was entrusted the management of the annual celebrations of the cult of Rome and Augustus bore high-sounding titles. The Asiarchs ('rulers of Asia' in the authorized version) are familiar to readers of the Acts of the Apostles;¹ and the inscriptions tell us of Bithyniarchs, Pontarchs, Armeniarchs, Lykiarchs, and Thrakarchs.² We shall see later under what forms a similar institution was established in the West.

It is worth while to devote a few moments to the examination of Augustus's methods of government in Egypt. Here at any rate he had a free hand. Although he avoided the official use of the title of king, and represented himself in the Monumentum Ancyranum as having 'added Egypt to the Empire of the Roman people', there could be no questioning of the fact that to the Egyptians he was the successor of the Pharaohs and the Ptolemies. The prefect of Egypt—who occupied the highest post open to his personal servants next to the command of the household troops—is described by Strabo as 'holding the office of a viceroy'. The adjective *βασιλικός* was applied as before to the crown lands, the serfs who tilled them, the State banks, and so on. Now the case

¹ Acts xix. 31.

² The existence of the last title shows that Thrace was regarded as belonging to the sphere of influence assigned to Hellenism; see Stein, *Römische Reichsbeamte der Provinz Thracia* (Sarajevo, 1920), p. 104 f.

of Egypt was a very special one. Here the native Egyptian population was overlaid with Hellenic and Oriental strata deposited under the rule of the Ptolemies—the military colonists, Macedonian, Persian, and so forth, the Greek and Jewish traders, and the omnipresent official class which exercised a minute bureaucratic control over the whole system of production and distribution.¹ In the later Ptolemaic period a certain fusion of races had begun to take place. As early as the second century B. C. the papyri show many examples of double nomenclature, and a list of so-called 'Greek cultivators' ('Ἕλληνες γεωργοί) of about 112 B. C. contains several unmistakably Egyptian names. Municipal life was unknown except in the rare Greek towns—Alexandria, Ptolemais, and the old 'factory' of Naucratis—and even here true self-government scarcely existed. But the districts (*νομοί*) into which Egypt was divided had each its urban centre or *metropolis* and in these the Greek element had long organized a common life which centred in the gymnasium—the counterpart of the expatriated Briton's golf course! As early as the third century B. C. we find a Greek gymnasium as far south as Elephantine beside the First Cataract; in the second *οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου*—the possessors of a Greek education and athletic training—are coming to be recognized as a definite social class. We may suspect that the half-breed stock which crowded into the gymnasium and claimed the title of *ἐφῆβοι* soon diluted the pure Hellenic culture with Egyptian ideas; inscriptions record their devotion to the 'Great God Souchos', i. e. the sacred crocodile.² On occasion they would break a lance in his behalf in the local warfare which Juvenal describes in his

¹ Rostovtzeff, *The Foundations of Social and Economic Life in Egypt in Hellenistic Times* (Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, vi (1920), p. 161 ff.).

² Dittenberger, *Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones*, No 178 (95 B. C.).

Fifteenth Satire ; but after the fight was over the parties would meet and swear amity over the wine-cup in Greek fashion.¹ With this heterogeneous population Augustus dealt on definite principles, firmly applied. He was a strict believer in the hierarchical principle, and in Egypt, which was of incalculable economic importance in his system, it seemed an instrument ready to his hand. The fact that he had reduced the Ptolemaic monarchy, represented by Cleopatra, by force of arms, justified him in treating the native Egyptians as in law belonging to the class of *peregrini dediticii*, i.e. non-Romans permanently reduced to the condition of surrendered enemies, forming no communities recognized as enjoying state-rights, subject to the ' rods and axes ' of the Emperor's military governor, and liable to whatever tax or contribution in money, kind, or labour Rome might impose—in short, *taillables et corvéables à merci*. Sharply distinguished from this population of *fellahin* was that of the Greek cities, especially Alexandria ; and an intermediate status was acquired by the Greek or Graeco-Egyptian element in the *μητροπόλεις*, who possessed the hall-mark of the ephebic education and were either wholly or in part exempt from the payment of the poll-tax (*λαογραφία*). Naturally there was also a sprinkling of Roman citizens, at first chiefly consisting of Imperial officials, agents of Roman commercial or banking houses, and stewards of the landed estates which were acquired by Roman capitalists, especially by members of the Imperial house or their freedmen and dependants ; to these were constantly being added time-expired soldiers and manumitted slaves. The policy of the emperors was to preserve this nicely-graduated social order, and the bureaucratic administration of Egypt was charged with the duty of subjecting to a searching scrutiny the claims

¹ Wilcken, *Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, No. 11 (123 B. C.).

put forward by individuals to any privileged status,¹ and to prevent the boundaries of race and class from being overstepped. The liberal principles applied in the Romanization of the West were felt to be inapplicable in Egypt; and here, if anywhere, we can trace something like the race- and colour-bar which looms so large in the modern world. In the second century a local official protests almost plaintively to the Prefect of Egypt against the insolence of 'Romans, Alexandrians, and veterans', who seem to think that the demands of the tax-gatherer put them on a level with 'the natives';² Caracalla, in an Edict issued at Alexandria, peremptorily orders the native population to leave the city and return to their villages, and in so doing draws attention to their unmistakable difference in physical type from the Greek citizens.³ The same Emperor, when he set his seal on the policy of his predecessors by enfranchising the free population of the Empire with a stroke of his pen, expressly excluded (as we now know)⁴ the *dediticii* from the grant.

In the Western half of her Empire Rome was not in the presence of an older civilization to which she herself owed the impulse to a higher culture. The Carthaginian rule in North Africa and parts of Spain had been material in its aims and brutal in its methods; and when Rome destroyed it, all that remained was a certain organized life in urban communities and the use of the Punic language in business and social intercourse. The Iberian and Celtic tribes of Spain and Gaul possessed a culture and an art of their own; but they lacked the political instinct, they had failed to achieve national unity, and they had reached the

¹ Stuart Jones, *Fresh Light on Roman Bureaucracy*, p. 15 ff.

² Wilcken, *op. cit.*, No. 35.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 22.

⁴ A portion of the Greek text of the famous edict is preserved in a papyrus at Giessen (Mitteis, *Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, No. 377).

limits of advance of which they were capable without the infusion of progressive elements.

To Romanize the West was a task for generations, and Augustus could do no more than make a beginning, dealing with each region as local conditions required. But it was clear from the first that the end in view could only be attained by the methods which Rome had pursued in Italy—that is, by an extension of her municipal system and a large concession of local autonomy within the framework of the provincial system. The unification of Italy, completed after the Social War of 89–8 B. c., had left two problems for solution—the provision of means by which the franchise now possessed by all Italians could be effectively exercised, and the decentralization of the functions of government. The first was never solved, for the representative principle was not grasped by ancient statesmen; the novel idea which is said to have occurred to Augustus of taking local ballots in Italian towns¹ would, even had it not come too late, have provided no effective remedy. But the creation of a common type of municipal institutions was attempted with success, and there is good reason to think that it lay near to the heart of Julius Caesar, who caused legislation on this subject to take place on three occasions—in 59 B. c., in connexion with the foundation of colonies for the settlement of Pompey's time-expired veterans; in 49 B. c., when Caesar redeemed his promise of enfranchisement to the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul North of the Po; and in 45 B. c., when he passed a comprehensive Local Government Act applicable to all the towns of Italy.² Caesar's work suffered from the feverish

¹ Suet. *Aug.* 46.

² An inscription found near Heraclea in South Italy, if it does not preserve a portion of the text of the Act itself, at any rate incorporates some of its provisions; see Hardy, *Roman Laws and Charters*, p. 136 ff.

haste with which it was carried through ; and it must be confessed that the Romans, in spite of their genius for jurisprudence, were not in the first rank as bill-drafters. But the municipal institutions which they created furnished a practical solution of the problem of reconciling the unity of the State with a measure of local freedom, and, so long as they were judiciously handled, served the further purpose of promoting the rise of the more backward races of the Empire to a higher plane of civilization. It had always been a cardinal principle of Rome's policy to establish an ordered graduation of status and privilege by which her subjects might climb to an equality with the ruling race. 'Citizenship without the vote', and the status of 'Latinity', a term which soon lost its ethnic significance and connoted a bundle of rights, some of which might be withheld or withdrawn from certain classes of persons or communities, but which always included that of using the forms of the Civil Law, are the most obvious examples. The Latin right in the form which dates from the later Republic, by which municipal office-holders in a Latin town acquired full Roman citizenship, was the means whereby Pompey the Elder (whose liberal policy towards Rome's barbarian allies we have already mentioned) promoted civic life and the spread of Roman political ideas in the region—largely Celtic—between the Po and the Alps. Under the Empire the graduation of privileges was turned to fresh and ingenious uses. The Latin right was bestowed not only on single towns and on certain classes of individuals (such as freedmen irregularly manumitted) but on whole districts. The most notable example of this is the act of Vespasian by which all the urban communities of Spain received this right. Scores of charters were drafted, two of which are fortunately preserved to us in part.¹ In these towns the full citizenship

¹ Hardy, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 61 ff.

was acquired by the holders of the local magistracies and their families, but it was provided that not more than six persons should be added to the roll in any one year. By a further refinement towns of 'greater' and 'lesser' Latin right were distinguished. In the former all who were admitted to the local senate became citizens of Rome, in the latter only the office-holders. There is some reason to think that Hadrian may have been responsible for this development and that it was especially applied to the Romanization of North Africa, which in the second century was succeeding to the place taken by Spain in the first.¹

The treatment of the Alpine regions by Augustus and his successors clearly illustrates the elasticity of Roman methods. Since 49 B.C. the towns north of the Po had enjoyed full privileges; but the spurs of the Alps and the valleys adjoining them were inhabited by backward tribes, largely of Celtic stock. It seems that by Pompey the Elder's statesmanlike settlement of 89 B.C. these peoples had been 'assigned' (*attributi*) to the Romanized municipalities, who exercised jurisdiction over the tribesmen and collected their taxes on behalf of the central government. Thus Rome imposed upon the communities which she introduced to political life the duty of educating by contact the less civilized elements which lay beyond the fringe. It is probable that in 49 B.C., when the Latins of the Transpadane region became full citizens, the tribal communities dependent upon them were also advanced a stage and received the Latin right. A well-known inscription² records the fact that Claudius, finding that certain tribesmen in the valley of the Upper Adige,

¹ A comprehensive account of Roman municipal institutions will be found in Professor J. S. Reid's *Municipalities of the Roman Empire*.

² Hardy, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 119 ff

dependent on the municipality of Tridentum (Trent), had for some time been exercising the privileges of Roman citizens, confirmed their prescriptive title in spite of the weakness of its basis in constitutional law.¹ Some, he says, were serving in the Guards (who were at this time recruited from Roman citizens of Italian birth), others had been enrolled in the jury-panels at Rome. We could wish for no more direct testimony to the assimilative power of Roman institutions. In the western valleys, through which passed the routes to Gaul, the problem was not so easy. In the valley of the Dora Baltea, which leads to the Great St. Bernard, the intractable and predatory tribe of the Salassi had long been a thorn in the side of Rome. In 25 B.C. they were ruthlessly crushed by a Roman commander, and the historians assert that the whole male population was sold into slavery. But this does not quite tally with the epigraphic evidence. Augustus founded a colony of 3,000 time-expired guardsmen in the depopulated valley under the title of Augusta Praetoria, still echoed in the name of Aosta; and an inscribed stone (found in 1894) bears a dedication in his honour made by 'those of the Salassi who had taken up their residence in the colony at its foundation'.² They had the status of *incolae*, i. e. residents or property-owners who possessed a domicile in the town, but only limited rights of citizenship; and wherever a colony was founded—and the Emperors settled their veterans in such communities in all quarters of the Empire—a native element from the region clustered about the Roman nucleus, acquired Roman manners, learnt the Latin language, and was

¹ It will be remembered that Seneca, in his satire on Claudius, says that 'he wished to see all the Gauls, Germans, and Spaniards in the toga'.

² Pais, *Dalla guerra punica a Cesare Augusto* (Rome, 1918), vol. ii, p. 375 ff.

doubtless gradually absorbed into the citizen body. Such were the Salassi mentioned above; and that no long time elapsed before they fitted themselves for participation in civic duties is shown by a second inscription, set up during the first century of the Empire by a local magistrate and his brother, who bears the significant name L. Julius *Salassus*.¹

In the adjacent district of the Cottian Alps, through which ran the second main route to the West, Augustus deemed it wiser to employ the services of the local chieftain, a princelet named Donnus, who ruled over a group of tribes mainly Ligurian by race. Some were hostile to Rome, and are enumerated among the conquered peoples whose names appeared on the 'Trophy of the Alps', the remains of which may be seen at La Turbie above Monaco; but Cottius, the son of Donnus, was loyal to Augustus, and though in the final settlement the title of king was withheld from him, he appears as 'M. Julius Cottius, son of King Donnus' with the title of *praefectus civitatum*, or military governor, in the inscription of the triumphal arch at Segusio (Susa). The bas-reliefs of this arch, rude and uncouth as they are in style, illustrate the pride of the newly-enfranchised Cottius in his command of Roman troops as a Roman officer. His son (or grandson) was permitted by Claudius to resume the royal title, but on his death Nero annexed the district, now thoroughly Romanized, as a province, whose inhabitants, in the time of Pliny the Elder, possessed the Latin right. Nero conferred the same privilege on the inhabitants of the military district of the Maritime Alps, through which passed the coast-road along the Riviera.

The religious policy of the Emperors in the West also deserves notice. Augustus soon recognized that the institutions which had sprung up in the fertile soil of the

¹ Pais, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

East would bear transplanting to the West, where the new patriotism had to be created and fostered. There are some difficulties in connexion with the establishment of the Imperial cult in the Western provinces. It has been made probable that provincial organizations for this purpose were not at first set up in the more advanced regions, viz. Gallia Narbonensis, the modern Provence, which was regarded as *Italia verius quam provincia*, Baetica, the modern Andalusia, which two centuries of Roman occupation had raised almost to the same level, and the province of Africa in the narrower sense, with its capital at Caesar's colony of Carthage. Here, it seems, it was left for the Flavian dynasty, which had no roots struck deep in the past, to develop the cult of the *divi* in its own interest, and to introduce it into the 'advanced' provinces. In the more backward regions the centre of worship was at first not a temple, after the fashion of the Greek East, but an altar, such as that of Tarraco in Northern Spain, made famous by Augustus's reply to the Embassy which informed him that a palm-tree had sprouted from it—'That shows how seldom you kindle the fire.' Most famous of all was the great altar of the Three Gauls at Lugdunum (Lyons), at which on August 1, 12 B. C. in the presence of Drusus, stepson of the Emperor and Commander-in-Chief of the Rhine armies, a Romanized Gaul, G. Julius Vercondaridubnus, of the stock of the Aedui—'brothers' of the Roman people—sacrificed as its first high priest on behalf of the sixty peoples whose names were inscribed on the altar. On the analogy of the Eastern *κονά* there was set up in each western province a *concilium*, representing its several *civitates*, the first function of which was to maintain the Imperial worship. What Augustus intended as the ultimate destiny of these councils we do not know. It was enough that they should serve the immediate purpose of ensuring that the only common

expression of the life of a subject people should take the form of a demonstration of loyalty, touched, it might be, with some faint religious emotion, to the Empire of Rome and to its ruler. It has been suggested that the *concilia* may have been formed with a view to the more prosaic purpose of assessing and distributing the burdens of taxation; but this may be regarded as disproved. It is more likely that Augustus had in view the possibility that they would exercise some check on maladministration by refusing complimentary votes to the governors or by formulating complaints against them: and this in fact they did; with the result that they became a hotbed of intrigue, as is shown by a well-known inscription from Thorigny in Southern France.¹

The worship of the Emperors was not the only religious tie which bound the provinces to Rome. In the towns of Roman right—probably at first only in the 'colonies', which, as a writer of the second century put it, were 'made in the image of the Roman people' (*effigies parvae simulacraque populi Romani*)—it was customary to set up on a height, natural or artificial, overlooking the Forum of the city, a temple of Jupiter the Best and Greatest, Juno, and Minerva, in imitation of the Roman Capitol. The most notable remains of these *Capitolia* are to be seen in North Africa, for example at Thamugadi (Timgad, 'the African Pompeii'). If the right to erect such a *Capitolium* was inherent in the status of a 'colony', we can see why that title was so eagerly sought. The Capitoline worship was characteristic of the Latinized West; but Ζεύς Καπετώλιος had his temples in the East also. The Greek text of the Edict of Caracalla (already referred to) gives as the Emperor's reason for extending the franchise to the vast majority of his subjects his desire to admit them to community of religious worship. It has been noted that a papyrus from

¹ *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, xiii, 3162.

Arsinoë, three years later in date than the Edict, deals with the local cult of Jupiter Capitolinus, and that Oxyrhynchus had a *Capitolium* in the third century; and it is plausibly suggested by Wilamowitz-Möllendorff that admission to the worship of Roman gods was regarded by Caracalla as a logical consequence of the enfranchisement of the subject races and a means towards their more rapid Romanization.

By such various and elastic means as we have described Augustus and his successors laid the foundations of a new polity with the least possible disturbance of existing custom, substituted fresh bonds of union for the older cohesive forces of race and tribe, built up like some coral island of the Southern Seas a new Graeco-Roman nationality, and smoothed the transition from the city to the territorial state. At the same time they brought into being a new governing order, representative of the new nationality. Augustus had had to make a beginning in this respect: partly because the old senatorial aristocracy had been weighed and found wanting, partly because he failed to interest its members in the prosaic duties of bureaucracy. He was obliged to entrust most of the administrative work of the Empire either to the second social order of the *equites*, from which his father's family sprang, or to the able Greeks who, as freedmen, could perform personal services such as no born Roman would render to an equal. With the discerning eye for ability and loyalty which marks the ruler of men, he chose his helpers well: and though there were some conspicuous failures under his successors, and the rule of the Greek freedmen at times enjoyed a bad reputation, the Imperial service was made attractive, through the *carrière ouverte aux talents* which it offered to capable men, and by the time that the old governing class became extinct, a new one was ready to take its place, drawn from all quarters of the Empire.

The Flavian dynasty could afford to break definitely with the tradition of Italian supremacy. Italians no longer claimed service in the legions as their privilege: they secured exemption from it as a burden, and the army was recruited from the Romanized provincials. The highest official posts were now open to them. A certain Annius Verus, a native of an insignificant town in Spain, attained the praetorship: his son was raised to the patriciate by Vespasian and was thrice consul and prefect of Rome; the grandson of the latter was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. From literary and epigraphic sources we know of about 150 senators of Italian and thirty of provincial origin under Vespasian; to these we can add thirty-four Italians and fifteen provincials of Domitian's creation, thirty-one Italians and twenty-eight provincials added to the roll by Trajan.¹ Vespasian bestowed the consulship for the first time on an African, Domitian on an Asiatic Greek, Hadrian on a Syrian. The Jews contributed an infusion of their blood to the new strain, and placed their conspicuous abilities at the disposal of the Emperors. When Lord Reading became Viceroy of India a writer in the *Nation* expressed himself as follows:

'For the first time in the history of British India a man of Eastern blood assumes the government of the great Eastern dependency. Rome, which knew neither the race-bar nor the colour-bar, would have thought that the most natural expedient in the world.'

The writer might have drawn the parallel closer by a reference to Tiberius Julius Alexander, nephew of Philo the Jew and son of an 'alabarch' or commander of *douaniers* in the Egyptian Customs, who rose by his great organizing abilities to be Chief of the Staff to Corbulo in the Armenian wars and to Titus during the Siege of Jerusalem. As Viceroy of Egypt he issued an edict, preserved to us

¹ Stech, *Klio*, Beiheft xii (1912), p. 180.

in an inscribed copy from the Great Oasis, which proves him to have been a humane and enlightened ruler with a genuine desire to eradicate abuses and relieve the oppressed classes in Egypt from the exactions of tax-gatherers and informers.¹ His son (it seems probable) was the first of Jewish descent to become a Roman senator.

From the fusion of races in the Near East was sprung a group of highly-placed officials in the second century. A typical career is that of G. Julius Severus, whose name would certainly not betray the fact (which his honorary inscription at Ancyra proves²) that he was descended from Deiotarus, the king of Galatia for whom Cicero pleaded before Caesar, and from two obscure tetrarchs of the same Celtic race, as well as from the old reigning house of Pergamon. In spite of his mixed blood he enjoyed the title of 'first of the Greeks' in the province of Galatia. Hadrian, when visiting the province in A.D. 123, recognized his merit by raising him to senatorial rank and launching him on an official career which took him from Syria to the Lower Rhine, and culminated in the consulate and pontificate. He was entrusted with a commission to reform the administration of Bithynia similar to that held by the younger Pliny; and the historian Cassius Dio, writing more than half a century later, tells us that in that province his name was still a household word. The inscription enumerates amongst his relatives a number of consulars, in whose pedigree we can trace Jewish, Armenian, and other Asiatic strains; and one of them left descendants who intermarried with the Imperial family.

Nor, of course, was this mingling of Eastern and Western blood confined to the ranks of the new cosmopolitan aristocracy. The Empire was tending to a racial unity, and the process was accelerated by the movement

¹ Dittenberger, *Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones*, No. 669.

² Op. cit., No. 544.

of the troops and the traders who followed the eagles. At Corbridge-on-Tyne lay buried one Barates, a Palmyrene in the Imperial service¹: at South Shields the long arm of coincidence has brought to light the tombstone of Regina,² a woman of British birth—once his slave, then his freedwoman, and finally his wife.³

Rome, then, succeeded in forming a unity embracing the diverse races which made up her Empire. She solved her problem by making privilege the reward of service, by observing the natural principle of continuity and doing nothing *per saltum*, and by giving her subjects some training in that self-government which mankind always prefers to good government. The often-quoted lines of Rutilius the Gaul, written early in the fifth century, are too apposite to be passed over :

Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam ;
 profuit invitis te dominante capi :
 dumque offers victis proprii consortia iuris
 Urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat.

But the idea was not a novel one. It is to be found as early as the second century in the Panegyric on Rome by Aelius Aristides, in some ways the most typical of the 'Sophists' or travelling lecturers who purveyed to a tolerably well-educated and very self-satisfied public

¹ *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, ix. 1153 a.

² Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, No. 7063.

³ In the *American Historical Review*, vol. xxi (1916), p. 689 ff., Professor Tenney Frank writes on 'Race-mixture in the Roman Empire'. His study is based on the nomenclature found in inscriptions. He concludes that in the time of Juvenal and Tacitus perhaps *ninety per cent.* of the free plebeians in the streets of Rome had Oriental blood in their veins, and the statistics which he has compiled for selected towns in Italy, Gaul, and Spain, are equally remarkable. 'It is evident', he concludes, 'that the whole Empire was a melting-pot and that the Oriental was always and everywhere a large part of the ore' (p. 702).

a handsome assortment of well-worn ideas at a moderate cost in money and intellectual effort.

When we pass from the political and administrative form to the social and spiritual content we are faced by questions not easy to answer decidedly. In speaking of the 'Romanization' of a province we usually think less of its gradual change in political status than of its adoption of a certain material culture. Here the change was not one of pure gain. Professor Haverfield in his excellent study of the *Romanization of Roman Britain* points out that the Roman Imperial civilization had much in common with that of our machine-made age, and that 'to pass from Glastonbury [a pre-Roman village] to Woodcuts [a Roman settlement] is like passing from some old timbered village of Kent or Sussex to the uniform streets of a modern city suburb'. Whether 'capitalistic industry' existed or not under the Roman Empire may be a disputed question: it cannot be denied that there was 'mass production', imitation, adulteration, and every trick of modern trade. The western provinces were flooded with the vulgar little lamps of Fortis, whose manufactory was at Modena: in fact, it is pretty certain that his stamps were freely borrowed (in the absence of a law of patent) by the manufacturers of the Rhineland. The red-glaze ware—'Samian', *terra sigillata*, or whatever we call it—of the potteries of Southern and Central Gaul has great value for us as a means of dating the settlements where its remains are found; but the elements of its decoration are mechanically applied, often ill-assorted and not always understood. That the Imperial triumphs inspired a grandiose and impressive art, especially in Rome, whither the best talent of the Empire was drawn, is not to be denied: in the more backward provinces such art as there was belonged to what Haverfield called 'the heavy inevitable atmosphere of the Roman material civilization'.

To the limitation of this somewhat vulgar and *bourgeois* culture there naturally correspond intellectual limitations. The problem of the backward races is at bottom educational: did Rome see it as such and set herself to solve it? The answer is not quite easy. It is not hard to find facts which tell in her favour. Even under the Republic Sertorius had set up schools among the Spanish tribes upon whose support he relied. When Augustus brought the Arvernian Gauls down from the height of Bibracte, whence they had defied Caesar, to the lowland town of Augustodunum (Autun), he established there a school which had a long and famous history. In a familiar chapter of the *Agricola*¹ Tacitus tells us how his father-in-law trained the sons of British chiefs in liberal arts—though he spoils the picture by adding the sneer that ‘what the inexperienced termed the higher culture was in fact a form of slavery’. At the mining village of Vipasca in Southern Spain the local schoolmaster was exempted from public burdens by the ordinance which regulated the industry. But opinions differ widely as to the positive value of the education which Rome gave to her subjects. Sir William Ramsay thinks that ‘the education imparted on a definite plan by the state did not go beyond a regular series of announcements, some of a rather brutalizing tendency’.² M. Camille Jullian asserts that ‘no political system has ever taken less account of mind and soul than the Roman Empire: no system has ever taken less thought for directing, instructing, and improving them’.³ On the other hand, M. Cumont, in his excellent essay on the Romanization of Belgium,⁴ quotes with approval Haverfield’s saying that ‘in the countries governed by Rome education was better under the Empire than at any

¹ Cap. 21.

² *Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 360.

³ *Histoire de la Gaule*, vol. v, p. 378. |

⁴ *Comment la Belgique fut romanisée*.

other period from its fall until the nineteenth century'. That there was a widely diffused acquaintance with the elements of culture I will not deny, though I confess to a doubt whether it penetrated far below the bourgeois crust. The tides of invasion swept away so much of this that it is hard to speak positively of what lay below ; but the survival of the Berber languages in N. Africa and of the Basque in the W. Pyrenees suggests that in many districts the lower strata were impervious to Latinizing influences. But the weakness of the system was that it culminated in rhetoric : when Juvenal wishes to illustrate by a paradox the spread of education in the provinces, he tells us that 'Thule has sent for a rhetorician'. The defect was fatal. There have been governments which taught their subjects *what* to think : there are—at least we hope there are—those who teach them *how* to think ; but a government which gives to rhetoric the first place in its educational system merely imparts instruction in the use of language to conceal thought, or rather (in the great majority of cases) to conceal the absence of thought.¹ If we turn to the East, where Rome left the task of raising the cultural and intellectual standards of the backward peoples to Hellenism, the success was likewise partial. It is true that the rubbish heaps of Oxyrhynchus have yielded priceless fragments of the finest Greek literature, which prove that the inhabitants of the Fayum towns read their Alcaeus and their Sappho, their Pindar and Bacchylides, as well as many other authors who are little more than names to us. But it is hardly to be supposed that the native Egyptians participated in this culture. In the Anatolian highlands, as the discoveries of Sir

¹ In the above sentences no account has been taken of *indirectly* educative influences. The chief of these was the gradual substitution of the Civil Law, with its logical construction and insistence on reasoned principle, for tribal custom.

William Ramsay and Mr. Anderson have clearly shown, there were survivals and revivals of primitive religions and their characteristic practices. I recall a remarkable inscription¹ from Tralles which may date from somewhere about A.D. 200. It is a dedication set up by L. Aurelia Aemilia, daughter of L. Aurelius Secundus, to all appearance a Roman lady, proud of her Roman name and citizenship—and of something besides, for she describes herself as ἐκ προγόνων παλλακίδων καὶ ἀνιπτοπόδων, 'the descendant of temple-prostitutes and *fakirs*',² and she adds the words παλλακεύσασα καὶ κατὰ χρησμόν, which show that she did not belie her ancestry. To this we have come after two centuries of Hellenistic education, crowned by the acquisition of Roman citizenship.

In conclusion we must ask the question whether the failure of the Imperial Government to raise to the higher intellectual and spiritual planes the mass of the more backward peoples who owed allegiance to it, is to be reckoned among the principal causes of its failure to withstand external attack. I hardly think that we can so count it. As long as good fighting material could be drawn from the provinces and organized by capable leaders, there was no reason why the frontiers should not be held. The causes of decay lay deeper. The failure was a failure to solve the fundamental problem (with which we are still wrestling) of the relation of the individual to the State, especially the Great State. At the time when Rome unified the Mediterranean world, its inhabitants were drifting away from the State as the Greeks had conceived it and the more enlightened of the Romans had tried to realize it—drifting towards abstentionist philosophies, towards other-worldly religions, towards the shoals and rocks of

¹ Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, vol. i, p. 115.

² The word—which means 'with unwashed feet'—is that applied by Homer to the priests of Dodona.

astrology, magic, and such like; and the State, enjoying omnipotence and claiming omnicompetence, was left in the heavy hands of the autocrats and the bureaucrats, in whose interests no man, in the last resort, will willingly fight.

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V

THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

A. J. CARLYLE

THE religions of the primitive or barbarian world, and even of the highly-developed civilization of Greece and Rome, were group or tribal religions, and this is also true of the religion of the Hebrews in its earlier form, while the modern conception of religion is that of something universal. It may therefore be said that in the ancient world, religion was not a uniting force, but rather one of the elements of separation, while in the modern world it is true to say that in principle—it cannot yet be said that this is true in fact—religion is something which unites men; the universal religion knows in principle no boundaries of tribe or nation or race, but everywhere and under all conditions is the same in its essential character.

The transition, therefore, from tribal to universal religion has a great significance in the history of the development of the sense of the unity of human life, and of the relation to each other of men of different civilizations.

It is under these terms that the subject of the part played by the Christian religion in modifying the relations of different nations or races to each other must in the first place be considered. That is not to say that it was the Christian religion which was the first to show the character of universality. It would seem to be true that the first highly-developed movement of this kind is to be found in Buddhism, for it was an essential aspect of its

character that it recognized no limitation of caste or rank or race.

We are, however, concerned in the first place with the West, that is with the civilization of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Here also it is clear that before the coming of Christ there had been a profound movement in the Hebrew religion. Originally, as will nowadays be generally recognized, the Hebrew religion had been of the same tribal character as other religions, but in some at least of the great prophets this character had been transcended, and it seems to be clear that in its later period there had developed a tendency towards the conception of the God of Israel as being the God of all mankind. There are traces of a tendency to present Him under the terms of the Most High God, the supreme *Divine Being whom all men might and should worship*. And certainly it is clear that about the time of the Christian era there was an energetic movement of proselytism; the statements of the classical writers, and the descriptions of the communities to whom the first Christian missionaries preached, are sufficient evidence of this.

The principle of universalism was established in the Christian Church, but not without a struggle. For, though it is now recognized that the intensity of the conflict between Paulinism and Judaistic Christianity has sometimes been exaggerated, that there was hesitation and even conflict cannot be doubted. It is true that it was in the main the penetrating insight and the restless energy of St. Paul which compelled the primitive Christian communities to understand their own essential principles. It is, however, also true that St. Paul was intrinsically right in his interpretation of the mind of Jesus Christ, for while he had lived among and preached to the Jews, his conviction of the nature of God and man left no place for the distinctions of race and nation. When St. Paul wrote in

the letter to the Galatians, 'There can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male or female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus', he was rightly interpreting the mind of Christ.

This, then, was the essential principle of the Christian faith, that God was the Father and the Friend of all mankind, and it is this which is expressed in the words of the epistle to the Ephesians, 'But now in Christ Jesus ye that were far off are made nigh in the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who made both one, . . . and he came and preached peace to you that were far off, and peace to them that were nigh: for through him we both have access in one Spirit unto the Father.' The religion of Jesus Christ was a universal religion, belonging not to one place, or to one civilization, but to all, and in that religion men were to know each other as one.

This transformation of the character of religion must not, however, be thought of as an isolated movement. It coincided with those great changes in the conditions, the thought and feeling and organization of the Western world which have been dealt with in the preceding parts of this work, that is, with the conceptions of the post-Aristotelian philosophies, and with the tendencies of Roman administration and law.

To Aristotle some three centuries earlier men had seemed naturally diverse and unequal; there were some who possessed reason in full measure, while some only possessed enough to recognize and follow it in others, some were by nature rational and free, while others were by nature slaves; and generally speaking he looked upon this as being the distinction between the Greeks and the Barbarians. Before the Christian era, however, this conception had given place to another which was radically different. Indeed there is no change in social theory more

startling in its completeness than the change from the Aristotelian theory of the inequality of human nature to the conception of its identity and equality as we find it expressed by Cicero about half a century before the coming of Christ. There is no resemblance, he says, in nature so great as that between man and man, there is no equality so complete, there is only one possible definition of mankind, for reason is common to all. Men differ indeed in learning, but are equal in the capacity for learning, there is no race which under the guidance of reason cannot attain to virtue. Nature has given to all men reason, that is true reason, and therefore the law, which is right reason commanding and forbidding.¹

The same principles are very emphatically restated by Seneca about a hundred years later. The slave, he says, is of the same nature as his master ; virtue can be attained by all, the free, the freedman, the slave, the king, the exile ; virtue cares nothing for house or fortune, but only seeks the man ; a slave can be just, brave, magnanimous ; slavery is only external, it only affects the body of a man, he errs greatly who thinks that the condition of slavery affects the whole man, his better part has nothing to do with it ; the body may belong to a master, the mind is its own (*sui iuris*), it cannot be given into slavery.²

These conceptions might indeed be set aside as insignificant if they represented merely the somewhat rhetorical temperaments of Cicero or Seneca, but it is quite clear that these are not individual opinions. Cicero is merely throwing into eloquent if somewhat facile phrases what he had been taught by the masters under whom he had studied, and Seneca is clearly expressing the judgement of the Stoic school of philosophy. They represent the general judgement of the educated men of their time.

¹ Cicero, *De Legibus*, i, 10.

² Seneca, *De Beneficiis*, iii, 18-28.

This becomes very evident when we observe that the same principles were embodied in the jurisprudence of Rome as represented by the great lawyers of the end of the second century. Ulpian lays down the broad general principle that men are by the natural law equal and free. Florentinus treats slavery as an institution of the 'ius gentium', which is contrary to nature. Tryphoninus says that liberty belongs to the natural law.¹ It must also be observed that while the definite expression of the new conception in the Roman law only appears at the end of the second century, we can trace clearly from the middle of the first century the growth of the principle that the slave was not really outside the law but within it. We can see that the law was coming to recognize that he had legal rights, if it was at first only the right to protection even against his master. The Emperor Claudius is said to have issued an edict that if a slave were deserted by his master on account of illness, the slave, if he recovered, was to be free. Hadrian is said to have banished for five years a lady who had outrageously ill-treated her women slaves, and Antoninus Pius, while anxious not to interfere with the rights of masters, prescribed that slaves who were unjustly ill-treated should be protected, and he ordered, in a particular case, that certain slaves who had fled for protection to the Emperor's statue, should, if it were found that they had been treated with unjust severity, or had been infamously injured, be sold and not restored to their master.²

It is clear that an immense and far-reaching change had passed over the conception of human nature and human relations, and that the older conception of some intrinsic distinction between the nations and races of men had passed away. Indeed, if we were considering the whole

¹ Digest, 1, 17, 32 ; i, 5, 21 ; xii, 6, 621.

² Digest, xl, 8, 2 ; i, 6, 2.

development of political and social philosophy we should be justified in saying that it is in the centuries which lie between Aristotle and Cicero that we pass from the ancient to the modern world, for it was upon these new principles of the identity or equality of human nature that the legal and political structure of modern civilization has been slowly built up. It may be added that these principles are in one sense only the expression of a still more profound apprehension which was taking shape at the same time, a new apprehension of the real meaning of human individuality or personality.

It was, then, in a world which was already prepared for it that the universalist conception of religion took shape in Christianity, a world in which the social and national distinctions were being greatly modified, if not lost, and in which the local and tribal cults were breaking down. It must, therefore, not be said that it was Christianity which first taught men the community of humanity. If we ask what it was, then, that it brought to the great movement, the true answer is that it brought not so much a new doctrine as a new force, a new power. This is true not only in regard to the new conviction of the common life and nature of men, but also in regard to many other aspects of the conception of Christianity,—a new force, a new and living sense of the truth, a new and compelling power. It helped to translate an intellectual conception into something which was a part of life itself.

It is also true to say that in actual fact it was the Christian society, the Christian Church which, as it received the doctrine, so also preserved it and handed it down to the new world which gradually arose on the ruins of the old.

What, then, happened when the Empire formally

accepted Christianity? The results were complex, and some of them melancholy. The Universalist conception of religion was in its essence reconciling and uniting, but it was also possible to interpret or apply it in such a way as to produce very different results. It was possible to fall into a gross confusion, to confuse the conception of a universal religion with that of an exclusive one (the phrase is not very adequate). It was possible to interpret the claim of a religion to be universal, as meaning that all other religions were not merely incomplete, but false and of no value. There developed thus very early in the history of Christendom two tendencies, one which contemptuously urged the absurdity or superstition or the moral defects of all other religions, the other which looked upon Christianity as different indeed from all other religions or modes of thought, but different in virtue of the fact that it completed and fulfilled all that was only partial and incomplete in them rather than that it contradicted them. These two tendencies, indeed, continue through the whole history of Christianity, and they have an important relation to the missionary temper even of the present time.

It was in the atmosphere of the conception of the exclusive character of a universal religion that there came the practice and then the theory of religious persecution. This is not the place to discuss the whole of the melancholy history, or to attempt to apportion the blame. It may, indeed, be questioned how far the persecution of the heretic and the violent suppression of paganism was due to the policy of the Empire, or to the influence of the Church; to the survival in the Empire of the conception of the group religion, or to the influence of the exclusive conception of religion in the Church. However this may be, the policy of persecution was fully developed within a hundred years of the conversion of Constantine, and can be studied in detail in the Theodosian Code, and the policy which was

thus developed in fact was defended in principle by the great but often mischievous genius of St. Augustine, for he more than any other is responsible for the acceptance of the principle of persecution by the Catholic Church. It is true that the better tradition survived and was occasionally expressed by men like St. Martin of Tours, and much later by Wazo of Liège in the eleventh century, but they were not strong enough to stem the flood.

The religious system which should have united men did in actual fact often tend to divide them. It may even be said that the intolerance of various sections of Christians towards each other contributed not a little towards the easy victory of the Moslem power in North Africa. The later history of Christendom furnishes us with many other melancholy results of this intolerance from the fourth century to the seventeenth, and even, though happily in a lesser degree, down to our own day.

We must, however, return to the consideration of the effects of the Christian conception of a universal religion in breaking down the barriers between different races, for this it has continued to do, in spite of religious intolerance and persecution. This becomes evident when we consider the missionary effort of the Christian Church, for this was in its beginnings, and is to this day, founded upon the assumption of the identity of human nature, upon the conviction that all men everywhere are capable of the life of communion with God, and that therefore the relation of men to each other must be determined not by the consideration of the advantages which the strong can derive from the exploitation of the weak, but by the obligation of those who have that which is precious to them, to share it with others.

It was the conviction that they had a gospel of emancipation and salvation to announce which drove the first

apostles and missionaries out from the restricted community of Judaism into the great world, and it has been the same conviction which has inspired all later missionaries. Within three hundred years they had carried their gospel throughout the Roman Empire, and had found a response in the hearts of men of every race and every condition within it. And soon their work extended beyond the Roman Empire. The conversion of the Gothic tribes was begun, if not completed, even before their invasion of the Empire, and the conversion of the Franks followed soon after. It would indeed be impossible to say that these conversions were effected wholly or mainly by the mere force of the spiritual appeal of the Christian religion to the new races ; the conversions were wholesale, and were often imposed compulsorily upon their people by chieftains and kings. For our purpose, however, it is sufficient to observe that the adoption of the Christian faith was of the highest importance in reforming the unity of Western civilization, in preventing the political dissolution of the ancient Empire in the West from bringing about the complete disappearance of that unity which Hellenic civilization and Roman authority had created in the Mediterranean countries and in Western Europe.

It is true that the barbarians had in race and customs much affinity with each other, but it was the Christian Church which in large measure secured the homogeneity of the new civilization which gradually grew up among the ruins and upon the remains of the old. The Church no doubt effected this partly in virtue of the fact that it was in the ecclesiastical body that there was preserved almost all of the ancient civilization, both in knowledge and in organization, which survived ; but partly also because the unity of the Church transcended and controlled the differences of tribes and customs, and that, while men

differed in language and in political attachment, they were at one in worship and in moral and spiritual ideals. It is here that we must recognize the immense services which the Roman See rendered to Western civilization. Some may lament its tendency to override or suppress local and national differences in religious temper or expression, and indeed in the sixteenth century a great part of Europe revolted against the uniformity of its system; but no one who has any historical sense or knowledge can refuse to recognize and appreciate the work which it did in welding the Western nations together.

And here we must remember that extraordinary reaction of the Christian civilization of Ireland on our own more barbarous Teutonic ancestors. For indeed it is a singular and admirable thing to see how it was from that farthest outpost of Europe that a new mission both of Christianity and of civilization came back upon the broken faith and the broken world. The origins of the Christian civilization of Ireland are still shrouded in the mists of a perhaps irrecoverable past, but the history of its missions is, at least here and there, clear. Hardly in Rome itself have men the sense of awe and of wonder more than when they stand on that little island of the Hebrides which looks out on the Western ocean and carry back their minds to the day when Columba and his little band of followers landed in Iona and set up their humble cells and their little sanctuary; sad, as men related, in that they had to leave their dear home, and were unable to endure even the distant sight of that which they had left. For it was from that little island that the Christian faith spread over all of Northern Britain, and it was by the Irish missionaries who accompanied Columbanus to the Continent, that the old civilization and

culture was spread once again over Central Europe and even far down into Italy. The memory of that great mission lingers to this day in the libraries of the monastic houses which they founded in Western Europe and even in Italy, and it was the scholars of the Irish tradition who were the leaders in the extraordinary revival of learning and culture in the Carolingian courts of the ninth century. Time brings many changes, but it would be well that men should remember, when they speak lightly of the Irish people, that when we were mere barbarians, they had a civilization and a faith.

Throughout the Middle Ages the expansion of Christianity and of the new Western civilization continued, until practically all European peoples were united in religion and in culture, but the discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries brought with them new conditions and new problems. Hitherto the Western civilization and the Christian religion, if we make exception of those Nestorian missions which seem to have spread from the Black Sea to the Gulf of Pechili, had been in contact only with the people of Europe and the Mediterranean basin; and although the religion of Islam was hostile, yet both the religion and the civilization of Islam were in a large measure founded upon the same Semitic and Hellenic traditions as those of Europe.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Europe at last began to come into contact with other races and other civilizations, with the ancient civilization of India and the Far East as well as with the American Indian and the African negro, and it is interesting and important to observe that almost at once the missionary spirit revived and the missionary work of the Church was resumed. It succeeded unhappily but a little in mitigating the horrors and crimes of the first contact of Europe with Africa and America. It was able to do little, but something it did

even then ; if the protests of the Spanish missionaries were of little avail, at least they did protest against some of the more outrageous crimes, and they did at least represent the principle that there are other aspects of human relations than those of economic exploitation.

The contact of Europe with races of men who, as in Africa and America, were for the most part obviously on a much lower level of material prosperity and probably also of moral civilization, at once produced a revival of that notion of the essential inequality of the human races, which had disappeared from post-Aristotelian philosophy and the theology of Christianity. And this revival has unhappily had a great effect upon those Europeans whose relations with other races have been mainly economic.

It is not my part here to sum up the character or the results of the Christian missions of the last four centuries. We may well remember with honour the men of the great Orders, Franciscan, Dominican, or Jesuit, or the patient labours of the Moravian brethren from Greenland to the far South, or of the Germans in South India and South Africa, or the mission of the English-speaking Churches, of the Baptists in India and the Congregationalists in the South Seas, or the work of the missionary societies of the Church of England in many lands. I do not know that the spirit of devotion and the spirit of adventure have ever expressed themselves in higher terms. The importance of their work for our subject lies in the fact that the missions have served continually to express another principle of the relation between men of different civilizations than that of the exploitation of the weak by the strong.

I do not, of course, mean to say that the economic relation is necessarily or even normally of this character. If men would only understand it—but they seem to find

it very difficult to do so—the economic relation is in principle a relation of mutual advantage, of mutual exchange of services and commodities, and in spite of many crimes and follies the economic intercourse of races and nations has at least immensely enriched the world, has assisted to raise the world above the level of a bare and precarious livelihood.

And yet it is also true that it is not in the terms of economic advantage that the most human of the qualities of human nature find their expression. The missionary spirit and enterprise is founded upon the conviction of the community of the moral and spiritual character of men of every race and condition ; the missionary approaches men and women not as the instruments of individual or even of mutual material advantage, but as those with whom he may share that which in his own experience he has found to be good. The sense of human kinship, the possibility of human respect and affection, it is these which bring men together, and which we hope and trust will remould the conception of the relation of Western civilization to the other civilizations of the world.

BOOK FOR REFERENCE

The New Testament.

VI

THE HUMANITARIANISM OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND ITS RESULTS

S. H. SWINNY

THE progress of mankind has depended on no single people. The torch has been passed from hand to hand. Some have moved forward, others have preserved ancient institutions, the total loss of which would have made civilization the poorer. Humanity has grown strong, not by the dominance of one type, but by the co-existence of many, each bringing its own special contributions to the common stock. Nor can every civilization be judged by the good it produced while it existed. There have been martyr nations, as well as martyr individuals, that have suffered in conferring some inestimable benefit on all future generations. In what follows I treat the West as, by reason of the growth of modern science, the leader for the moment of the whole world. This is a possession which it has gained, not for itself only, but for all mankind. It implies no permanent leadership. The torch may pass to other hands, or the nations, having all become possessed of our scientific achievements and having recognized the unity of Humanity, may advance as one whole, each bringing a different offering to the common altar of human brotherhood and the common service of Man.

In the period of transition between the close of the Middle Ages and the opening of the modern era, West and East faced each other, not as superior to inferior, but as

equals in strength, riches, and knowledge. Neither was accounted 'backward' as compared with the other, for the idea of progress was not yet accepted by either. They both claimed to be the heirs of Greek philosophy and science, and they divided between them the dominions of Imperial Rome. Mutually they pitied and despised each other as miscreants ignorant of the true faith; but the dream of a Catholic and universal church, or of the whole race gathered together in the brotherhood of Islam, receded more and more into a distant future. In the Middle Ages, indeed, the Mahommedan world might well have seemed to take the first place. There alone the science of the Greeks was preserved, while the schools of Bagdad and Cordova were the great centres of learning. The East had at its command the rich and spontaneous products of the Tropics, while the wealth of the West still awaited for its realization the laborious ingenuity of Man. The united powers of the Catholic Feudal world failed to rescue the holy places of Christianity from the infidel, and in turn the infidel threatened the West. And yet even on the day when the city of Constantine had fallen to the Turk, the triumph of the West was already assured. If both civilizations had inherited the lands of Rome, the spirit of Rome had never been assimilated by the theocratic peoples of the East. And at the very moment when the Church was losing its influence its great contribution to civilization, the separation of spiritual and temporal power, its fundamental protest against the rule of force, was to remain as a heritage to the modern world; and thus the science of the Greeks, so carefully hoarded by the Moslems, was enabled to resume its onward course, rising to heights of which the Greeks never dreamed. The idea of progress was born, and by comparison the East began to appear backward and unchanging. Gradually and partially, more in some nations

than in others, religious animosities, the old source of contempt, died down. Gradually, too, the old sources of respect weakened, as the West grew in knowledge, power, wealth, and freedom.

Thus the growth of the West, and the comparative stagnation of the East, inevitably led the one to despise the other ; but this was not the only source of the increasing distinction between them. Europe had long been separated from the richest countries of the East by the mountains and deserts of Western Asia. All frontal attacks had failed. Then with the improvement of navigation the Portuguese and others sought to turn the obstacle, and by sailing round Africa or across the Atlantic to reach the Indies by sea.¹ Europe thus came into close contact with races, Negroes of the African coast or American Indians, of a far lower civilization than the large and ordered communities professing the monotheistic religion of Islam. Those who still divided mankind into Christians and Infidels were thus led to despise the infidels more than ever. Secondly, the growth of knowledge, communications, and wealth, and the decline of the power of the Church and of the morality which it had taught, left the way open for the spread of commercial greed. Especially was this moral chaos seen in international relations, as the Popes became less and less recognized as arbiters between the nations, and sank more and more into Italian princelings, weakening their spiritual influence in their efforts to extend their temporal sovereignty. And

¹ The settlements and conquests of the Europeans, whether among savage peoples or those long civilized, as in India and Peru, were rendered possible not only by improvements in navigation—better shipbuilding and the use of the mariners' compass—but by the introduction of more powerful weapons of war, due to the employment of gunpowder. Both, however, were the result of the new scientific and industrial development of the West.

if the peoples of Christendom thus flouted all moral bonds in their relations one to another, how much more did they come to look on pagans as their natural prey. The era of commercial expansion and exploitation had begun. Further, the Renaissance and the Reformation, so contrary in many aspects, conduced alike to the degradation of weaker peoples: the one looked back admiringly to the ancient civilizations resting industrially on slavery; the other brought into new prominence the teachings of the Old Testament. The men of that and the succeeding ages were not slow to apply to recalcitrant Negroes and Indians precedents drawn from the treatment of Amalekites and Philistines and other enemies of the Chosen People.

I propose to trace the gradual recovery of Europe from this moral chaos, especially as regards the relations of peoples in different stages of civilization, the building-up of a new international morality out of the increasing knowledge and the growing unity of mankind. Yet it would be unfair to forget that a great Churchman, Cardinal Ximenes, Regent of Spain, refused to sanction the introduction of Negro slavery, or to pass over one famous experiment, that of the Jesuits in South America, in which, if the methods were new, the inspiration was derived from the religion of the mediaeval world. The Society of Jesus, the prime instrument in the Counter-Reformation, has been in consequence a special object of Protestant animosity. Like all successful attempts to revive a declining institution, it took advantage of the very forces which had weakened that institution's power, as e.g. by outbidding its foes as educators. It sought to compromise with the spirit of the age, and as that spirit was at bottom profoundly antagonistic to Catholic morality it often seemed insincere. But among the hunting tribes of South America, as in its Eastern missions, it could show its flexibility and relativity without

any such danger of misunderstanding. The Spanish adventurers who destroyed the old civilizations of the Aztecs and the Incas, had many great qualities, but they united religious intolerance with greed of wealth, the one justifying the other. The Jesuits in Paraguay had little to destroy. Hunters of the bison in North America, if they did not enjoy the enduring traditions of the pastoral family, had at least to keep united in order to hunt game that lives in vast herds. In South America the hunting was that of single animals ; each hunter depended on his own skill, and the young had an advantage over the old. There resulted what the school of Le Play call the 'unstable family', in which the children leave their parents early and no family tradition or connexion is maintained. In such a society there is little traditional morality to be destroyed. The Jesuits had a virgin soil which they cultivated much to their own credit, even by the acknowledgement of their enemies. Uniting the earnest faith of the Middle Ages with the power and knowledge of the modern world and acting on a people in so low a stage of civilization in a country of vast extent, they had an opportunity not likely to recur. To imitate their despotic rule under other conditions would be a course replete with danger.

The seventeenth century showed at first little improvement in the relations of advanced and backward peoples. The trade with the Tropics, the establishment of trading stations, and the exploitation of the neighbouring inhabitants continually increased. As regards the two leading nations, in France, the Gallican Church, at the zenith of its intellectual greatness, was the subservient handmaid of the monarchy, while in England the Puritan spirit was little inclined to be merciful to weakness, or to recognize the good in civilizations unlike its own. Nevertheless, in this same century, there were in England two series of

events, the one literary, the other religious, which heralded the better spirit of the centuries to come. In this literary foreshadowing of the humanitarian spirit, I do not include Shakespeare's play of *The Tempest*. It is of the greatness of the master who was not for an age but for all time, that each succeeding generation has been able to discover in his works new wisdom to suit the new time, to find in Shylock, the cruel Jew, the martyr of religious liberty, and in the brutish Caliban, the exploited slave, flattered while he is still unbroken, trained that he may be the more useful, deprived of land and freedom, and educated sufficiently to 'know how to curse'. Shylock and Caliban have changed with the growth of human feeling : the early seventeenth century passed such aspects by. It was in the second half of the century that Mrs. Aphra Behn wrote her novel *Oroonoko*. She was the first woman to gain her living by her pen, and she was the first writer to make an African slave the hero of a novel. It is true that the chief interest and the larger part of the book is concerned with life in a tropical colony and with vivid descriptions of Surinam, where the author had spent her youth, and that the pathos of Oroonoko's situation is not derived so much from his position as a slave, as from the contrast between his former greatness and his present misery. We are asked to pity not the enslaved human being, but rather the enslaved chief. Yet it was a notable triumph for the human spirit, that such a book should have issued from one who had passed her youth amid a society resting on slavery. We are already a long way from Sir John Hawkins, who took for his crest 'a demi-moor in his proper colour, bound captive'. Nor was it a slight gain that before the end of the century, Chardin, the French Huguenot, who 'nomen sibi fecit eundo', as his memorial in Westminster Abbey puts it, returned to Europe to give the first complete picture of a Mahomme-

dan state in his account of Persia. Henceforth, critics of contemporary evils, like Montesquieu or Goldsmith, found it useful to put their criticisms into the mouth of Orientals visiting the West, and so paved the way for a respectful treatment of the East. Finally, in the earlier years of the opening century, in a book destined to be read generation after generation, Daniel Defoe, having triumphantly shown the continuity of Humanity in Robinson Crusoe's dependence, even in his isolation, on the human past during the time he was alone on his island, later in *Man Friday's* shrewdness, fidelity, and capacity for improvement, equally triumphantly asserted the union in sympathy of the whole human race.

The same period saw two isolated protests against slavery from the religious side, one from Richard Baxter, and the other from Morgan Goodwyn, an Anglican clergyman who had been in Barbadoes. A more permanent effect was produced by the foundation of a religious movement destined to be a powerful leaven making for human fraternity. In one aspect, the Society founded by George Fox was an advance in the direction of individualism which had been continuously increasing with the decay of mediaeval civilization, and was one of the chief characteristics of Protestantism. In the supremacy of the individual conscience as guided by the inward light, in the abandonment of forms, ceremonies, and sacraments, in the repudiation of a separate clergy, the Society of Friends were the most extreme of Protestants. But the preaching of George Fox contained other elements. His work was also a protest against the Puritans' intolerance, their appeal to force, their attempt to revive theocracy. It was an appeal for a free fraternity against the forcible rule of the Saints. It was, under new conditions, a vindication of the independence of the spiritual power. Hence it is that Comte, in drawing up his Calendar of

Great Men, while many Protestants figure in other parts, placed two only in the month devoted to Catholicism, George Fox and William Penn. It was in international morality, in the relations of stronger and weaker races, that the members of the Society of Friends were to shine forth most triumphantly. In 1671 George Fox wrote :

'Respecting the Negroes, I desired them [i. e. the 'Friends'] to endeavour to train them up in the fear of God, as well those that were bought with their money as those that were born in their families. . . . I desired also that they would cause their overseers to deal mildly and gently with their Negroes, and not use cruelty towards them, as the manner of some hath been and is, and that after certain years of servitude they should set them free.'

This condemnation of cruelty and of perpetual servitude, guarded as it appears to us, was bold for its time, and the principles its author preached were destined in the end to light such a consuming fire of indignation against the hated institution in the hearts of his followers, as made them the protagonists in the struggle for emancipation. Even more decisive was the conduct of William Penn in his relations with the Indians. No copy remains of his famous treaty. But its justice and its success made it the first great step towards the restraint of the robbery and exploitation of weaker peoples.

But in the eighteenth century the destruction of the remnants of the mediaeval world and the building up of a new world continually advanced, though with unequal steps. The movement of destruction far outstripped any possibility of immediate construction, and mankind seemed only held together by the belief in freedom and enlightenment. But in spite of the prevailing view that all action was governed by self-interest, throughout the century, the bonds of human fraternity were continually growing in strength, the family of mankind was so

enlarged as to embrace all nations and peoples without regard to creed or colour, and devotion to human service became more and more recognized as a great ideal. In England the intellectual movement, so fraught with moral consequences, passed from a few great and almost isolated thinkers in the seventeenth century to the Deists at the beginning of the eighteenth. But its moral promise remained unrevealed. The English Deists, worthy men enough in their private lives, were even intellectually scarcely of the first rank, and were mainly destructive; they hardly set themselves up to be moral guides, least of all in the difficult province of the relations between stronger and weaker peoples. But in dying, for as a school their influence soon passed away, they gave birth to or at least promoted the rise of two other movements, destined to a longer and a wider influence. Directly, they inspired Voltaire to begin that rationalist movement that soon drew into its course practically the whole intellect of France. Indirectly, they impelled Wesley and Whitefield to their crusade against the infidelity and the indifference of the age. From these two very different roots, from the rationalism and humanism of France, from the evangelical revival (combined with the older movement of the Quakers) in England, came the driving force that eventuated in the freeing of the slave.

Sir Samuel Dill, writing on 'Roman Society in the Last Century of the Roman Empire', shows that in the time of Augustine—and in spite of all his polemic—the mentality and the morality of the Pagans was not very different from that of the contemporary Christians. There were certain fundamental conceptions which each party accepted and to which each appealed, conceptions as different from those of the Pagans of the first century as of the Catholics of the twelfth. So was it in the times of Wesley and Rousseau. Even the Tory Johnson could

speak of 'nature rising up and claiming her original rights'. Thus between the exponents of the new spirit in France and the evangelicals in England there was this in common, that their appeal was essentially to the individual, whether the first consideration was to save from oppression in the present or from the wrath to come. Both were full of the humane feeling of the time, pity for suffering, readiness for self-sacrifice. Wesley, amid his chosen work of saving souls, did not ignore the social problems of his age. Voltaire, in all his zeal for enlightenment, spent years in defending the victims of wrong. In fact, as Morley puts it, 'To Voltaire, reason and humanity were but a single word, and love of truth and passion for justice but one emotion.' It was this age, with its care for every individual soul, its love of freedom, its growing recognition of the unity of mankind, that found itself called upon to condemn or approve the grossest violation of individual liberty, the horrors of the middle passage, the disregard of all family ties, the degradation of a whole race. The answer was given in no uncertain voice. French and English, rationalist and evangelical, joined in the great movement that ultimately led to the abolition of negro slavery.

Yet there were some contrasts in the efforts of the two schools, as in the source of their inspiration. The humanist movement that had its centre in France was more universal, more widely spread throughout the West. There were few, if any, recalcitrants in its ranks. The influence of the evangelicals was almost confined to England and its colonies. At first it included many supporters of slavery. Whitefield, its most famous leader next to Wesley, at one time approved the holding of slaves, and Newton—who later made full atonement by his zeal against the hated institution—even after his conversion made voyages in command of a slaver, whereon

he established public worship twice every Lord's Day, officiating himself. He kept a day of fasting and prayer on behalf, not of the slaves, but of the crew, and amid the horrors common to every slave-ship, where the human cargo had to lie so packed as to touch each other on every side, he could record: 'I never knew sweeter or more frequent hours of divine communion than in the two last voyages to Guinea.' Later, the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade found no effort of their propaganda more successful, alike in England and France, than their plan of a slaver, with every inch of the lower deck covered by its black burden, each shackled to his neighbour, and allowed but a foot and a half, the sick and the whole, the living and the dead, side by side. The evangelicals, indeed, with their great leader, Wilberforce, confined themselves almost entirely to the question of Negro slavery, where they found the way already prepared by the Society of Friends. The leaders of opinion in France and their followers in other countries denounced all forms of racial oppression. Their most powerful enemy, Burke, did the same; but he belonged to a school very different from the evangelical.

The French *philosophes* were themselves divided on many points, but they were united in the great cause of human fraternity. Voltaire, with his burning zeal for enlightenment and the casting out of superstition, Diderot already looking forward to a new world, based on human science and directed only to the Service of Man, and Rousseau, the prophet of human equality, were all, though perhaps in different degrees and ways, lovers of freedom and believers in human unity. Voltaire and his school were indeed inclined to give exaggerated praise to the civilizations of Asia in their dislike of the mediaeval, and Rousseau, by his contempt for civilization, foolish as it might be, did much to abate the pride of Europe.

'The noble savage', however imaginary, was accepted as a reality by numbers of Rousseau's contemporaries, and at least discredited the insincere defence of those interested in the slave trade that they were depriving the negroes of their freedom in order to raise them in the scale of civilization. All schools of the new movement were alike immune from the pretension that slavery should be supported as a means of bringing the slaves to the true faith. But though the leaders thus prepared the public in France, and indeed all over Europe, for a policy of righteousness and justice, the chief direct contribution of the school on the subject was contained in a work now hardly ever read by an author whose name is almost forgotten. Yet the effect on public opinion of the Abbé Raynal's *Histoire des deux Indes* was enormous. 'It was that book', says Morley, 'which brought the lower races finally within the pale of right and duty in the common opinion of France.' An easy and varied narrative, covering a vast extent of ground, and full of eloquent denunciations of wrong-doing and of goodwill to all mankind, it hit the taste of the age; and its author was acclaimed as one of the greatest men of his time. He was certainly one of the most characteristic. Beginning as an ecclesiastic, and therefore having by law and custom to remain so to the end, he was in some respects a central and typical figure of the French eighteenth century, troubling little about its conflicting sections, sentimental, humane, with a burning hatred of injustice, a firm belief in freedom and enlightenment, and for the greater part of his life a radiant hope in the happier future of mankind. Almost alone among his fellow-workers, he lived to see the Revolution, and then he bitterly disliked the results of their labours. But though his work was so effective in his own generation, it had certain faults which told against its survival. To us his sentiment and his denuncia-

tions alike seem exaggerated. We have had plenty of horrors since his time, and the reign of justice comes but slowly. Above all, his elaborate history is found to be full of inaccuracies. He was not only careless and gullible, he could not persuade himself to lose a good story—especially one that lent itself to a display of virtuous indignation—merely because it was unauthenticated, or even when it was proved fictitious. What his contemporaries thought a serious history is now recognized as only a bulky pamphlet on some questions of the hour; but considered as a pamphlet, it achieved its purpose. The Abbé Raynal, in spite of his faults, deserves well of all oppressed and subject peoples.

In fact, throughout the eighteenth century and as a consequence of the general trend of its thought, which affected all schools, even though in different degrees, there was a continuous testimony to the great truth of human unity, a protest ever growing in warmth and power, against the ill-treatment or the enslavement of weaker races. A long line of poets from Pope to Cowper, historians like Robertson, economists like Dean Tucker and Adam Smith, joined the protest, and the last named showed that in the end free labour was more profitable than that of slaves. But none were stronger than the Tory Dr. Johnson, of whom Boswell says, that he was always 'very zealous against slavery in every form'. The affection that existed between Johnson and his negro servant, black Frank, is a beautiful episode in his noble life. But he was very far from confining his sympathy to those who, in losing their personal liberty, had experienced the hardest fate of all. He had no fondness for Empire. 'All distant power is bad.' And when he heard of the suicide of the great Lord Clive, he only expressed surprise that remorse for his deeds in India had not driven him to it long before. A still more illustrious conservative,

my countryman Edmund Burke, he who met the revolutionary philosophy of his age in the only way in which it could be satisfactorily met, by opposing to individual rights the organic view of society as a living and growing whole, made himself the great defender of the people of India. The trading company that found itself so strangely the rulers of an Empire were not without some good qualities. Intent on gain, they interfered as little as possible with the religion and customs of their subjects, and when the first Indian who landed on our shores, Naoroji Rastamji, the Parsee, sought redress against their servants for wrongs done to his family, they readily granted it. But when with the spread of dominion the ambitions of the Imperialist mingled with those of the trader, when in their zeal for British supremacy the rulers began to destroy the old landmarks of Indian life, all Burke's hatred of oppression was reinforced by his love of venerable institutions and his distrust of innovation. Society to him was a living organism, not a mechanism the parts of which could be altered or replaced. Glancing obliquely at the youthfulness of so many of the Company's officials, he declared himself stupefied by 'the desperate boldness of a few young men, who having obtained a power of which they saw neither the purpose nor the limits, tossed about, subverted, and tore to pieces, as it were, in the gambols of a boyish unluckiness and malice, the most established rights and the most ancient and most revered institutions of ages and nations'. Of the particulars of his great indictment of Warren Hastings I cannot here speak. Suffice it to say that the world saw with amazement the once omnipotent ruler of India, defending himself for long years against charges of oppression inflicted on men of a different race and civilization, and the greatest orators and statesmen of the time coming forward as the champions of those who were the

alien subjects and not the citizens of the state. Abortive as was the result of the trial, it had far-reaching effects. The Governor of the most distant possession henceforth was marked as responsible at least to the public opinion of his native land.

The contact of the West and more particularly of England with backward races and with the ancient civilizations had great and varied effects. Philosophically, as we have seen, the ordered and enduring societies of Asia, seats of learning and the arts when the peoples of the West were still barbarians, could be used as a foil to the civilization of Christendom. By exaggerating the merits of these ancient societies and the wisdom of their scriptures, the opponents of the old order in Europe could use them in their crusade against the prevailing religion. Thus it came about that the most conservative societies in the world were pressed into the service of revolution. But this was largely due to misunderstanding. It is only in our own time that these ancient civilizations—unduly praised by *philosophes* in the eighteenth century, perhaps unduly censured by missionaries in the nineteenth—are seen in their grandeur and their decadence, triumphs of the first efforts of the human spirit, and full of enlightenment for the student of social development.

But in this country, so much more intimately connected with the East than its sister nations, the effects of the contact were more immediate. The 'Nabobs', as they were called, added a new element to the corruption of public life. They had acquired riches quickly; they had lived among a subject people. They therefore had in combination the ostentation and the insolence which spring from these conditions. And after years of exile in the Tropics they were strangers in the land of their birth. In course of time, as the government of India became more settled, and the avenues to sudden and exorbitant

wealth became fewer, these characteristics became less noticeable ; but as the British Government of India grew more orderly and more powerful, as the rulers succeeded in imposing a regulated domination on the country, so there were introduced into India and spread to this country, theories of government hostile to constitutional liberty and individual freedom. It is true that none of these tendencies had undisputed possession of our public life. They were checked by other circumstances of the time. The spread of British domination in India almost synchronized with, or was closely followed by the industrial revolution at home. The wealth of the cotton lords soon surpassed that of the Nabobs. The rising power of the middle classes—to which by origin most of the Anglo-Indians belonged—was hostile in an era of expanding trade alike to autocratic and bureaucratic government. Therefore influences which seemed dangerous in the eighteenth century became negligible in the first half of the nineteenth. It was not until the latter part of that century, in the Imperialist movement which culminated, in the South African War, that the maxims of racial supremacy and imperial domination which had been first learnt in India, again became powerful and dangerous.

The effects of the contact of East and West in the other direction, that is on the people of India, have been more extended and permanent. The eulogists of British rule lay great stress on the Pax Britannica and the establishment of Courts of Justice following fixed rules of law. There is much truth in both contentions, but also some exaggeration. India, when we began our career of conquest, was in one of those periods of anarchy, met with from time to time in her history, caused in this case by the decay of the Empire of the Great Mogul. But this was not characteristic of India. Short periods of anarchy or invasion alternated with long periods of peace, and

even in the worst times, the village community, unless in the immediate track of the contending armies, lived its unchanging life. As to the establishment of our courts, they undoubtedly made for the recognition of a standard of equal justice ; but, if these courts were free from the arbitrary violence of the Indian ruler, they were inspired by principles drawn from an alien civilization. The Indian Prince and his representatives, if they were prejudiced, at least shared the prejudices of their people. Above all, their justice was more flexible : the inflexibility of British law, the binding effect of past judgements, was not an unmitigated advantage. Caste and marriage, for instance, which under Indian law were continually undergoing adaptation and development, have become hardened and stereotyped under the decisions of the new courts. Moreover, the industrial life of the country is poorer, less varied, because of the decay of the old handicrafts. On the other hand, as a result of contacts with the West, the old morality of India has grown weaker, new maxims, the product of an alien environment, have been introduced, a new conception of life has appeared, recommended by the prestige of the conquerors. This was an aspect of the situation that filled the conservative mind of Burke with misgiving. In the place of an ancient tradition rooted in the past and closely interwoven with every relation of life, new theories were accepted, foreign in their origin, and not a natural and organic growth of the Indian situation. Individual freedom and happiness were preached instead of social duty and the ancient pieties that joined generation to generation. There grew up a new class, educated in the learning of the West, and almost inclined to despise the ancient wisdom of their motherland. India was threatened with a great moral crisis ; but its very immensity and the strength of its ancient civilization prevented the ruin of the old morality. Amid an ever-

increasing disorder in thought and action there is yet a growing hope of final synthesis and conciliation. In the revulsion from the exaggerated value put upon Western knowledge and institutions some ideas remain to strengthen or revive the ancient life ; continuity with the past is not lost ; but modern science, the love of country, the unity of all mankind, add a new power to India's ancient tradition.

More drastic has been the change experienced by the negro slaves in the West Indies and North America. Sprung from a far more primitive civilization, they had less power of resistance and their change of environment was more complete. For the old organization, rude as it may have been, for the tribe and the family, the power of the chief and the tribal traditions, there was substituted the unorganized life of the plantation, an amorphous group, some but just enslaved, others grown old or even born in servitude, drawn from many tribes with varying customs, and differing in their aptitudes under their new circumstances. Family life scarcely existed, or where it did husband and wife, parents and children, were liable at any moment to be parted in the slave-market. Could a situation of greater moral danger be imagined. What future could be expected from those subject to it ? What wonder if the descendants of those who had no family ties should fail in domestic duties, if those should be idle and improvident who worked always for others and under the eye if not the lash of the taskmaster ! And then see, as I have seen in Memphis on the Mississippi and in Virginia, the prosperity, the industry, the family affection of the people of colour, and be of good hope for the future of the whole human race. Nor must it be forgotten that even under the institution of slavery, wherever close personal relations existed, many ties of duty and affection grew up between master and slave ; and human brother-

hood triumphed over all the hateful prejudices of race and colour.

It was in the emancipation of the slaves that the feeling of human fraternity, the recognition of the unity of all races and peoples, found its chief practical results ; and though the actual fruition only took place in the nineteenth century, it was prepared in the eighteenth, of which it is the true outcome and completion. I propose, therefore, in conclusion, very briefly to review the various stages by which that result was attained, especially in Great Britain, in France, and in America. As regards Great Britain, the movement falls into three distinct phases: first, the vindication of the freedom of the slave in the English and Scottish Courts ; secondly, the efforts for the suppression of the slave-trade from 1787 to 1807 ; and thirdly, the fight for the abolition of slavery ending in the Act of 1833.

The long contest between the Crown and Parliament, and the victory at the end of the seventeenth century of the Parliamentary aristocracy, though not without evil effects in the strengthening of class privileges and economic disabilities, favoured the liberty of the subject. The courts were open to all, and the flexibility of the English Common Law enabled the judges to incorporate therein principles really suggested by the general tendencies of the age. Yet in the fifth year of William and Mary the Court of Common Pleas allowed property in a negro boy, because negroes are heathens. Henceforth, any negroes at large in England made haste to be baptized, and it is to the credit of the age that they not only found no difficulty in obtaining sponsors, but the sponsors were ready to come forward in behalf of their god-children, if the liberty of the latter was threatened. In 1729, however, the Law Officers of the Crown gave an opinion that a master did not lose his rights in his slave by bringing him to this country. As a result, advertisements for the

recovery of runaway negroes appeared in the news sheets, and in 1756 a working goldsmith of Westminster announced that he made 'silver padlocks for blacks and dogs'. In 1763, a negro boy who had belonged to a criminal hanged at Tyburn, and whose property was therefore forfeit to the Crown, was sold by the public authorities for £32. It was soon after this that a negro slave, Jonathan Strong, being useless through sickness, was abandoned by his master in London, and sought medical advice from Dr. William Sharp. It was a fortunate choice, for there Strong was noticed by Granville Sharp, the doctor's younger brother, who henceforth became the great protector of the negroes. Strong recovered, and being seen in the street by his master, was again claimed. Granville Sharp secured his release, as the master was held to have relinquished his rights. Other cases followed, for all negroes in this country now looked to Sharp as their protector. By applying for writs of *Habeas Corpus*, he freed many, one even being taken from a ship already in the Downs on its way to the West Indies. On another occasion a master having seized a negro in open court, Sharp laid his hand on the master's shoulder and charged him with assault. By these means the masters were intimidated, but there was no final decision of the Courts ; and though Sharp had found a contrary opinion of Chief Justice Holt, that of 1729 still stood. However, in 1772, in the case of Somerset, Lord Mansfield and a full bench pronounced the judgement that as soon as the slave touched the soil of England he became free—a judgement perhaps more in consonance with the spirit of the age than with the law of the country. Blackstone, while accepting this, so far as it related to personal liberty, suggested that the master might still be entitled to his slave's perpetual services. But in 1777 the Court of Session in Edinburgh by eight to four decided that no

such obligation of service existed, and this decision was never challenged in the English courts.

Four years after the judgement in Somerset's case, Hartley, the member for Hull, son of the utilitarian moralist, brought the slave-trade before the House of Commons. There was as yet no organized movement ; but in 1785, Dr. Peckard, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, propounded as the subject for a Latin essay the question : ' Is it right to make slaves of others against their will ? ' The prize was won by Thomas Clarkson, who entered on the competition ignorant of the subject and intent only to show his proficiency in the Latin tongue, and left Cambridge after his victory to devote his whole life to the service of the negroes. In 1787 a meeting was held and a Committee appointed for the abolition of the Slave Trade. It consisted of twelve members, of whom no less than nine belonged to the Society of Friends, but of the remaining three one was Granville Sharp, and another the young winner of the Latin essay. Of Clarkson's adventurous visits to Bristol and Liverpool to collect evidence against the Trade, he has left us a most fascinating account. What he found surpassed in horror all his expectations, as e. g. the 132 sick and therefore unsaleable slaves, thrown overboard alive to cheat the underwriters, or the sick boy, left to starve to death, lest he might lower the average price of the cargo and, as a consequence, the perquisites of the ship's officers. Also he discovered that in no trade were the sailors worse treated.

In 1789, at the request of the Committee he went to France, where the great Condorcet had already written against slavery, and in 1788 a Society of Friends of the Blacks had been already formed. France was in the throes of the revolution and public men had much else to think about, yet Condorcet, Brissot ' the Quaker ' as he was nicknamed, and many others were eager to confer

with Clarkson. Mirabeau declared that of the 1,200 members of the Constituent Assembly, 300 were convinced supporters, and 500 more would join if the English, so much more concerned in the Trade, voted its abolition. But owing to the troubles of the time nothing was done ; many of Clarkson's friends ultimately perished on the scaffold, and the Revolution passed into more strenuous hands. But this only benefited the cause ; and on February 4, 1794, the Convention decreed the emancipation of all the slaves in French territory. Thus Wilberforce, with bitterness in his heart, saw that Atheistic France had freed her slaves, while Christian England kept hers in bondage. But the history of emancipation in the two countries well brings out certain differences between them. The English Committee, determined to do one thing at a time, and not to raise opposition needlessly, confined itself to the Trade and repudiated any attack on slavery itself. It took twenty years to carry out this limited purpose. The French Society went straight for emancipation, and accomplished it in less than six years. But what the English gained they kept. In France, the arch-reactionist Bonaparte, whom some now acclaim as a vindicator of progress, reintroduced slavery ; and though Hayti—in spite of the loss of Toussaint L'Ouverture, the greatest of his race—remained free, elsewhere slavery was only finally abolished at the revolution of 1848.

In the British Empire, in spite of the views of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, of Pitt and Fox, the Slave Trade remained unsuppressed ; the anti-revolutionary reaction was in full force ; and it was not till 1807, under the Ministry of All the Talents, that this iniquity was ended. Denmark had already taken the step, many other countries followed, and at the Congress of Vienna the Powers agreed that the suppression of the Slave Trade should be part of the Treaty. Clarkson and

his friends now turned their attention to the abolition of slavery, but it was only in 1833, more than a quarter of a century after the suppression of the Trade, that the Act for the emancipation of the slaves was passed by the British Parliament. The existence of other wrongs hindered the redress of this one. Those who were horrified by the sufferings of the factory workers insisted that their claims were more urgent than those of the Negroes. Later, the American slave-owners answered British remonstrances in three words: 'Look at Ireland.'

In America the old colonies of Spain took the lead. Most of them under the exigencies of the revolt against the mother country preceded England in emancipation. In Venezuela, Bolivar the Liberator, having by the chance of war come into possession of his own plantation, freed all his slaves to the ruin of his private fortune. Mexico, whose greatest statesman in times to come, Juarez, was of pure Indian blood, freed her slaves in 1829. In Brazil, on the other hand, slavery continued longer than in any other country of the West, but it must be remembered that owing to the complete absence of colour prejudice among the Portuguese it had there a far kindlier aspect than elsewhere. It was, however, in the United States that emancipation was most important and encountered the greatest difficulties. The rightfulness of slavery was questioned by the Society of Friends almost from its inception. The action of the American Friends falls into three phases: first, till about 1765, they aimed at amelioration, they prescribed kindly treatment, condemned the separation of families, discountenanced purchase. Then came a period lasting roughly to the end of the eighteenth century when the teaching of John Woolman began to bear fruit and slave-holding was generally condemned and the members were counselled to set their slaves free wherever it was legal to do so. Finally, being themselves entirely free from the taint,

they devoted themselves to encouraging emancipation by others, to making the status of slavery illegal, and to caring for slaves who had been freed. But in the second half of the eighteenth century they were powerfully reinforced by the spread of the humanitarian and rationalist movement that had its origin in France. Jefferson, of all the statesmen of the time the most under the influence of the new philosophy, though a slave-owner, tried to induce the Virginian Assembly to abolish slavery, and in the first draft of the declaration of independence which Jefferson drew up, the King was charged among his other misdeeds with waging

'cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of *infidel* powers, is the warfare of the *Christian* King of Great Britain.'

And though in deference to some of the slave states this was ultimately withdrawn, the Virginian Deputies supported it.

During and immediately after the War of Independence the prospects of emancipation were bright. Slavery had proved a failure in New England and the Middle States, and in one after another it was legally abolished. The prevailing political philosophy of the Rights of Man was admittedly outraged by the institution. The South was always in terror of a slave insurrection. Vested interests were low, and as the supply of slaves rather exceeded the demand, those with slaves to dispose of looked benignantly on the opponents of slavery as 'bulls' tending to raise prices in the market. The general belief was that slavery would peacefully and gradually die out in the South as it had done in the North. But in the nineteenth century the outlook darkened. As late as 1827 there were 130

Abolition Societies in the United States, of which 106 were in the slave states. But a change for the worse in the South was already in progress. Whitney's invention of the cotton-gin in 1792, after a time enormously increased the cultivation of cotton. Between 1825 and 1850 slavery changed from a domestic institution to an industrial system. The demand for slaves increased, and the importation of slaves from Africa being legally forbidden, though this was laxly enforced, Virginia and the border states set themselves to breed slaves for the southern plantations. The separation of families became worse than ever. And just at this time the prevalence of French views which had distinguished the Fathers of the Constitution and their contemporaries began to fail. Opinion became sharply divided between Slave and Free States, even among the Churches. And finally, emancipation was only attained as the result of years of civil war. In 1862, on September 22, a date ever since held as a festival by the coloured citizens of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the Republic, signed the decree by which, on January 1, 1863, in any states that remained in rebellion, slavery would cease legally to exist. Two years later he fell by the hand of an assassin, a martyr in the great cause.

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VII

EUROPE AND ISLAM

SIR T. W. ARNOLD

FOR nearly thirteen centuries Christian Europe and the Muslim world have faced one another, like hostile powers, mutually aggressive and distrustful, and there have been few periods during which they have not been in open conflict in some part of the long frontier between their respective territories. Within a century after the Arabs had poured out under the banner of Islam in their career of conquest, they succeeded in imposing their authority over Palestine and Syria, over Egypt and North Africa, and had established themselves in Spain, all of them countries that had once formed part of the Christian Roman empire. For a thousand years all attempts on the part of European Powers to win these countries back again ended in failure, with the solitary exception of Spain.

So long as Constantinople remained the capital of the Eastern Roman empire there was a barrier interposed to check the western movement of Muhammadan domination. The ranges of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus mountains for four centuries remained the frontier between the Byzantine empire and the Caliphate, though Muhammadan troops raided Asia Minor from time to time and more than once threatened Constantinople itself. But before the end of the eleventh century, a fresh conquering race, the Seljuq Turks, had succeeded in occupying all the centre of Asia Minor, leaving only a strip of country to the Christian power. The Crusaders were able, for nearly

a century, to wrest Syria and Palestine from Muhammadan control, but Saladin crushed the short-lived Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and the Holy Land passed once more into Muslim hands. The struggle for the Christian reconquest of Spain was longer and more permanent in its success, and by 1492 the last remnant of Muhammadan rule in Spain was swept away when Granada submitted to Ferdinand and Isabella. But while Christianity was winning in the West, in Eastern Europe the Ottoman Turks had, from the middle of the fourteenth century, been firmly establishing themselves in the Balkan peninsula. In 1366 their position in Europe was sufficiently assured for them to make Adrianople their capital, and their victorious armies had made them masters of almost the whole of the countries between the Adriatic and the Aegean sea before the capture of Constantinople in 1453. This achievement did not mark the climax of Ottoman progress. The annexation of Bosnia and Serbia was shortly afterwards completed, and was followed in 1526 by the conquest of Hungary, which for a century and a half remained a Turkish province. It was not until 1683 that the tide of Turkish conquest received a check before the walls of Vienna. From that period begins the long story of the decline of the Turkish empire, and the growth of European influence in countries once independent under Muhammadan rule. During the earlier part of this long period of nearly thirteen centuries the points of contact between Christian and Muhammadan civilization were more numerous than was the case after the Renaissance. It would take too long to consider these in detail; but in order that due importance may be attached to those mutual influences tending to bring the two rival systems closer together, brief reference may be made to some of the more remarkable instances.

The earliest systematization of Islamic theology was

due to the stimulus Muslim theologians received from the Christian theologians with whom they entered into controversy, particularly in Damascus during the first and second centuries of the Muhammadan era. The Roman law, the knowledge of which the Arabs derived from the subjects of the Eastern Roman empire who came under their rule in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, served as a model for those elaborate systems of Muslim jurisprudence, current in Muhammadan countries and even administered to the present day by such European governments as have Muhammadan subjects.

A further influence of far-reaching result was communicated to Muslim thought by the Oriental Christians under Arab rule who translated into Arabic philosophical writings of the schools of Plato and Aristotle, and Mr. Edwyn Bevan has well said that ' There was a time when Aristotle returning to the world would have found his name more honoured and his thought better understood in Baghdad and Samarkand than in Athens and Rome '.

In these three great departments of systematic theology, law, and philosophy, the Muslims in the Arab empire entered into the inheritance of Christian civilization.

In the early Middle Ages it was Europe that was glad to learn from the Muhammadan world, and from Arabic sources derived a large part of its knowledge of medicine, mathematics, and the natural sciences. A still wider influence characterized the period of the Crusades ; and the intimate relations that grew up between the representatives of the various Christian peoples and the Muslims they met in Syria and Palestine gave a powerful influence to the intellectual life of Europe, which marks a new epoch in the history of the art, literature, and science of Southern Europe. Similar influences made their way into Europe from Spain, and Christian scholars did not disdain to learn from Muhammadan teachers.

The Crusaders were driven out of the Holy Land, and the advancing flood of the Ottoman conquests caused the fear of Muhammadan domination to be a nightmare for several centuries; but under the Turks there was a decline in Muhammadan civilization, and European powers began to recover lost territories and assert their authority over countries with large Muhammadan populations. The predominance of power has thus passed into the hands of the various states of Christian Europe. How altered the position now is from the time when Christian and Arab troops fought near Tours in 732 and the Arabs raided Burgundy and the Dauphiné, when the Arabs were not only firmly established in Spain and Sicily, but had settlements in Sardinia, Corsica, and Malta, when the Ottomans occupied Otranto in 1479 and threatened even Rome itself!

At the present time France exercises authority over the greater part of North Africa, the seat of successive Muhammadan dynasties; Italy has annexed Libya; England controls Egypt and Palestine, and of the once powerful Turkish empire there is only a pitiful remnant left in Europe, and it is still uncertain how much of its Asiatic possessions will remain under Turkish rule.

Most of the great powers of Europe are faced with the difficult problem of dealing with Muhammadan populations under their control. France governs a population of over fifteen millions of Muslims in Africa; Italy controls a much smaller number, about a million and a half; the kingdoms of Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Serbia all number among their subjects large groups of Muhammadans, for whom special administrative measures have to be adopted; Holland has to frame its colonial policy in consideration of its thirty-five millions of Muhammadans in the Dutch Indies. The problem presents itself in still greater complexity and diversity in the British Empire;

and as we are more especially concerned with the relations between ourselves and our Muhammadan fellow subjects, I propose to enter in some detail into the consideration of the constituent parts of this population.

Various estimates have been made of the total number of the Muhammadans in the world, differing as widely as from 175 to 270 millions. As a considerable part of the Muhammadan world is made up of countries in which no census has ever been taken, the numbers are necessarily conjectural ; but in regard to those who are living under British rule or under British protection, we have in most instances reliable statistics or at least careful computations. According to these estimates, made before 1914, the total Muhammadan population in the British Empire is nearly ninety-two millions ; but by the incorporation of German East Africa into British Africa there has recently been added a large Muhammadan population in a country where an active propaganda has, for the last twenty years, been winning whole tribes to the Muslim faith. The war, too, has brought England into closer relations with Mesopotamia, Palestine, and certain parts of Arabia. There are seventy millions in India and Ceylon ; one million in the Malay States ; nearly thirty-five thousand in the West India Islands and British Guiana. Even before the war there were supposed to be more than twenty-two millions under British rule in Africa. The English converts to Islam dwelling in our midst, though few in number, add a fresh element to the problem, since they can serve as a mouthpiece for Muslim opinion elsewhere and may readily become a centre for organized effort.

These facts of population are sufficient to show how intimately our life as a people has become bound up with that of the Muslim world. We can no longer look upon the Muhammadans as dwellers in regions with which we have

no concern. On the contrary, there are even Muhammadans who take part in the organization of our own national life. For many years there has been an Indian Muhammadan member of the Privy Council, sitting as one of the Judges of Appeal on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Another Indian Muhammadan has taken his seat with other representatives of the British Empire at the Peace Conference. There are two Muhammadan religious missions working in this country, and the number of English adherents to this faith is on the increase.

There are certain characteristics of this Muhammadan population which present serious problems for the politician and the statesman, in addition to the moral responsibilities that are hereby imposed upon their fellow subjects in the British Empire.

One of the most striking features of the Muhammadan world, which has been emphasized by many observers, historians, travellers and missionaries, is the feeling of unity in Islam which overleaps all the barriers set up by nationality or by geographical position. Islam has succeeded in obliterating race prejudice to an extent to which no other religious system in the world offers any parallel, and though, like other forms of the ideal of human brotherhood, Islam has failed to realize its ideal of the brotherhood of all believers, still the measure of its success is the more noteworthy feature. It would be easy to give historical examples throughout the whole period of the thirteen centuries of the Muhammadan era. The ready welcome a convert receives into Muslim society, whatever may have been his previous nationality or social status, has impressed many Christian missionaries in various parts of the Muhammadan world. To the politician this characteristic of unity in the bonds of faith is a source of constant anxiety, as it is capable of expressing itself in forms of fanaticism that may spread rapidly

over immense tracts of country and may link together in a common activity peoples otherwise sundered by whole continents or oceans. In the present day when intercommunication is so much easier, and the sufferings of the Muslim world have done so much to excite sympathy for fellow Muslims in distress, the possibility of a widespread activity becomes still more possible.

It is strange how little the seriousness of this problem is realized by our fellow countrymen. There are indeed certain facts in contemporary history and in international relations which are so frequently impressed upon us that they become commonplaces and lose all influence on our practical life and everyday thinking. Among these is the responsibility resting on the people of this country in regard to the Muslim world.

What little attention is given by us to the study of Muhammadan history—and this has reference chiefly to the period of the Crusades or to the history of Turkey—tends to make us regard the Muhammadans as people living entirely outside the sphere of our daily life and in a measure largely inimical to us. We thus fail to realize how large a proportion of our fellow subjects in the British Empire are Muhammadans, and however many of us may be aware that every fifth person in the British empire is a Muhammadan, this fact has very little practical bearing upon our conduct. But the increased facilities of communication between one part of the globe and another, and the consequent shrinkage of the world must soon compel men to recognize that the old geographical obstacles that have hitherto kept men apart have largely disappeared and will, in the future, tend even more rapidly to make the intellectual content of human thought common to all the civilized races of the earth, and cause even the most diverse races to become familiar with one another. It is time, therefore, that the hostility

which, in Europe at least, has marked the relations between Christians and Muhammadans should be laid aside, and that we should abandon that aloofness which is so fruitful a source of misunderstanding, if not an actual hostility. We may, then, well consider what possible basis there is for more friendly relations and a more friendly attitude of mind. Two possible lines of approach may be suggested—one from the standpoint of religion, and the other from that of general culture.

Some useful purpose may be served by the recognition of common elements in Christianity and Islam. In the Middle Ages such a recognition was not unknown; but for various reasons, among which were the growth of the power of the Inquisition and, in the sixteenth century particularly, an increase in the number of renegades from the Christian faith, such an appreciative attitude towards Islam came to be fraught with danger, and scholars in the seventeenth century were apparently so apprehensive of persecution that they used to make elaborate apologies for even paying attention to the study of Islam at all. When they wrote of it, they adopted so violent an attitude of opposition that the Muslim faith came to appear to be altogether outside the possibility of the sympathies of Christian people.

I will not now attempt to enumerate the many points of theological doctrine and ethical teaching that are common to Christianity and Islam. Any one of you can find them for yourself in easily accessible text-books on this religion. I would now merely point out that whereas, in our country at least, Muhammadans have frequently been described as heathen, so that for the majority of English people Islam represents a faith that is not only hostile to Christianity, but has no points of contact with it whatever—there have, on the other hand, been times when points of similarity have been emphasized. Two

examples will suffice. During the latter days of the Crusades there was a monk attached to the Dominican convent in Acre, known as William of Tripolis, who in 1273 wrote an account, at the request of a Belgian arch-deacon, of the religion and teaching of Islam. In enumerating the main principles of the faith of a Muhammadan he concludes: 'Thus it doth manifestly appear that they are near to the Christian Faith and not far from the way of salvation.' These words were written after nearly two centuries of conflict in the Holy Land had embittered the relations between the two rival creeds. The other example belongs to an earlier period, before the great conflict of the Crusades between Christendom and Islam, and is found in a letter from no less a personage than Pope Gregory VII. In 1076 he wrote to an-Nāsir, the Muslim Amir of Algeria, commending to him the newly-consecrated Bishop of Bona (an African see that had once been occupied by St. Augustine). In this letter the Supreme Pontiff appeals to the common elements of faith in Christianity and Islam, and speaking of the love which man owes to man, adds: 'This charity you and we above all other peoples especially owe to one another, since we believe and confess one God, though in diverse manner, and praise and adore him as the Creator and Ruler of this world.'

Such examples of the recognition of common elements in the Christian and the Muslim faiths are (it is true) rare in the Middle Ages, but even in the controversial literature of that period, in the accounts of Muhammad written by ecclesiastics—unhistorical though they often are—emphasis is laid upon his connexion with the Christian Church. In such accounts he is represented as the pupil of a Christian monk, or even as having himself been a renegade cardinal. Following the judgement of the ecclesiastics of the Eastern Church in the generations

nearer to the period of the rise of Islam, mediaeval controversialists described Islam as a schism. This designation no doubt did not cause them to look upon it with more charitable eyes, but at least it implied that they did not relegate it to the outer world of heathendom, as became the fashion with the post-Reformation theologians.

The torrents of abuse poured upon Muhammad in this later period of theological literature had their origin, doubtless, in the comparisons which Roman Catholic controversialists, in their attacks upon Protestantism, drew between the doctrines of Luther and Calvin on the one hand, and those of Muhammad on the other. In return, Protestant writers on Islam tried to exhaust all the resources of invective in pouring upon the Prophet of Arabia all the most horrible terms of abuse they could discover ; and this heritage of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries lingered on into quite recent literature, and has naturally proved a source of resentment to Muhammadans, when they find their faith so unjustly described, in English literature especially.

If better relations are to be established, a truer and juster estimate of Islam must receive general recognition, and not be confined, as at present, to a small group of scholars. Emphasis may well be laid on the common elements in the two great rival faiths and upon the finer aspects of the life and teaching of the Muslim world. The conscience of Christian Europe has been shocked, during the present and the last generations, by an appalling series of cruelties perpetrated by persons professing to belong to the Muslim Church ; but it should be remembered that these horrors are as abhorrent to upright and earnest adherents of the Muslim creed as they are to Christian people. Such inhuman savageries as the Armenian massacres have tended to obscure the recognition

of these principles of belief and practice which Islam shares with Christianity. In the aggregate, Islam accepts the theistic doctrine set forth in the Bible ; it holds also to the faith as taught by Abraham, Moses, David and the other prophets of Israel and accepts in its own way Jesus as the last great teacher before the coming of Muhammad. The ethical doctrines of Islam are in a large measure the same as those found in the Old and New Testaments, and moral philosophy in the Muhammadan world has much in common with the moral philosophy of Europe in that both acknowledge their debt to Aristotle. But further—and this is of great importance for our present purpose—there has recently been in Muslim thought a development of dogmatic and ethical teaching which has tended to thrust into the background such opinions and practices as are out of harmony with the enlightened conscience of modern times, and just as we have abandoned the habit of our Puritan ancestors in looking to the Old Testament for sanction for the savage practice of religious persecution, so the modern Muslims inveigh against practices which their predecessors defended, and they now condemn slavery and polygamy and other social institutions with which the modern world is out of sympathy.

Apart from the fundamental dogmas common to Christianity and Islam, there is a sphere of religious thought in which devout persons succeed in overleaping the boundaries that diversity of creed erects between human beings. Mystics in all parts of the world feel with one another a community of thought, and it is in mysticism that the devout life of Muslims has found its fullest expression. Their mystical literature is full of expressions of sympathy with the followers of other creeds, and again and again inculcates a large-hearted toleration. This literature and the sentiment which it

encourages might well serve as a link with persons in the West who are in sympathy with this aspect of religious thought, and the writings of many of the Muhammadan mystics have now been made readily accessible, especially in the translations made by Dr. R. A. Nicholson.

But it must indeed be confessed that the religious history of our own time does not afford much encouragement to those who seek for a basis of union in the acceptance of certain common features of religious doctrine. In the life of a religious community points of difference tend to become emphasized, though they may be numerically less than the points of likeness. Still, something will be gained if English people may be induced to look upon their Muslim fellow countrymen as having an outlook upon life which is more in harmony with their own than has usually hitherto been recognized.

There is possibly more ground for hope in the establishment of sympathetic and friendly relations, if we turn from the specifically religious circle of ideas, and concentrate attention on the fundamental principles of Muslim civilization and that general attitude of mind which we call culture. One great obstacle in the way of a better understanding of our Muslim fellow subjects is the feeling of aloofness that causes English people to regard Muhammadans as dwelling in an intellectual atmosphere that is entirely dissimilar to our own. What is needed is emphasis on the fact that the Christian and the Muslim world are both heirs of the same civilization; though we owe much to the institutions of our barbarian ancestors, we (together with the other nations of Europe) are debtors to the civilization of ancient Rome, and like ourselves the Muslims have entered into this inheritance. When the Arabs came out of their deserts and conquered the Roman provinces of Palestine, Syria and Egypt, they had no system of law or of administration adequate for the

great tasks they had to undertake in the government of the empire which had so suddenly come into their possession. I have already shown how they learnt from the conquered people, over whom they had assumed supreme rule, the system of administration established by the Roman empire. They had to take over the functionaries whom they found already at work, and the system of law which the Muslim legists elaborated was based, in the main lines of its structure and in many of its details, upon the Roman law. This process of adaptation did not end with the earlier period of Arab rule, but it is equally characteristic of the later period of conquest under the Turks in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ; for the Ottoman Turks, when they established themselves in what was left of the Byzantine empire in Europe and Asia, in similar manner took over the administrative methods and the legal machinery of their predecessors, and Roman civilization lent vigour and stability to the new power that had come out of Central Asia. We have also seen that not only in law and administration, but in philosophy and the natural sciences, the Muslims went to school with the same teachers as ourselves.

In more recent years throughout large sections of the Muhammadan world, notably in Turkey, Syria and India, the influence of early Muhammadan literature has been considerably displaced by European writings translated into Arabic, Turkish and Hindustani ; European thought and literature have become widely known, particularly in intellectual circles, among men who have acquired a knowledge of some European language, or have, in increasing numbers, received their education in Europe itself. There has consequently been a revivification of intellectual interests and a new direction given to thought and life which can in many respects be compared with the Renaissance and the Humanist movement in Europe.

It is unfortunate that in this country the strength of this new movement is little realized, and the student of Islam and of Muslim thought has served up to him by writers on this subject doctrines and opinions which have as little real influence upon the modern Muhammadan world as the absurdities of mediaeval science have upon ourselves. It may be safely maintained that many modern educated Muslims know more of the thought of Europe than they do of the literature of the exponents of their own creed, and that they are guided in their outlook upon life and the problems of ethics and politics by what they have learnt from the same sources as we ourselves draw upon.

We must dismiss from our minds the old distinction between East and West. It is a distinction largely based upon ignorance and is now out of date, in view of our larger knowledge of the vast complexity which our ignorance used to conceal from us under that easy generalization—the East. Whatever barriers previously existed are now rapidly being broken down by easier methods of communication, not merely those of actual transit which are causing geographical spaces to shrink, but by more rapid and widely diffused communication of ideas. There is a great danger in our judgement of living men being influenced by what we have read in books, especially if these books are already several centuries old. The modern Christian Church would be ill judged if our knowledge of its meaning and purpose were based only on a study of mediaeval literature, but unfortunately the knowledge of Islam with which most English writers provide us is equally out of date. If we are to live in harmony and co-operation with our Muhammadan fellow subjects we must come to realize how much more numerous are the points of likeness than those we have hitherto recognized.

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VIII

THE INDIAN PROBLEM

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IN this course of lectures I have been asked to speak to you on the 'Indian problem'. I am not quite sure which Indian problem is meant. If, however, we are to consider the inter-action of India and the Western World, one might perhaps think of a cluster of problems cohering together like chestnut-balls, which need to be disentangled. The subject is indeed of far-reaching and varied interest. I think it was J. S. Mill who remarked that 'on all the great problems much remains to be said'. I cannot hope to do more than suggest a few points out of the vast range of the subject-matter which has been given me to handle.

In this course of addresses it is suggested that lecturers should treat their subjects historically as well as critically. I do not propose to do more than touch on one or two salient points in the imperfectly ascertained history of India. We need not trouble with prehistorics, where, on the strength of language and a comparison of myths and religious conceptions, philology has made us conscious of a very remote cousinship with some elements in the Indian peoples. The salient fact of long centuries of India's history is its isolation from the West. There is one moment of interaction after the invasion of Alexander the Great. It is impossible not to see in the early sculptures of North-West India traces of the Greek civilization of Alexander's successors. To give but one illustration, it

has been noticed that for three centuries after his death Buddha was never represented in the sculptured stones that told the story of his life. His presence in these sculptures was merely indicated or symbolized by an empty throne, a riderless horse, or the sacred fig-tree. It has been thought that the working out of the figure of Buddha owes something at least to Greek influence; it has been held that some Indian influences can be detected in the early gnostic literature of Christianity. A trade connexion certainly existed between India and the Roman Empire. But later the veil between East and West fell. The Muhammadan conquests of Palestine and Egypt in the seventh century interposed a barrier rarely crossed for the next eight centuries except by some stray and daring traveller. It would not be true to say that during this period India lived in a world of its own. From the third century B. C., after the life-work of the great Buddhist Emperor Asoka, the influence of Indian thought and ideals was directed to the Far East, to China and to Japan. But the synthesis of the life of India and the Far East is beyond the scope of this essay. It is not till the opening of the sixteenth century that our problem, the interaction between India and the West, opens. Every one knows how the year 1498 saw the beginnings of a new era, when the three tiny ships of Vasco di Gama, none of them over 120 tons, found their way round the Cape to the low-lying, coco-nut-fringed strip of coastland between the Western Ghats and the sea at Calicut and Cannanore. A new trade route was opened. Indian produce no longer had to come through Muhammadan lands, via the Levant and Venice to Europe. The price of pepper (worth its weight in gold in the Middle Ages), which came from the pepper-vines in the forests behind Calicut, slumped heavily in European markets. Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English traders broke the age-long spell of India's isolation

from Europe. You know the story of what followed, how commerce grew, how amid the decadence of the Moghul Empire dreams of political conquests suggested themselves first to the French Dupleix, and afterwards to Clive and Hastings ; and how the command of the sea turned the scale in our favour. Sometimes against our own will, sometimes in virtue of the tendency which makes it seem a necessity or a duty for a strong state to swallow up weak and ill-governed neighbours, sometimes, as under Dalhousie, from deliberately-planned annexations, the British raj extended itself, and the pax Britannica spread over the whole of India proper and beyond its confines.

This isolation from the West, then, is a very deep-rooted and significant fact. Contact with the Western world begins only with Akbar and Jahangir. Western influence grew strong, and then dominant, only from the end of the eighteenth century. Is it any wonder that Hinduism with its age-long tenacity of life, which reabsorbed Buddhism into itself, and refused to surrender to victorious Islam, resents this alien overseas influence, or if Indian nationalism, as represented by Tilak or Mr. Gandhi or the Ayra Samaj, often seems to long for a reversion to a supposed golden age before the Western intrusion ? The old Indian polity appeals to this school of conservative or reactionary Nationalists. After all, it is almost within living memory that the tabu against high-caste Hindus crossing the black water was really formidable and effective. Yet it is needless to say that such a reaction or reversion is now past praying for. Isolation is impossible—even if it were desirable, which it is not—in days of railways, steamships, wireless, and aeroplanes. For good or for evil, but surely on the whole for good, the stream of Indian life has broadened out into the wider water of human history ; and in this sense the inclusion of India as an original member of the League of Nations marks an

epoch, and registers a fact which has to be accepted. Before we leave this somewhat breathless glance at remote centuries, there are two further reflections which I should wish to submit to you.

I am sure that the history, as we read it, exaggerates in our minds the anarchy and misrule from which British administration rescued India. To the Indian, I rather think, this anarchy of the eighteenth century, when the line of the great Moghul rulers failed after the death of Aurangzēbd, must seem but a stage in a familiar process. Creation, preservation, destruction, these in Indian philosophy are the normal stages of the cycle of life. Rebirth comes out of death, and the phases repeat themselves. Out of the chaos of plundering Mahrattas or rebellious Sikhs the new Indian ruler would have risen and established a new dynasty, had not the Western powers seen their chance and established their sway. Reading the story of the East India Company and of Clive and of Warren Hastings we westerners have our minds directed to the breakdown of all order, and the helpless incapacity of the last Moghul. The Indian Muslim, at all events, thinks of the great and striking line of able rulers from Babar to Aurangzēbd. And if any one of you here cares for a piece of vivid personal history, he might do far worse than familiarize his mind with the story of that line of rulers. The history becomes astonishingly vivid. There is a wealth of intimate detail, and full literary materials. The court-painters of the time enable one to see the life of the age, and you can get to know the features of these rulers and the men around them as familiarly as we know the age of Queen Elizabeth or Henry the Eighth. Babar, the founder of the line, in his own memoirs reveals a fascinating personality. Akbar, contemporary of Queen Elizabeth, in an age of great men, though illiterate and showing some taint of the savage, was incomparable among the men of his day for states-

manship, achievement, success, tolerance, and force of mind and body. Shah Jahan, who built Delhi mosque and Agra fort and the Taj, was one of the great builders of the world.

Painting, history, and tradition have kept the details of the events of these reigns alive in the Indian mind. In my time at Oxford, Indian history as taught in the Modern History schools was the history of the British in India. It did not therefore begin till these great days were over. I sometimes wonder whether one difficulty of British and Indians understanding each other is that each has in his mind a different picture of India's past.

Then again, I think the history ought to show us—it very often does not succeed in doing so—how comparatively little the Empire in India came to us through the exercise of mere military subjugation. It would be idle to deny that force was there ; and there were times, as I have said, when political conquest was deliberately planned and intended. ' We hold India by the sword,' a soldier will often tell you. Large parts of India were certainly never conquered. They acquiesced in or were glad of our protection to save themselves from plunder or misrule ; as for instance the Rajputana States who made treaties with us in 1818. But even the armies which did effect the conquests were largely composed of Indians, and when the Mutiny came in 1857—a mutiny of part of the army—it should be remembered that there were more Indian sepoys raised by us to help our white troops than were fighting against us. There is a moment in very recent history which illustrates the extent to which administration in India rests on something other than force. For a period at the outbreak of the Great War, Lord Hardinge had the courage to hold India, with its 1,800,000 square miles of territory and over 300 millions of people, with no more than 15,000 white troops ; and that daring step was not taken rashly,

but after careful sounding of opinion and assurances that real danger was not involved. Does not this conclusively prove that India is held in the Empire by some ties other than those of force? If there had not been at that time some bond of goodwill, at lowest a sense of acquiescence in British rule and at best of conscious and willing partnership in the Empire, how could British administration under such conditions have survived?

It is easy to find traces of a reaction in India against Western influence in some spheres—a reaction for which as we have seen there is some historical explanation. But in the political sphere there is nothing of the kind. The cry of the politicians is for Western democratic institutions. I don't say that it is a universal demand. You come here and there across the wish for the typically Indian system, for the rajah who feels his responsibility to God, limited, as a mediaeval kingship was limited in Europe, by the advice of the Brahmin or by the influence of powerful nobles, or by the force of customary restraints. It is difficult to say how deep down in the Indian population the demand penetrates. Whoever may be qualified to speak as to what is in the mind of Indian villagers, I certainly have no qualifications whatever; and it is, of course, the dwellers in the villages who make up the overwhelming mass of the Indian peoples. One would guess that much like other peasant land-workers the Indian ryot mainly thinks of his crops, and the seasons, his debts, family concerns like the marriage of his daughters, and perhaps the simple pieties of village religion. Sir George Birdwood had a very idealized view of Indian village life, the beauty of its simple existence, its music and myth and folklore, all based on an economic standard of four annas a day. But Indian politicians will tell you that this life, even if it was idyllic, is now touched, or beginning to be touched, by the infection

of modern unrest, and the literates in the villages read vernacular papers to their fellow villagers. Be that as it may—I do not pretend to more than the most tentative indication of a possibility—there is no doubt that the organized political demand is unhesitatingly for institutions on the Western model.

Looked at historically, the spread of Western representative institutions is a striking and significant phenomenon. Their extension has been singularly rapid. In the eighteenth century they were thought to be the invention, the patent, and the monopoly of Britain. You have the doctrine set out clearly in 'Rule, Britannia':

The nations not so blest as thee
Must in their turns to tyrants fall;
While thou shalt flourish great and free,
The dread and envy of them all.

That is a perfectly good summary of the historical position before the French Revolution. England had its constitution; the Continental states were modelled as imitations of the scheme of Louis the Fourteenth. But the English system develops itself, with necessary variations, first in the United States and after an interval in the whole American continent. Representative institutions appear in France, and then after the set-backs of the French revolutionary period they are extended by stages, throughout the nineteenth century, all over Europe, even to countries just emancipated from Turkish rule. Men in Asia, seeing the preponderance and success of self-governing countries, their power and material progress, began to demand: 'If this system of self-government is good for Europe and America, should not we have it too? Are not we with our centuries of Indian civilization behind us, as capable of self-government as, let us say, Bulgaria or Peru?'

The demand for Western institutions would have

probably come anyhow in India, as part of this movement of thought. We made it certain as the result of our own actions. From the days of Macaulay onwards we gave our Western education to India. Indian students read Milton and Burke. They were taught through English history what a great and glorious thing it was to defy and defeat the executive. They absorbed poems in defence of liberty. Is it any wonder that the forces which we had ourselves created and trained demanded their outlet? If this self-government is so precious a possession, if it makes for material happiness, and if it is the source of character and manhood, why should its virtue not operate east of Suez? We had in fact created an *intelligentsia*, specially of lawyers and journalists, and inspired them with a theoretic and academic belief in self-government. It became impossible to answer to the Indians, 'Yes, but we meant self-government for Britons, and we did not somehow happen to be thinking of you.'

For a time it seemed possible to maintain an anomalous position. The British constitution is capable of anything. It threw out the Lancastrian experiment of constitutional government in the fourteenth century, and then the Tudor despotism in a succeeding age. For a time it seemed as though it were evolving a more and more democratic government at home, and at the same time creating in India an absolute government, which was capable of sitting in the seat of Moghul emperors at Delhi or Agra. But if this dualism had been in fact possible to maintain, it would have been undesirable. It would have been out of harmony with the currents of thought throughout the Empire. Democratic Australians, for instance, did not much like the autocratic character of the Indian Empire. They did not wish to feel themselves in any way responsible for, or connected with, such a system of rule.

Our administration at the end of the nineteenth century

rested on the framework of the old Moghul system, just as we took over the Moghul system of the assessment of the land revenue. A chain of responsibility stretched through the whole of the bureaucracy. Below the Governor-General or Viceroy were the heads of the provinces, Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, and High Commissioners. Under the heads of provinces, who in the most important cases were provided with Executive Councils of officials, there were men who were singularly misnamed 'collectors'. They were, in fact, the rulers of the 'district', an area on the average the size of Devonshire and Somersetshire put together, with an average population of about a million. Besides this the central government had organized special technical services, forest officers, the medical services, and so on. Such in bare outline and with omissions of many details was the system. But there was no responsibility to the Indian peoples. The chain of responsibility in theory lay through the collector, head of province, and Viceroy, to the Secretary of State for India, and through him to the Imperial Parliament, and in the ultimate resort to the British electorate.

That system was broken into first by the reforms of Lord Morley and Lord Minto, and later by the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme of reforms, which is now in force. Lord Morley himself stated that his innovations were not intended to lead up to parliamentary institutions; but they undoubtedly had that effect. Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford carried their reforms avowedly as steps to full responsible government within the Empire. That goal of Indian institutions was expressly recognized both by Royal proclamation and by Parliament. The statute of 1919 in which the reforms were embodied declared that its aim was :

' the gradual development of self-governing institutions

with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the Empire.'

Undoubtedly one part of the Indian problem, if the working of Western influences on India is to be studied, concerns the successful working of these new institutions. Lord Chelmsford declared not long ago that he was sanguine as to their prospects. It is early yet to judge of institutions scarcely come into full working order. In a single session of the Councils, tendencies have not yet had time to show themselves. We may, however, glance at some of the difficulties that have to be surmounted.

1. Some Indian orators would challenge the view that self-governing institutions were alien to the Indian tradition and civilization. They would quote the village communities of the earliest Indian history as evidence of early self-government in India. Greek observers in Alexander's day noted the existence of these village republics. At best these institutions were superseded centuries ago by the traditional rule of Rajah, Brahmins, and Nobles. But even then one must never forget the characteristic institution of caste, under which Indians are divided up into numberless groups of men and women, who must not dine or worship with each other, or intermarry. The village communities in those remote times were caste-communities, where the tie of kinship was everything. The essence of modern democratic communities is that men are organized within the nation not according to the tie of blood, but according to the tie of locality. So strong is caste-feeling in India that already under our eyes a characteristic Indian modification of western institutions as we now know them has taken place. Communal representation has had to be conceded. Men vote in the new electorates as Muslims or Sikhs or land-

owners, not merely as members of the Indian electorate. The caste-feeling has transformed the ordinary type of modern democracy. These institutions in the process of transplantation have made a characteristic adaptation to their new locality. The fears, which were freely expressed while the reforms were passing, that the strength of caste-feeling would lead to an oppressive oligarchy of the higher castes over the lower or depressed classes, has not so far been justified. The non-Brahmin majority in the South of India seems capable of looking after itself.

2. There is, of course, irritation at the half-way character of the reforms. No doubt, nothing would content the party of revolutionary force. But experience shows that if substantial though guarded progress is conceded, a revolutionary party, if it cannot safely be ignored, can at least be met otherwise. Apart from the party of physical force, impatient idealists demand at once full and immediate Home Rule. What is in force is nicknamed 'Dyarchy'. The bureaucracy is still responsible under the Governor of the province for some branches of the administration, e. g. for the maintenance of law and order; while other branches such as education, sanitation, and the like are to be managed by Indian ministers responsible to the provincial assemblies. No doubt this looks invidious; Pharaoh seems to say 'you shall go into the wilderness, if you will; only you shall not go very far away.' It does not imply, however, a distrust in the racial capacity of Indians for self-government. It implies in fact the reverse. No one would deny the racial fitness of Frenchmen for governing themselves; yet they broke down helplessly in 1789, partly at least because the necessary period of training in self-government had been skipped. The waiting period in India is justified by the remembrance of some obvious facts in the present social

condition of India. Before the recent reforms there was practically no electorate—a few thousands of voters at the outside among three hundred millions of people. The new electorate requires at least some training in political affairs. It bears about the same numerical proportion to the population of India as the English electorate after 1832 bore to the total population of England. Besides this, there are great varieties of intellectual level among the Indian peoples; a deplorably high amount of illiteracy, and great varieties of race, caste, creed, and language. Moreover, the success of self-government does not depend on the knowledge of shibboleths learnt out of a text-book of political science. It depends on the establishment of constitutional conventions, customs, and understandings, and on the formation of habits of political action for which some preliminary training is requisite. All Indians are not fit for self-government. Some undoubtedly are already, but there will never be a sufficient number, unless they begin to learn in a limited but progressively expanding sphere. Nor is the time-limit set at any very distant date. After eight years from now a new Parliamentary Commission is to be sent out to India to report as to the further completion of these schemes.

3. Indians thought that the Indian Civil Service or the English commercial classes might prove recalcitrant and wreck the reforms which Parliament had enacted. That difficulty need not, it seems, be apprehended. After all, the changes came, not in the least because the bureaucracy had broken down. Over vast tracts of India the system could have continued for years without friction, though in the end the reforms might have been inevitable. Undoubtedly the bureaucracy was the best of its kind known to history, upright, disinterested, efficient. It only happened not to be a substitute for self-government; and we conceived it to be our duty to train the Indian

peoples in that difficult art. Eminent members of the Civil Service have said in effect: 'In the past we never knew what the British people really meant. Did they think of India as a nascent but untrained democracy? or did they consider themselves the successors of Akbar? There was something to be said for either view, but nothing whatever for not making up your mind which view you meant to act upon. As soon as a national declaration has been made that self-government is the accepted goal, we, the civil servants, will co-operate and assist.' It seems also that some members of the British commercial community now see that they must contribute their share in the government of the country; which is an advantage doubtless both for the country and for the British business men.

4. Perhaps the gravest dangers to the success of this great experiment lie not in India itself and not in the nature of the reforms at all. They have come into being in stormy post-war days of unsettlement, discontent, and defiant racial aspirations. The unrest of the time in India was intensified by events which were felt by many to be real grievances, such as the administration of martial law in the Punjab. It is a singular fact that the war revealed in the British Empire an immense power, with which no one before the war would have credited it, and immediately after peace is secured its position is challenged, not only in India but in Egypt and Ireland. Everywhere in Asia—and for that matter in Africa also—there seems to come a challenge to the dominance of Europeans. Do you know the litany written by a man of negro race in the United States:

'Sit no longer blind, O Lord, deaf to our prayer, dumb to our dumb suffering. Surely, thou too, O Lord, art not also white.'

The war, it may be, has shaken the prestige of the white

peoples. Is this Europe torn to pieces in a savage and suicidal war so greatly superior to other races as she thinks herself to be? That feeling is, I think, really there, though you may have to listen for it.

To exacerbate this feeling of unrest in India comes the still unsettled state of our relations with Turkey. It would take me into the forbidden waters of controversial politics, were I to attempt to deal with our handling of those relations. This has its reaction on the feelings of seventy millions of Muslims in India. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of the policy which Great Britain has pursued in the Near East, it is not to be doubted that the resentment of Islam militates against the successful working of Indian reforms.

5. One further condition of the success of these reforms should, I think, also be noted. It will be remembered that we are now committed to full self-government within the Empire as our eventual goal. In mid-Victorian days there was a small school of thinkers who, dwelling on the iniquity of conquest in the abstract, and in particular on certain cases of conquest in our Indian history which they deplored, seemed to think that it was right for England to make a noble gesture of disinterested self-abnegation and to leave India. Yes, but to what, or to whom? That was not so explicit in their declarations, perhaps because they regarded their proposal as abstractly right, but as a remote contingency. Clearly it would be anything but noble, and indeed a flagrant breach of trust of which no government could be guilty, so to withdraw from India as to leave her defenceless in a world of international cupidities. Is not China temptation enough in the Pacific, where the building-up of great navies is still difficult to control? Or is India, requiring an army for defence on her North-Western frontier, whence so many invasions have come, and hampered by a deplorably low

standard of life—is India to drain her resources by building up a naval defence force like that of Japan ? Could not the resources of the Empire be pooled ? Could she not, like the other Dominions, build up her self-government under the shield of the Empire's navy ? This third possibility of self-government within the Empire has much more to recommend it than the sharp antithesis of the mid-Victorian era, Empire or abdication. Yet it must be admitted that the Dominion status, which for the fully self-governing colonies admirably reconciles freedom and unity, may not find conditions so favourable for its success in the case of India. The tie of community of race, which with some qualifications operates with the self-governing Dominions, is practically absent in the case of India ; and the gulf between Indian and British civilization is far wider.

I think an Indian might probably reply that the conscious acceptance by India of her position within the Empire depends mainly on the future character of the Empire. In the first place, citizens of the Empire must clearly have equal rights within the Empire ; invidious barriers and racial distinctions are out of place. From that standpoint the treatment of Indians in British Columbia or in some parts of Africa is a grave Imperial danger. The right of restricting immigration is conceded to all the Dominions as an essential right of self-government. The cases in which it is exercised against British immigrants into Canada are more numerous, I believe, than the cases in which it is exercised against Indian immigrants into that Dominion. But if the right is to be exercised at all, its use should be based on economic and not on racial grounds. Measures can be taken, if need be, to defend a standard of life by the restriction of immigration. But exclusion on racial grounds is naturally resented as an insult and indignity.

Secondly—and this leads at once to a different aspect of the Indian problem—the position of India inside the Empire can only justify itself to Indians, if the Empire is not merely tolerant of Indian civilization, but leaves it full and free scope. We may give our good wishes for the success of Western political institutions in their new extension to India. But the Westernization of Indian civilization is not to be desired. We have in many ways Europeanized too much already. It would be disastrous if there were produced in India a pale and lifeless imitation of English culture. Fortunately Indian civilization has a very tenacious life of its own.

This view is of course only tenable, if it can be held that Indian civilization has a distinctive character of its own and is worthy of development and preservation. Mr. William Archer in a recent book on India roundly denounces it all as mere 'barbarism'. There are features in Indian life, like the worship of Kali at Calcutta, which, though interesting as historical survivals, are certainly not attractive. We have learnt, so far as religion goes, that we must not officially countenance any proselytism. In such matters India must work out her own salvation. I could not in this lecture attempt any appreciation of what is best in Indian life. I am not in any case qualified for the task. Any one who wishes to appreciate the best elements of that civilization must make the adventure for himself or herself. But it is not altogether easy to do so without seeing India; and in any case the tropical and luxuriant growth of Indian languages is a serious bar to us. Yet with the utmost diffidence I would venture to say a very few words on an immense subject in the hope of arousing interest, of giving some one a clue, or of putting some one on a trail that may be worth while to follow. Indian architecture is indeed one of the things that can hardly be appreciated except in India itself. Books and photo-

graphs give little or no conception of the impressiveness of South Indian temples ; and not the faintest idea of the haunting and unforgettable beauty of the Taj and its garden. Indian music again is difficult for us Westerners to appreciate. It has its own conventions, but heard at its best in India, it has a real emotional appeal and a strange beauty of its own. There at all events the tradition is still alive. Unfortunately that is not the case with Indian painting. Indian painting, however, can be appreciated as well in England as in India. Collections in London or at Oxford will enable those who make the effort to care for the palace art of the Moghul painters, who make the life of Akbar or Shah Jahan live again, or for the more popular Hindu or Rajput paintings, which deal rather with domestic scenes, or the Krishna story or illustrations of varying musical modes. Such paintings must not be looked at from the standpoint of academic or Western conventions in painting. But they are more and more appealing to the modern schools of painting, and there are some who have eyes to see. That art, unfortunately, is almost entirely dead, and a well-known school of painting at Calcutta, partly under Japanese influence, tries to revive or recreate a broken tradition.

Lastly, there is the wide field of Indian philosophy, which has had a life and development of its own from undated centuries. Here more especially I tread with the greatest diffidence, conscious as I am of the barest and most superficial acquaintance with a vast subject. It is of course a happy hunting-ground for esoteric religions and theosophies, not to say for cheats and charlatans. For there is ready to hand a luxuriant growth of uncouth technical terms, which, if half understood or dexterously misapplied, sound effective or impressive. There was never a study where you need more to escape from the tyranny of words. But any one who cares

for a voyage of discovery, would find real interest in getting back to the fountain-head. The Upanishads, if any one here does not know them already, were early philosophical speculations, memorized, not written, centuries before the Christian era, the work perhaps of hermits in their forest dwellings. They carry us back to some of the earliest guesses, speculations, intuitions as to the meaning of the world and of our life in it. They make one see the kind of thinkers who existed in Greece before Socrates, of whom we have nothing left but scattered sentences that summarized their thought for themselves and for their disciples. The ideas of the Upanishads are of course mixed up with much that is crude and primitive. But in these early thinkers you get the dawn of the thought that the world is but the expression of one divine life and that that life is one with the life of the soul or mind of man. Indian monism, Indian pantheism, say the critics, placing this speculation in its appropriate scientific pigeon-hole. But it is none the less of interest to see these thinkers trying in one metaphor after another to express and bring home their idea. Later their thought was elaborated, and sometimes not improved in the formal philosophies. You find it transfusing, rationalizing, and sometimes plainly sophisticating the simple and honest folklore and the religious mythology. It is everywhere at the back of their art, their sculpture, their building. It inspires poets like the weaver poet Kabir or Tulsi Das. It is still an article of current faith, and you will find it reappearing in the works of Sir Rabindranath Tagore. The vitality of that belief is perhaps the basis of the generalization that the East is spiritual and the West materialistic. Stubbs used to say that all generalizations, when you looked at them, faded away, like the Cat in *Alice*, into a grin. There is some spiritual life in the West and some materialism in India. But if I may venture

to criticize Mr. William Archer's views which I have quoted above, I would say that you don't begin to get an insight into Indian civilization at all, if you look at it from the standpoint of a Western rationalist. So I think we must agree with Sir Rabindranath Tagore, who recently wrote an interesting article on this aspect of the Indian problem in the *Socialist Review* :

'Western political institutions may be borrowed and perhaps assimilated or adapted to India's special requirements ; and certainly India will acknowledge her debt to the West for its achievements in science, which really account for the greater relative progress in material welfare in the West as compared with India during the last three centuries.'

But India's own individuality must have full scope for its development. 'All the elements in our own culture', as Tagore says, 'have to be strengthened, not to resist Western culture, but truly to accept it and assimilate it, and use it for our food and not for our burden.' I have tried to suggest to you that there is a storehouse of Indian beauty, shown alike in buildings, painting, music and textiles, filled by the hereditary craftsmanship of a race of artists, which ought not to be wasted or overwhelmed by mere imitations of the West. India has her own special contribution to make to the philosophic or religious thought of the world.

If the British Empire can achieve this tolerance, contenting itself with keeping the peace, and encouraging each national culture to develop along its own lines, it will escape the blunder of previous empires. We are certainly not bound to admire all the qualities of all the races of which the Empire is composed. Enough if, to accept J. S. Mill's words, 'we recognize each other's reciprocal superiorities'. In that way, I suggest, India may do a real

service to the Empire. The Empire in the long run cannot safely be based on the dominance of the white race. It should rest on the ideal of justice and freedom within the Empire for all the races contained in it. Its permanence will depend not on the sentiment of unity in a race, but on the extent to which it promotes liberty and justice and peace over wide spaces of territory. In other words, it should be bound together not by a racial tie, but by its maintenance of common ideals of progress and freedom.

Perhaps, however, this presents too rose-water a view of future eventualities. It may make too heavy a demand on human patience, on statesmanship, and on the possibilities of mutual goodwill. Race hatreds may grow too strong, and extremest agitations, countered by appeals to material force, may after all bring confusion and disaster in their train.

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IX

WESTERN RACES AND THE FAR EAST

W. E. SOOTHILL

THE Cave-men of the period of barbarism have for long been made conscious of their deplorable condition by the flickering torch of their prophets, and have been groping for a way of escape into an outer world. To-day they are catching the rays of the sun along the rugged path out of the cave into a more celestial vault and a more generous life. If the English-speaking races will join hands to tread the way of escape they may reasonably hope to lead humanity out under the dome of Heaven, provided always that their leadership is not merely for selfish advantage—to get the first place in the sun—but for the welfare of all races.

Individually we have assented to the profitable law, 'Love thy neighbour as thyself,' and in practice do our best to avoid stepping on his toes, and no longer greet our weaker neighbour with a 'flint'. We have given up our duelling swords to the judges, and internationally developed cordial relations with our former enemies—for present profit—but the law of neighbourly love has yet to find a fuller expansion among the nations of Europe before they can harmoniously apply it to each other's welfare, not to mention its application to other races.

There was a time before the War when German enterprise in the Far East had produced a rivalry in which the vulgar spirit of 'Codlin 's your friend, not Short ' had even invaded high politics, to the annoyance of the patriotic minister. That spirit is likely to revive. Apparently

we must have trade, Germany and Japan as well as ourselves, and self-interest and 'profit' threaten to debase relationships and control the destiny and happiness of nations and races, even of present-day Allies. There is something to be said for the old-fashioned Tory who despised Trade as beneath a gentleman. There is more to be said for Mencius who more than 2,000 years ago disdained the word 'profit', and declared that the true political law is kindness and justice, not 'profit', indeed that when you get to the bottom of things you find that the true and lasting law of 'profit' is kindness and justice.

The West. In view of the unlikelihood of any community of European nations immediately adopting the common-sense principle that the welfare of the whole is greater than the welfare of the part, and that the welfare of the East is a prime essential to the welfare of the West, I propose to limit my consideration of the subject to the relations of the English-speaking races with the Far East—not that I think we are particularly admirable exponents of the Kingdom of Heaven, though I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we are the best existing. May we improve, or a better arise!

The Far East—what does one mean by it? Strictly speaking, the term covers all the eastern peoples beyond the confines of our Indian Empire—Siam, Malaysia, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, French Indo-China, the Philippines, Japan, Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, and last and greatest, China. Just as we sum up the European nations as a White Race, so nearly all these Far Eastern peoples can be generally summed up as the Yellow Race. Now these Yellow Races are as varied in development as are the races of Europe. You have the unlettered nomads of the north, baked in summer, frozen for months in winter, with their own languages, laws,

customs, and meagre literature. You have the unlettered peasants of the far south, with very different languages, laws, and customs, peasants who toil for a bare living under a sun which the year round threatens to melt the very bones ; where also you find the inflammable Malay and the gentle Javanese. You have the ignorant fanatical Tibetans on the west, on the east modern Japan, and in the midst the great continent of China, with its 5 per cent. of lettered men and its 95 per cent. of illiterate toilers, and with every variety of climate and development. In a brief lecture it is as impossible to consider them all, as it would be to treat the nations of Europe. What I have to say therefore will chiefly centre around the two leading races of the Far East, China and Japan, as keys to the whole subject.

Past Relations. For more than two thousand years there has been a measure of intercourse between the Far East and the West. In the second century B. C., soon after the fall of the Graeco-Bactrian empire, a Chinese traveller visited the eastern boundary of the Roman Empire and left on record his experiences. The Greeks and Romans before his day knew of the land of the Seres, whence the silks came, though no Greek or Roman had ever visited it. The main trade-route ran across Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, and thence by land to Antioch, or by water to the head of the Red Sea. Early in our era the Arabs opened the sea-route to China. With the fall of the Mongol dynasty in the fourteenth century the overland route lost its importance to the sea-route. It was not, however, until the sixteenth century, less than 400 years ago, that direct sea-communication was opened between Europe and China, indeed we may say that it is only during the last hundred years or so that the Far West and Far East have seriously developed intercourse, and only in our lifetime that they have begun to fraternize.

The advent of the West to the East has naturally been very disturbing. It did not begin under happy circumstances, and pecuniary 'profit' for both was the sole bond which enabled the acquaintance to be maintained. The Portuguese Rafael Perestrello visited Canton in 1511. His Portuguese successors would have found as rich and ready a market awaiting them as had their Arab predecessors if they had been pleased to burden themselves with a conscience. But these valiant venturers, to whom we all owe so much, were by way of being bold and brutal buccaneers, a profession which they quite needlessly pursued along the Chinese coast as elsewhere, to the detriment of their legitimate trade and the woful tarnishing of the character of the occidental. Spaniards and the Dutch followed with as little consideration for honour and decency. Even Weddell, with his little English ships—in consequence of Portuguese intrigue—opened British acquaintance with China in 1636 by attacking and capturing a Chinese fort and only restoring it after his goods had been sold!

In the Philippines the Spaniards in 1602 and 1639 massacred 40,000 Chinese settlers merely on suspicion of plots. Fifty years earlier the Chinese had set the example, in consequence of the 'insolent and licentious conduct' of the Portuguese, by attacking and killing in Ning Po 'twelve thousand Christians, including eight hundred Portuguese'. The Dutch plundered important Chinese towns and seized Formosa, only to be driven out thirty years later by Koxinga.

Not without excuse, therefore, did the Chinese style all Europeans 'barbarians', and treat them as dangerous intruders, who were too active to be wholly excluded, but must be rendered as innocuous as possible by confinement to specified areas and by rigorous supervision. Thus was bred the spirit of contempt which a century and less

ago treated with contumely the noble envoys of the East India Company and of the British King, and which brought about in 1842 the so-called Opium War, a war in which opium was the accident, albeit an accident unsavoury and discreditable. At bottom the real cause of the war was the Chinese word for 'barbarian' and the spirit of contempt engendered by it. By the Opium War China was vigorously persuaded officially to taboo the obnoxious word 'barbarian', though it took more than the rest of the century to change public opinion, as witness the Boxer upheaval in 1900, itself the outcome of German and Russian aggression.

When the founder of the Christian Church in China, the Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, reached Peking in 1601, and got the ear of the Court, it seemed possible that his learning and judgement might lead to better relationships with Portuguese and other foreigners. This hope was frustrated by the continued truculence of the trader, as also by the beginning of a serious strife over religious terminology amongst the Roman missionaries, and the ultimate seeming creation of an *imperium in imperio* by the fatal intervention of the Pope in decisions which traversed those of the great Emperor K'ang Hsi.

The changed attitude of the Chinese has not been brought about by priest or by cannon, unless we except the astounding shock of the Japanese victory over China in 1894 and again over the Russians in 1904. It has been brought about by the Mission College and Hospital, by wise British servants of the Chinese like Sir Robert Hart, by trusted British and other ministers like Sir John Jordan, by our honourable Consular Service, by able missionary writers like Drs. Y. J. Allen and Timothy Richard, by gracious lives of many missionaries, by fair and honest dealing of the modern merchant, and especially by the increasing number of Chinese who visit the West,

particularly America. The Boxers were the 'last ditchers' for the word 'barbarian', and on their miserable failure there was nothing left for the Arch-Boxer, the Empress-Dowager, to do but turn 'barbarian' herself, and so she did, adopting the 'barbarian' system of education, preparing for a 'barbarian' parliament and constitutional government, suppressing native and 'barbarian' opium, establishing a 'barbarian' army and navy, and so on, but she left it to the Republic to introduce 'barbarian' trousers on to celestial legs and 'barbarian' bowlers on to queueless heads.

I am not vain enough to be unduly proud of our past history in China, but there is still less room for the Chinese to be vain. If two blacks don't make a white, two bads make a worse. At any rate for several decades past Britain has acted sympathetically and honourably, and now that the wretched opium business—which was Indian, not English—is out of the way, she can look China in the face without a blush.

Japan was early led into the way of modernization, with a progress so rapid that, through alliance with Great Britain, a position of international equality has been gained still unearned by China. Japan has won her place by ordered government, by a radical revision and, on the whole, creditable administration of her laws, by systematic and thorough study and application of western methods, by the early reformation on a sound basis of her educational system, by the development of her industries, and by the very thorough development of western man-killing methods. The growth of Japanese power, since it forcibly disclosed the rottenness both of China and Russia, has infected Japan with the microbe of militarism, and Prussian officers have fostered its growth. With an overflowing population, a shortage of home-grown food, and an oppressive taxation, chiefly for military purposes,

Japan is making an organized endeavour to exploit the resources of China, Manchuria, and Korca for her own advantage. This is making Japan a bad neighbour. Korea has been mercilessly, China arrogantly treated. Consequently China's diminishing stock of anti-foreign hatred is now directed solely against her island neighbour.

Japan's action may have seemed profitable, but even by nations 'a good name is rather to be chosen than great riches', and everybody knows that the 'goodwill' of a business may be an asset of no small value. Japan has aroused the bitterest hatred in China and Korea, and has produced serious distrust in America. She has benefited by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance—England also—but it will be to the advantage of neither to renew the Alliance with America left out, and therefore we may rejoice over the prospect of the forthcoming Washington Conference.¹ We may also rejoice that China is to have a voice in settlements which profoundly affect her. Nothing could cause that country more humiliation than to be kept on the door-mat while her future was being discussed and then to be handed dictated terms, however excellent they might be. If her chaotic political condition depreciates the present market value of China as an ally, the making of her into an ally should increase that value by inducing her to put her house in order, and giving the Allies rights—of friendship—which at present they can only claim as creditors. As to Korea, the entry of America into an alliance with Britain and Japan would justify the hope of a measure of self-determination in that sorrowful land. Japan it is true has improved material conditions in Korca and Manchuria, but she has failed

¹ Since this lecture was delivered the Washington Conference has met and, we may reasonably hope, heralded a new day of international comity and co-operation in the Far East by enlarging the membership of the Alliance.

in the more important moral and spiritual functions of government.

The Yellow Peril and the White Peril. In regard to the three races, White, Yellow, and Dark, we gain nothing by closing our eyes and refusing to examine the present or look ahead into the future. As to the Yellow Peril, then, is there any need for the fear which set the late theatrical Prussian ruler facing the Far East in shining armour, and which sent forth his soldiers like Attila and his Huns? On the other hand, and equally important to the Far East, and therefore to world welfare, is there a White Peril of which the Yellow Races, with their crowded population and economic needs, may stand in dread, and against which they must stand for ever on guard? Let us examine the two positions, see if we are facing bogies or realities, and if the latter, inquire whether there is any solution of the difficulty other than that of poison gas and an army of gravediggers.

Far be it from me to deny the existence of a Yellow Peril. It certainly does not take the form of a fresh Tartar outburst, as when the Hun or the Mongol horsemen thundered across the plains of Asia, shaking the earth and the hearts of men, and carrying death and destruction into the middle of Europe. Nor do I think it will take the form of millions of armed Chinese soldiers, perhaps under the hegemony of Japan, driving the European out of Asia, and ultimately off the planet. If there be a Yellow Peril it is much more subtle than anything of this kind. If such peril exists it lies rather in the steady expansion of a multitudinous people, who are most happy when they are working, whose highest bliss is a wife and family, and who are well contented with an all too simple life. We see the process at work not only inside but outside China in the large and increasing population of Chinese who, by sheer ability and perseverance, are gradually taking

possession of the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Java, Sumatra; who have invaded the United States and Australia; and who are now invading South America. One objection to the Chinese is his industry; the same objection is raised against the Japanese; another is their unassimilability; and one of the troubles about both is their 'procreative profligacy', which some would say is a sure sign that they are 'the lesser breeds without the law', for breeding is their law, and they have not learnt that restraint which encourages 'race-suicide'!

In Japan the population has steadily grown during the last ten years from 50 to 57 millions, and is increasing at the rate of 750,000 a year. In China, figures can at best only be approximate, but it seems probable that the population under the Manchus has grown fourfold. Civil war, floods, famines, epidemics, and most of all an incredibly high infant mortality have checked its natural increase. We are told, for instance, that the infant death-rate of Hong Kong is 80 per cent. during the first year of life. Yet in Hong Kong there is a system of sanitation not found in China proper.

Of course, this increase of population is not confined to the Yellow Race. It is going on in Europe. It is going on in India and Africa, where we are aiding it by successfully endeavouring to stop tribal and civil wars; by struggling to prevent floods and relieve famines; by checking epidemics through medical energy; by pointing the hygienic way to infant and general health through the teaching and even enforcing of systems of sanitation and hygiene.

The latest book on the Peril, *Ghina, Japan, and Korea*, is a very able, if pessimistic, work by Mr. J. O. P. Bland. His views on the present and prospective struggle for existence in the Far East are well worthy of consideration by Far Eastern specialists, but they may easily mislead

the general public. As one with the widest experience said to me the other day, 'Things don't happen like that.' Now the population of the world is estimated at 1,600,000,000 of people, and it is divided into approximately equal proportion of White, Yellow, and Dark races. It is perfectly easy therefore to show that if these races are kept from cutting each other's throats, if they control famines and epidemics, if they promote hygienic conditions, especially in regard to infant welfare, and if they seriously undertake the task, they may in the course of ten generations, or say 300 years, 'be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth' to overflowing, and this by the simple process of arithmetical progression, or just doubling their numbers in each generation. But as my friend admirably said, 'Things don't happen like that.' I have put the case in this extreme way so as to show that, viewed from such an angle, the Dark, White, and Yellow Races are too well justified in looking on each other as trespassers and a deadly peril, and therefore in arming themselves for a war of extinction for the sake of food. In that case the race which is the biggest breeder—*ceteris paribus*—may have the best chance in the struggle for existence. The Peril, therefore, is a Peril of three, and it seems to be about equally divided.

How, then, is this position to be met? There are various ways of regarding it. First of all, we can put aside the notion of race-extermination as physically impossible, as it would be morally destructive to the destroyer. Secondly, it is too late and of no use advancing the cry, Let the less developed races alone, unless it be to encourage them to keep up their civil wars, their floods and famines and plagues, their excessive infant mortality, their struggle for existence. Our Traders will not consent, for these less developed races are also essential to our 'profits'.

Our Doctors cannot agree, because of the 'urge' within them, and because epidemics and disease are their natural enemies, even though the extinction of them threatens their own existence ! The Church and its missionaries will not consent, because they want the mind and soul of these people. So, as far as the Yellow Race is concerned, we cannot let it alone. Moreover, most that we know has already been translated into their languages ; they are now developing on our lines, decline to be suppressed, and indeed are bringing their own contribution to the general stock of knowledge.

Force may have had its value in the past, but it will not solve our problem. You cannot repress the Yellow Race, even if you want to, which you certainly do not. You cannot bring them into servitude, splendid toilers as they are, nor do you want to do so. They are pressing forward into the common life of the nations. They are necessary to us and we to them. We have got to learn to live together in the same world somehow. Force will not help us. War and the slaughter of millions would only briefly postpone the struggle. Some other remedy must be found.

Now, self-preservation is the first law of life. It is a law for the Yellow Race equally with the White. Japan has discovered that national development is essential to national preservation, and it has found that Western culture makes for both. China, much later, has discovered the same law and now hopes to make up for lost time by development on modern lines. Already in both countries mechanical equipment has been introduced of every kind. Huge factories have been built and there is every prospect of an enormous industrial expansion. Our Manchester cotton man wonders if it will destroy his markets. Our Manchester machine-maker rejoices in the opportunity of supplying 'frames' whatever may come to the cotton

man. So far both seem to have thriven, and I see no reason why they should not continue to thrive. The economic law still holds that poverty means low purchasing power, and consequently that a rich China and Japan would mean higher purchasing power; just as Germany, though our greatest trade rival, was also our richest and best customer, and the richer she grew and the harder she worked the more we benefited—which is curious!

It is chiefly pressure of increasing population which has stirred Japan to look enviously on her continental neighbours. Japanese imperialism and the Japanese population problem are questions which cause anxiety not only to Japan but to other nations, particularly to China, which is asking questions in regard to its own increasing population. Korea also very reasonably objects to be seized and governed and coerced by Japan. The Chinese bitterly resent Japanese exploitation of Manchuria and Shantung. Manchuria and Mongolia are China's natural zone of expansion. Moreover, the Japanese no more assimilate with the Chinese population than they do with Americans. They also fail to acclimatize, as indeed they fail to acclimatize in their own northern islands. They simply seek a field of exploitation, not in the interests of the inhabitants but for the benefit of Japan. We English cannot, I fear, protest too loudly, but at any rate we have for long had the welfare of our 'native' populations at heart, and we are improving all the time. Unless a better feeling is produced, if the Chinese cannot drive out the Japanese by force, there will be recourse to some more subtle method, the boycott for instance.

For China the question of expansion is little easier than for Japan; but China, in addition to Manchuria, has the Mongolian and Central Asian prairies on her northern frontier, and the Chinese are willing to and can live and thrive anywhere, in arctic winters or tropic summers.

In regard to emigration to America, Australia, or Africa, my affectionate regard for the Chinese makes me a sympathizer with their needs. At the same time we cannot shut our eyes to the objection of those countries to an invasion of competitive labour. As Mr. Bland has pointed out, the question is not one of 'racial equality', but an economic one. It is not only China and Japan that are affected, but our own enormous population in India. America already has its prolific race of Negroes, a problem sufficiently serious. Africa also has a native problem likely to become every bit as anxious. Australia, Canada, and South America are the principal fields left open for European expansion, and so far as Australia and Canada are concerned they have received all the Orientals they think they can absorb.

Years ago, when there was considerable agitation in China over America's refusal of the open door to the Chinese, I ventured to put the case to a high Chinese official thus: In order that we may judge the matter equitably let us look at the question from the standpoint of Reciprocity. Now is China prepared to offer a satisfactory *quid pro quo*? For instance, is China willing to allow foreigners to enter freely into this country, buy land, open mines, develop industries, and farm and trade at will throughout the land? Is she willing to allow Japanese farmers and artisans to settle at will? Far from any such willingness, China has bitterly resented the entry of foreigners and severely restricted them to a limited number of treaty ports; moreover—excepting those who come for philanthropic purposes—she gives them little freedom of action outside those ports. Indeed, when the Peking Syndicate—a European company—secured mining rights in Shansi, the Government of that province paid a large sum to get rid of them. If China were willing to throw open, without restriction, the whole

of China, then it might be reasonable to ask America and the British colonies to throw open their countries on reciprocal terms. But if China is unwilling, how can she blame America? Seeing that the throwing open of China—which would mean a serious Japanese invasion—is distasteful to China, then the only thing is to agree on reciprocal terms for the interchange of residents. Therefore, for every American admitted to China why not obtain permission for one Chinese to go to America? Or, if you consider one American is worth ten or twenty Chinese, then make a reciprocal agreement proportionately! Needless to say His Excellency and I were only having a friendly and intimate chat together. There was no need for me to express my sympathy with the Chinese point of view; he knew it. But it is naturally difficult for a high Chinese official, who has never been abroad, to see the American difficulty except in terms of his own.

It is no use, then, looking abroad for any great opportunity for China's future expansion. There are, however, certain lines of development nearer home which will temporarily relieve the situation until the Chinese return to the marriage customs of their own ancient and sensible ancestors. If they must continue to follow old custom—which the modern young man and woman is to-day unduly flouting—then let them get their 'old custom' old enough, right back from the days when 'convention' had not obscured 'naturalness', as Confucius says. They will find that of old the age for men to marry was thirty and for women twenty-five, and not fifteen or so for both sexes as at present. These early marriages are solely due to fear of committing—for the sake of the ancestral sacrifice—what Mencius considered the greatest sin of all, i.e. failure to have a son. This is an extreme and quite unnecessary doctrine, which has

produced more sins than it has cured, for it is the main cause of child marriages, of concubinage, of divorce, of excessive devotion to ancestors, of geomantic and other superstitious observances, and some unkind people would say of the sinfulness of all—too many Chinese!

Laws postponing the legal age of marriage might be of some value, but Education, with its resulting higher standards of life—amongst which is the realization that men and women exist for other than mere breeding purposes—will do far more than State laws can do. But education takes time, and in the meanwhile China is in need of early relief, and immediate conditions are not very promising, for chaos—only temporary I believe—has supplanted an effete but order-sustaining autocracy.

There are two possible lines of procedure to prevent international ill-feeling, and more important still to prevent the certain recurrence of famine and its accompanying pestilence, ever threatening China in one part or another. These two courses are Industrial Development and Agricultural Expansion. Industrial Development is the first and greatest of these, in the course of which it is to be hoped that the selfishness of the Chinese exploiter will not be allowed to reproduce the horrors that European workers suffered, or the shocking conditions which have marked Japanese industrial development, now happily undergoing reform.

Industrial Development is the most immediate form of relief from the pressure of population. China is very rich in undeveloped natural resources. She has enormous deposits of coal, iron, and other minerals. In the province of Shansi alone, where I lived for some years, there is coal enough of the best quality to supply the world for 'thousands of years'. And that is only one of many coal-bearing provinces. Iron of the best kind is being worked on a large scale in Hupeh, one only of many iron-producing

provinces. Oil has been found in Shensi. Factories of many sorts have been and are being erected, some with foreign, others with Chinese capital. It is probable that China will follow the lead of India and Japan by supplying, in a few decades, all her own needs in the lower grades of goods. China is also the home of silk, and a larger industrial development seems possible. But there is a host of directions in which industrial development is possible, and while the Chinese workman cannot compete with his Western brother in certain directions he is hard to beat in diligence and average intelligence.

We can see, then, that the new era of industrialism, already begun, will draw multitudes to great centres of employment, and provide them with an urban living. But they must have supplies of coal, metals, cotton, silk, linen, hemp, &c., and the getting or cultivation of these raw materials will give employment to proportionate numbers of people. There is, however, one essential item—they must be fed, and food is the greatest problem of all.

Agricultural Expansion. This problem of food can only be met in three ways: Increase of production in existing fields; the opening of new territory; or, the importation of rice from other countries. The possibilities of the third point are limited; some rice may be imported, but the amount will not be large as Japan and other countries are competitors. So far as Food is concerned China will have to remain as in the past a self-sustaining country. Some increase of production in existing fields is possible through deeper ploughing, improved seeds, irrigation works, and so on, but China is already parcelled out into tiny farms intensively cultivated. One has also to remember that the demand for increased quantities of raw materials will further encroach on existing food-supplying areas. The second course therefore is the most important, namely, the opening up of new fields. A considerable

expansion in this respect is still possible in the west of China, and despite all that has been done in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Central Asia, there is still room. Dr. Faber made the optimistic assertion that there is room for five times the present population, a view I find difficult to accept.

To these possibilities there is a natural limit, and at bottom there is only one safeguard against the arithmetical progression of a hygienic China, protected from civil war and calamities, and that is the arrest of profligate prolificness. It cannot be done by means of the Japanese Yoshiwara, which is not only morally degrading but ineffective. The only moral way is by a raised standard of life, and the only possible way of raising that standard is by educating the people intellectually, morally, and religiously.

China's Revolution. You all know that in 1911 the great Revolution occurred, which in 1912 resulted in the abdication of the Manchu boy-emperor and the establishment of a Republic. Young China, like Young Turkey, began well, but after the abortive attempt of China's greatest statesman, Yuan Shih K'ai, to enthrone himself as founder of a new dynasty, China fell into the hands of a number of territorial military governors, who have reduced the Central Government to impotence and much of the country to chaos. The present Central Government is nourishing its feeble life on borrowed scraps, while its Tuchüns, or military provincial autocrats are, with one or two brilliant exceptions, batten on their plunder of the people. Consequently the ultimate fate of China hangs in the balance. There is the danger of its temporarily splitting-up into antagonistic states, as it has done many times before, for during nearly a third of its historical period China has been a divided country. People here have had it drilled into them that the Chinese are

a 'peace-loving people', and assume that they are therefore a peaceful people. All settled communities and nations are 'peace-loving people'. But any one who knows the history of China, ancient and modern, knows that it has followed the usual course of human history, only more so, in that it has soaked its soil with the blood of its own people more than any other country, unless it be India. Of late the Indians, also a peace-loving people, have been kept peaceful by the beneficent Pax Britannica, for which they have ceased to be grateful, whereas China in our lifetime has exterminated far more of its own people than European nations have killed of each other's in the past century—not much to boast of for 'peace-loving people', whether east or west.

My point is that there is nothing historically improbable in China dividing into two or a score of warring states as so often in the past. But as a centralized Government, under an autocratic divine-right sovereign, has been the loadstone of the nation through all history, so is it probable that a centralized Government will prove necessary to a Republic, and to emergence from the present distress. To all appearances China will remain a Republic. It has really had enough of dynasties, each of which, preceded by decades of anarchy, has been founded by a 'hero' of dubious character, and ended with a degenerate or a child. The revolution so far has resulted in less bloodshed than any previous change of government, and we may still hope for and believe in its success.

As to the common people, they know little of these political changes. They are neither politically educated nor politically interested. Hitherto their attitude towards Government has been similar to their attitude towards Religion. Both were matters for condolence, since Government meant tax-gatherers, or the law-courts, with nothing whatever to show for either, except loss of money

or many stripes, while Religion generally indicated misfortune, sickness, or death, with a coffin and a grave as unwelcome additions to one's property and estate. As a matter of fact the Chinese never have been governed. They have only been taxed. Consequently they have governed themselves, in very haphazard fashion 'tis true, and with very little public spirit, but their compulsory self-government, however clannish and archaic, has been educative. When the Tutchüns have filled their pockets, they may begin to think of their duty to their country, patriotism may revive in their hearts, and they may unite to restore order to a suffering hardworking people, and to establish an effective system of representative government, which will leave to the provinces a reasonable measure of home rule.

West for East and East for West. How then can the West aid the East and the East aid the West? Some one may say, Why should they? Is not self-preservation the first law of life? In the fierce struggle for existence is not this law paramount? Agreed, as a primary but not as an ultimate law, for is not that a short-sighted policy which only recognizes the law of the jungle 'red in tooth and claw'? Man's real struggle is not merely one for food, but rather to raise himself out of the jungle law into a higher one which does not make him 'red in tooth and claw'. '*Man* shall not live by bread alone,' that is, by jungle law, but 'by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God', that is, by divine and spiritual law. St. Paul phrases the same struggle in the cry, 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' in other words, How shall I make this mortal body subservient to a life in the eternal realm of mind and spirit?

It is, then, away from the jungle law of mere self-preservation to the higher law of self-development that we must look for relief. Indeed, we must advance a step

further, and recognize that as no man liveth to himself we can only find ultimate satisfaction in the more advanced human or divine law of mutual development. This law, proved applicable to individuals, is equally applicable to communities, and therefore to nations. We have seen enough of the effects of 'jungle law' to satisfy our generation. The question is, Can we raise ourselves and the world to the higher and more effective law? If so, the Far East must enter into Far West calculations, and of one thing we may be assured, that the bond between East and West cannot be severed, nor can it be lacerated without suffering to both. On the other hand, it can be strengthened to mutual 'profit'.

Mutual development is therefore the finest international investment we can make, and I would now like briefly to indicate a few directions in which the West may perhaps be able to work for the mutual advantage of West and East, and therefore to the higher 'profit' of mankind. I speak with natural diffidence, for so much depends on how far the pride of the East will welcome the aid of the West.

A Commission of Inquiry. The refuge of the weak! Having nothing to offer, offer a Commission! I hope that will not prove to be my unhappy position. We really do need to find out, in less haphazard fashion than heretofore, what are the facts of the present situation, and what methods are feasible for their amelioration. To this end I would suggest that half a dozen wealthy philanthropists, British *and* American, should quietly combine to appoint a small, carefully selected, but thoroughly efficient commission to study the political, economic, hygienic, educational, moral, and religious conditions of the Far East, and to report and recommend practical lines of action acceptable to East and West.

The British and American Diplomatic Services do

conscientiously try not to trespass on the interests of China. Japan will not let them trespass on hers! But a diplomatist's duty lies first and foremost to his own country. As to the Trader, he naturally goes with a single eye to his firm's immediate profit. The Banker, or the big-game hunter in the shape of concessions, railways, money-lending, &c., may take a longer view, but the interest of his principals is quite properly at the basis of all his considerations. The Missionary, who has led the way in matters of health, education, morals, and religion, is wholly devoted to the welfare of the people he serves, but, with admirable exceptions, is limited by his specialized training. Missions would do their work none the worse for an inquiry, and would welcome it, for they are doing a great work and the world would be the wiser and more helpful for knowing it.

Therefore my first point of practical suggestion is to find the men who will secure for us not the haphazard wisdom of the newspaper correspondent, nor the sectional views of the self-interested, but the considered judgement of not disinterested but wisely and widely interested men—in other words a survey of the field by competent surveyors.

Political and Economic. I hesitate to discuss the subject from the political standpoint, because it is too complicated with competing interests to be capable of a brief and simple statement. The situation is a very difficult one, but the right spirit of goodwill can distil a new spirit east and west. The essence of the difficulty is economic, not racial. How to harmonize the jungle law with civil law and both with economic development is the problem. Japan wants food and raw materials. Can she be assured of reasonable supplies without fear of China closing her markets, or the West unduly competing in them? Can China be protected from foreign aggression,

especially Japanese, and induced to set her political and economic house in order for the sake of her suffering people and the peace of the world? Can wasteful loans be stopped and productive loans only be made to the Chinese Government through open and recognized channels and under proper control, so as to avoid the increase of her debt and subsequent ruin? Can the foreign exploiter and money-lender be brought for a time under due surveillance? Can Japan be led to realize that the return of Shantung and in due course Manchuria, also the annulment of the secret treaties forced on China, may be in her own interests as well as those of China? Will Japan give Korea a reasonable form of Home Rule? These are all questions of moment, and if the West can help the East to find a satisfactory answer it will be doing a service to East and West.

Extra-territoriality. Among the Intellectuals of China this is another vexed question. Its meaning is that foreigners residing in China are not subject to the law of the land and may not be tried in Chinese Courts of Law, but are subject to the laws of their own countries. The international legal equality of Japan has already been recognized. British, American, Chinese, and other foreign residents in Japan are now subject to Japanese law and have no appeal to their own tribunals. China naturally objects to be considered as inferior to Japan. So long as extra-territoriality was invoked chiefly by Occidentals there was little vocal objection—for the Manchus had set the example by having their own laws and judges—but now there are large numbers of Japanese in China, subject only to their own consuls, and Young China bitterly resents the indignity.

While I would personally not hesitate to trust myself to some of China's judges, I should hesitate to trust myself to the majority of them, and to some neither I nor Young

China would like to trust our worst enemy. The administration of justice in China, though greatly improved, is not creditable to a civilized nation, and under present conditions it is unfair to ask either Occidentals or Japanese to deprive themselves of the protection of their own just laws and honest administration. Let a modern Chinese ask himself whether he would trust his own father or brother to the tender mercies of the Courts of Justice as they are conducted to-day over the greater part of China, Courts in which torture and bribery still prevail. Let Young China be honest with itself and not merely see law as it is honourably administered in certain favoured spots, but go and see it as it is administered in most of the provinces, and then they will better understand that until great changes have taken place in the laws and their administration, the question of extra-territoriality can only be raised to the unveiling of conditions which will bring the blush to their faces. 'Faithful are the wounds of a friend.' It is a pleasure to know that important steps have already been taken in the direction of law revision, and I am firmly of opinion that in course of time the government, the laws, and the judicial administration will be put on a satisfactory basis. In the work of revising the laws and administration the experience of the West is at the service of China, and when satisfactory laws have been settled and an honest administration secured, then the question of extra-territorial abolition may safely be considered. This indeed has already been promised by Britain and America.

Education is one of the ways in which the West has helped, is helping, and can still further help the East, with assurance of ultimate beneficial interaction. The day is past when any intelligent man considers ignorance as a world asset. As the free interchange of commodities increases commodities and wealth, so

intellectual freedom and intercourse increase our wealth of knowledge and, I hope, of wisdom. If Japan needs any further aid from the West she is now quite capable of obtaining it. The organization of her educational system, carried out originally by a missionary, has been a modern miracle, and I have the profoundest belief that it will yet result in a great intellectual, moral, and spiritual contribution to the nation and the world.

In regard to China, an amazing change has taken place in educational development. As one of those who struggled as an educational pioneer when everything was against us, it is a delight to me to see the wonderful progress which has been made. To-day modern schools of very varied quality are universal, and modern educated scholars are a power in the land, somewhat heady, because they are young and lack the steadiness of maturity. They will grow older and wiser. The unsettled political condition of the country and the financial embarrassment of the government have prevented the realization of Chinese projects for a national and complete system of education. It is an enormous task, on a par with starting from the bottom to educate all Europe. Consequently there is a great field for private as well as public enterprise.

In this respect American missions have done admirable service. In quantity, their work far outstrips that of British missions, though the latter have no reason to be ashamed of their quality. It is in this field of service that invaluable aid can still be rendered to China by philanthropic individuals and societies in this land and America. The best kind of education, in some form or other, covers the whole range of human life, body, mind, and spirit, and offers a field for private benefaction or personal service of unique value to the life and spirit of China. The need of it is evident from the realization that China is an illiterate country, not more than ten per cent. of the adult males

and under one per cent. of the women being able to read and write. A simplified system of writing is now being used experimentally. Whether it is the best possible, time will show. Some system less complex than the old one is essential if the common people are ever to be able to read and write.

But there is another line of procedure in which this country could render valuable service, a procedure which I brought to the notice of Sir Edward Grey in 1913, and which he brought before the attention of the Government. There are still nine million pounds sterling due from China to Britain on account of the Boxer Indemnity. The American Government long ago released half its claim, which is used for American education of Chinese students. In the mutual interests of England and China why should not the *British Government* act with generosity in the matter of this Indemnity? Aid might then be given to British educational establishments in China which are doing excellent work under adverse financial conditions. In addition we might foster Anglo-Chinese, or Anglo-American-Chinese Universities in certain great centres, always in co-operation with the best Chinese coadjutors, with a view to their ultimately becoming wholly Chinese, but in the meantime standing for the best Western and Chinese standards. I took an active part in endeavouring to found such a University for Central China, but, after funds had been contingently guaranteed, the War destroyed our plan. Let the British Government make up its mind now while it can do something really effective for Chinese education, or—well—the money will disappear in the morass of Chinese financial misery, with nothing to show for it either for China or England.

Industrial Aid. Again it is China I discuss, for Japan is small, compact, and able to 'fend for itself'. Some day, when the world is better known and organized, we

may know each year how much of everything is needed, and work, pay, and goods may be equitably distributed to the various nations according to their several abilities, like the ten talents—but that day is not yet. In the meantime we must pursue our rough-and-ready methods, and even under present conditions these can be applied to the mutual advantage of East and West. The Chinese might wisely minimize waste and expedite profitable development by seeking out western firms of first-rate standing to co-operate with them in joint-stock concerns. There is, of course, something, however little, to be said for gaining your own experience rather than buying it. We all prefer to risk a tailor's misfit rather than buy a ready-made suit. And the Chinese want to do things for themselves, which is laudable, however costly and wasteful. China for the Chinese is my cry as earnestly as that of any Chinese, but isolation of brains or capital will be no more effective than was the Great Wall or the Ocean for geographical isolation. Mind overcomes most physical barriers and Capital drives Neptune's horses as its slaves. With experience the Chinese will run their own mines, furnaces, factories, railways, and so on with skill and success, but there is a *ch'a-pu-to*-ness, or 'approximateness', with them as yet which is the enemy of efficiency in highly organized industries. We here should never dream of trusting the organization of great engineering developments to men, however clever, who had just finished their Engineering Course and done their workshops. But that is just what too many people in China would like to do. China can materially shorten this period of wasteful inefficiency by a wise selection of firms who will be honourable partners and not mere selfish exploiters.

Moral and Religious. Finally, sadly aware though I am of the unfortunate discrepancy there is between our

western theories and practice—a discrepancy emphasized by the late War—I am more than ever sure that we have an invaluable contribution to offer the whole of the Far East in the moral and spiritual principles and institutions of Christianity. The Intellectual Renaissance of the Far East is seriously discounting ancient moral standards and religious beliefs. The moral standards are worthy of a great, an observant, and a thoughtful people, and their practice is not proportionately lower than the practice of Europe in view of its loftier ethical ideal. But any one who knows the condition of popular religion in China knows that it is still essentially animistic, incredibly superstitious, and of low spiritual power. In Japan, Shintoism, animistic in origin, has become an imperial and conservative asset through its emperor-worship and the cult of the ancestor. On the other hand, neo-Buddhism has developed there into an influential spiritual force by adopting Christian ideas and practices, and ceasing to bear much resemblance to primitive Buddhism.

In China the closed mind of the old literati has become the open mind of the modern Intellectual. Nothing is taken for granted, everything must be triturated and chemically analysed before it is swallowed. This is all to the good when the analyst has had a sufficient training. It is good that the spirit of inquiry should be abroad—whence? how? why? whither? It would seem as if the sun itself had taken the shape of an interrogation mark! I heartily welcome the new spirit, and do not fear to submit to it the teaching and life of our Lord, who stands unmoved and unsullied in the truth, beauty, and goodness of His Gospel of Fatherhood, Sonship, and Brotherhood—the Hope of the World. Animism, with its nature-gods and ‘heroes’ and swarming ubiquitous demons, would be swept away in time by science. Buddhism, the religion, as Rabindranath Tagore describes

it, of 'duhkha' or misery, of asceticism and of nirvana, has failed already, in India, in China, in Japan, and that which is preached in the two latter countries is no longer true Buddhism. Jesus Christ, with His own 'simple Gospel' of and universal call to divine sonship, a relationship out of which grow all the duties of life, offers the higher law. It is a religion of brotherhood and carries with it the true 'ananda', the real joy of living for humanity East and West. This I believe to be the greatest contribution of East to West as of West to East, and on its development in practice rests a welfare not confined to colour, clime, or time.

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X

THE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF THE TROPICS

JOHN H. HARRIS

THE exploitation of the tropical and sub-tropical areas of the world is rapidly changing its meaning. Until quite recent times we have been in the habit of regarding the exploitation of the tropics as affecting areas only within the parallels of $22\frac{1}{2}$ degrees North and South of the Equatorial line ; we now know that conditions of labour vary within these areas according to altitude, density of forest lands, rainfall, and proximity to coast-line, whilst far South of the tropic of Capricorn, at an altitude exceeding 6,000 feet, the low-grade mines of the Rand, through their humidity and depth, almost everywhere generate conditions but little if at all different from those of the tropics.

From the economic standpoint the real dividing line is physical, not geographical ; colonization in its truest sense is not exploitation, but development. By colonization we mean the development of virgin territories by the aid of settlement and labour. The test question which differentiates colonization from exploitation is whether the immigrant can live a normal domestic life, marry, bring forth and educate children, and himself cultivate the soil. If this test fails, and the immigrant gathers the produce from the country by first dislodging the native producer and then, by one means or another, forcing the native to labour, then a system of exploitation is set up, and, as Booker Washington was in the habit of saying—

'there is all the difference between working and being worked.'

The exploitation of tropical and sub-tropical regions means in practice the gathering of raw material ; there is at present very little industrial life as we understand that term in Europe. If we meditate for five minutes upon the physical contacts of a single day, we shall be surprised how completely the raw produce of the coloured man enters into our lives ; he is with us in fact from the moment we rise until we retire again to rest. With the aid of the vegetable oils of Africa and the South Seas we take our morning bath. The aroma of cocoa, chocolate, coffee, or tea bids us welcome to a breakfast-table adorned with the everlasting ivory of Africa and the glistening silver of Mexico. Breakfast finished, we mount our Rolls-Royce or more humble motor omnibus, whose cushion rubber tyres protect from the joltings of former days our somewhat delicate framework. Arriving at our counting-house, school, or office, we cannot enter without a reminder of our coloured benefactor (although he is seldom remembered) as the huge doors of African oak or Honduras mahogany swing open and allow us to enter and seat ourselves at counter or desk, whose sweet odour of scented wood is a perpetual reminder of the tropics. And so our day wears on, the Stock Exchange, the Bank, the Shipping House, toss to and fro their quotations of tropical produce, and at night we return to our respective homes beautified with mats, curtains, wicker-work and brass-ware, and to tables frequently weighted with the spices and fruits of every tropical land, whilst from a cosy arm-chair there floats in a cloud of incense, the fragrance of Walter Raleigh's weed of the tropics. Coffee again reminds us of our coloured friend, and as we retire to rest beneath our silk-clothed eiderdown we thank the good God who gave the down to the eider-duck, ignorant of the fact that the

African has filled the coverlet with the silky kapok of his forest trees !

The volume of tropical and sub-tropical products gathered by the natives is emphasized by certain striking facts. Kings Solomon and Hiram, by their joint efforts, collected 300 million pounds worth of gold for the Holy Temple from, some of us believe, the Zambesi Valley.

In West Africa, the Gold Coast territories have been won from barbarism, famine and disease, through the medium of cocoa, at the same time becoming the greatest cocoa-producing area in the world. In more recent times Sir Douglas Haig blasted Vimy Ridge and smashed the Drocourt Switch by the aid of glycerine obtained from the oil palms of the African forest. In South Africa the 200,000 native and 15,000 white miners have, in less than forty years, won for Great Britain, or more correctly for a moddy of cosmopolitan financiers, gold to the value of 700 millions, or something like one-seventh of the world's store of gold. These, then, are the exploitable products of the tropical and sub-tropical lands : precious metals, gums and spices, sugar and sweetmeats, cotton, fibres, and scented woods, all of them incapable to-day of being garnered by white men, but in great and increasing volume by the black and brown man.

Broadly, two methods are pursued in obtaining these stores of raw material :

(a) Through the indigenous native as a producer in his own interests.

(b) Through immigrant companies by means of wage-earning native labourers.

The home of the first system is British West Africa, where vegetable oils, cocoa, ivory, rubber and other gums, are cultivated and then gathered by the natives, who sell to the white merchant for export, and from whom in return the native purchases European manufactured

goods. Under this particular system the merchant makes a twofold profit, one on the sale of produce in Europe or America, and another on the manufactured articles he sells to the native—a system which seems to give every satisfaction to both parties.

But West Africa is not altogether alone in following this system, for one or two interesting experiments have been made in the West Indies, mainly with ex-indentured East Indians and their descendants. The Lamont Estates some years ago commenced sugar-cane farming as distinct from estate plantations, with the result that the volume of cane greatly increased and the costs of production decreased. More recently the Waterloo Estate operated by Messrs. Kleinworth embarked upon a similar system, and Mr. Carlee, the manager, has supplied the local government with interesting statistics upon this experiment.¹

In 1914 the lands in the vicinity of the Waterloo Estates were more sparsely populated than those of many others in the island of Trinidad, and the opinion was expressed that owing to this scarcity of population the estates were incapable of greater production. Then Mr. Carlee commenced the system of cane-farming, of which the nearest European equivalent is probably the small-holding system. The whole situation immediately changed, population flocked towards Waterloo, settlements sprang up in four districts, each of them comprising hundreds of small dwellings, with the result that the Manager of the cane mills at Waterloo, instead of working short time on a limited supply of cane, found himself the happy possessor of a volume nearly three times as great as any previous record, namely an increase from 3,500 tons to 9,500 in the year, and machinery was ordered to cope with 15,000 tons.

¹ Council Paper, 36, 1918.

This success owes its origin to the recognition of a very simple fact to which the estate manager, somewhat crudely perhaps, drew the governor's attention, i. e. ' . . . a man will do for himself what he hates to do for others ', and he went on to say that so successful is the scheme that none can foretell its development, for at the time of writing people were still flocking to the estates and taking up the land in order to produce the cane. This success is but characteristic of every tropical territory where the labourer on the land produces in his own interest. The time-expired Indian coolies of British Guiana, liberated from their indentures a generation ago, sowed a few grains of rice on waste patches of land which white men had left despised and derelict, and from these simple beginnings grew the rice industry of British Guiana, which well-informed observers say will yet reach an output capable of satisfying the entire needs of the American Continent. It is precisely the same story in West Africa. Sir Hugh Clifford, probably the greatest and most enlightened of our Colonial Governors, thus describes the organization of the cocoa industry :

' Cocoa cultivation is, in the Gold Coast and in Ashanti, a purely native industry ; there is hardly an acre of European-owned cocoa-garden in the territories under the administration of this Government—this remarkable achievement of a unique position as a producer of one of the world's great staples assumes, in my opinion, a special value and significance.'

Hardly an acre of European-owned cocoa-garden, the capital evidence of success in the eye of Sir Hugh Clifford, would, to the short-sighted colonial, be indisputable evidence of disaster. Those who advocate a policy of white-owned and managed estates, frequently argue that the success of West Africa is due not to its small-holding system but to a difference in the ' fibre ' of the African,

and that the successful policy pursued in the Gold Coast would fail elsewhere. Unhappily for those who advance such arguments, there is conclusive and striking evidence available. The late German Colony of the Cameroons is 'cheek by jowl' with Nigeria and the Gold Coast; many of the tribes are of identical race. Prior to 1914 the opposite policy to that of the Gold Coast and Nigeria was pursued, namely that of white exploitation. The system was started about 1890 with a great flourish of trumpets; the plantations were highly organized, electric light and telephones connected the estates, the natives were taught the 'dignity of labour' by force, and the producing world was invited to watch the magic results—and what were the results? In the first place the natives revolted, but were cowed by slaughter, and the economic results were little better, for by the year 1906 the output of cocoa did not reach the miserable figure of £50,000. If we take a seven years' period and compare Cameroons with the Gold Coast the figures are eloquent:

	British Gold Coast. (Native Production)	German Cameroons. (White Exploitation)
1906	£336,269	£48,000
1913	£2,489,218	£150,000

These figures show that the simple natives of the Gold Coast, without any of the modern advantages of the German exploiter, actually increased their output seven times in seven years, whilst the Germans only managed to increase theirs three times in the same period! But this again is not all, because the area of the Cameroons is more than twice the size of the Gold Coast, namely 191,000 square miles as against the 83,000 square miles of the Gold Coast.

The foregoing represent but a few of the ascertainable economic results which accrue to the native development of tropical and sub-tropical territories. It is a system

from which every one obtains the maximum of benefits and the minimum of risks and disadvantage. The white merchant benefits from the greater volume of trade, the native by the enjoyment of the whole proceeds of his labour, and the administration from an abounding revenue. At the same time the community is spared all the degradation, all the sorrow, and indeed all the horrors which are inseparable from crude exploitation, and which have, in fact, involved the death of millions of human beings.

When we pass from the system of indigenous production and enter the sphere of white capital and coloured labour, we pass into a region where every form of labour has been introduced with the object of extracting the maximum of profit for immigrant or overseas interests. The principal means by which exploitation is pursued fall into three main categories :

I. Contract Labour.

II. Forced Labour.

III. Land Expropriation.

Contract Labour varies widely from that of the Transvaal mines, which is to-day the best system of its kind in the world, to the iniquitous form of slavery in the Portuguese territories of West Africa, and again to the malodorous indentured labour of Fiji, Samoa, and the New Hebrides.

The Reef Mines of the Rand and the higher level gold mines of the Gold Coast represent an industrial undertaking which at present seems beyond the capacity of any indigenous race. It is extraordinary how little the task of gold-winning appeals to the natives; their whole thought centres upon the more healthy and less speculative development of agriculture, and who shall say that the simple African is not the wiser person, for we should remember the price which gold-winning exacts. Those who would realize the tragedy of gold-winning should visit the Phthisis Hospital of Johannesburg; those who

cannot, and are not afraid of sleepless nights, should read Judge Scully's *At the Ridge of the White Waters*. The Official Report of the Miners' Phthisis Commission¹ contains passages which indicate in carefully guarded language something of the price which white men must pay for digging, delving, and blasting 5,000 feet below the surface for the yellow ore so precious in the eyes of European and American financiers.

In one part of this Report the Commissioners say :

' We may therefore expect that out of the total number of underground miners (11,400) on the Rand the number of men affected will not be far from 3,600. But, while this number may represent the number of miners who show some signs of the disease, it does not represent the number who are at the present time incapacitated, partially or wholly, by Miners' Phthisis.'

How deadly the work in the mines may be is shown in the following passage upon drilling :

' It will be seen that 50 per cent. of the men who have worked 4 to 5 years are affected, and at 10 years of underground life approximately 80 per cent. are attacked.'¹

and again :

' The conclusions strongly suggested by the above results are that the use of rock drills over a prolonged period greatly increases and accelerates the incidence of chest diseases amongst miners, and that the working efficiency of any rock drill miner, working under present conditions, will on the average be impaired or even exhausted after 7 to 9 years' work.'²

The fatal results of phthisis are shown by this passage upon the average age at death :

' . . . we find that the average age at death from respira-

¹ Miners' Phthisis Report, U. G. 19. 1912.

² Miners' Phthisis Commission Report, 1902-3. (Minutes of Evidence, p. 3, para. 74.)

tory diseases for the three years is 41, while the average age of those dying from Miners' Phthisis, Silicosis, and Tuberculosis, is approximately 38.¹

In a further passage dealing with a period of ten years the Commission says that some 90 per cent. of a stable body of 12,000 miners would contract the disease. What the effect may be on the native workers none can tell, but there is a theory that the short terms of the native contracts with their alternate period of open-air life render them largely immune from anything but milder attacks. But it is not merely the incapacity rate and the death-roll which make the task of gold-winning a doubtful experiment, for it is frequently stated, and with some evidence of truth, that more has been spent than won, or that it has cost us altogether more than 700 millions in cash to win 700 millions from gold-bearing ore.

The principal form of labour contract under British Administration is that of the mines in South Africa, and it represents in most respects the best form in any country. The 230,000 to 250,000 native workers in the gold and diamond mines are paid about 50s. to 70s. per month with everything found. The period of the contract is from six months to one year, the shorter term being the more popular because it permits the labourer to earn wages in 'Joburg' or Kimberley for six months and to gather in the harvests of the village farms during the remaining half-year, whilst, as already pointed out, the alternation of sub-surface occupation with that of agriculture is believed to preserve the worker from the terrible malady of phthisis which is so fatal to the white worker.

The system of indentured coolie labour from the East Indies is now almost completely abolished, but there are still surviving remnants of it in Fiji, Ceylon, and Natal, and until we get through the present transition stage it

¹ Miners' Phthisis Report, U. G. 19. 1912.

will be impossible to say how much of the old system survives in the new one which is now being organized.

But in North Borneo and the South Seas there is a good deal of Chinese indentured labour, including the mandated area of Samoa. The conditions of this labour are but little known, and seldom come to the notice of the public unless some gross scandal occurs, some uprising of the coolies, or the resignation and subsequent disclosure of an outraged official.

We know most about Portuguese Contract Labour, which for nearly seventy years has been used to exploit the possibilities of cocoa on the islands of S. Thomé and Príncipe, and sugar-cane in the Angola mainland, but it was not until 1900 that people began to realize that Portuguese Contract Labour was nothing but a gigantic system of slave-owning. From 1905 onwards, through the exposures of H. W. Nevinson and the patient inquiries by the principal British cocoa firms, civilization learned how the wretched *serviçaes* were bought or captured in the heart of Africa, driven in the chain gang to the coast, and there sold to the sugar-planter on the mainland, or the cocoa-planter in the islands. The average price per slave delivered in good health was £30, which, it was alleged, represented the cost of recruiting. It is estimated that since 1885 the cocoa islands alone have 'absorbed' 70,000 Africans at a cost of something over £2,000,000, but the total traffic covering both the islands and the mainland cannot be much less than 500,000 slaves. Not until the year 1908 had a single slave been set free, in spite of the fact that the *serviçaes*, as they are called, were supposed to be under a legal contract of three years only. By constant exposure and the pressure of public opinion over 10,000 men, women, and children have been liberated from the islands and restored to the mainland.

Forced Labour. Within recent years the tendency has

been to augment the labour supply by methods of force. It has hitherto been held that forced labour, exacted in exceptional circumstances, and used for purposes of public utility, might be tolerated in the initial stages of Colonial development, but that the use of such labour for private purposes was barely, if at all, distinguishable from slave-owning. The best authority on this is the late Lord Cromer, who, in an article in the *Spectator*, said :

‘ We reluctantly admit the necessity of compulsory labour in certain cases, and we do not stigmatize as slavery such labour when, under all possible safeguards against the occurrence of abuses, it is employed for indispensable and recognized purposes of public utility. On the other hand, we regard the system when employed for private profit as wholly unjustifiable, and as synonymous with slavery.’

But recent tendencies have shown a greater temptation to Administrations to engage in industrial enterprises, and with this has come the doctrine that the moment the Administration embarks upon the construction of a railway, the making of a port, or the building of a bridge, the work in question becomes one for the public good, and therefore justifies the use of compulsion to obtain labour. Generally speaking, this work is unpopular amongst the natives and is executed under conditions which prejudice native welfare, and frequently the peace and good order of the colony.

The most recent example of this, and one which even now is not fully developed, is to be found in the British East Africa territory now known as the Kenya Colony. The policy was inaugurated in 1920 and was really an attempt to re-establish a ‘property right’ in the African; the first stage in this effort to establish such right took place during 1913, and the most favoured method then was to expropriate natives from their land. For various

reasons this manœuvre failed, but with the close of the war, pressure from the settlers again increased, very largely as the result of organized 'soldier settler' schemes. But with the unprecedented expropriation of the natives of Southern Rhodesia before the public, it was clearly impossible to attempt a similar experiment on so colossal a scale in British East Africa, and another hare was started. This time a leaf was taken out of King Leopold's book, and the East African native was held up to public odium as an essentially idle and degraded being, who for his own moral welfare must be taught the dignity of labour—by compulsion. It was urged that compulsory labour in the interests of the general community was a perfectly legitimate method of education, but the awkward admission was made that this public work was so unpopular that the native, rather than be subjected to it, would bow to the inevitable, and leave his village to 'work for wages'. To the delight of those who believed in the educational value of forced labour, a very neat amendment to an existing Ordinance was thought to have secured this happy development! But alas! even in Africa the best-made schemes of mice and men quite unexpectedly go all to pieces. The Ordinances in Kenya provide for a levy of twenty-four days for local public works, and a conscription of sixty days for general public works—eighty-four days in all. Into these Ordinances there had been inserted an exemption clause, again with the object of forcing the native to 'work for wages'; but, unfortunately for the real authors of the scheme, this clause, intended to be a shackle, became in fact the portal of liberty. Under this clause the native was exempt:

'If he (the native) be fully employed in any other occupation, or has been so employed during the preceding 12 months for a period of three months.'

A common-sense interpretation of this clause gave liberty to every native to engage in his own agricultural and industrial enterprise, and those who know the habits of the African know very well that, with this exemption, very few Africans would be conscripted. But in order that the freedom of the African should be safeguarded beyond doubt or question, Mr. Oswald Mosley asked the Colonial Secretary : ¹

‘ Whether, in claiming exemption from the forced-labour Ordinances of British East Africa, a native will be entitled to show that he has worked for three months during the preceding year on his own gardens or plantations, and to claim exemption on these grounds ? ’

To this Mr. Mosley received the satisfactory reply that :

‘ If a native has been fully employed in cultivation for himself for three months during the preceding twelve months, he is exempt from the provisions of the Native Authority Amendment Ordinance, 1920.’

It seems that this reply cabled to East Africa caused consternation amongst the settlers, and also in certain official quarters, and the cry went up that the economic prosperity of the Colony was endangered because once again the plan for forcing the native to ‘ work for wages ’ had collapsed. It was clear that something had to be done, and yet another Commission came into existence, this time appointed by the Convention of Associations, the most influential and vocal body of organized public opinion in the Colony. The Commission included the Chairman of the Convention, the Archdeacon of Kavirondo, a Vicar-General, the Chaplain at Nairobi, and a number of leading settlers.

The Report issued by this Committee will make interesting reading for future generations. The East African native depicted in this Report is a very unlovely creature,

¹ 27th October 1920.

but it is amazing that a Commission composed of intelligent men should have placed on record the following interpretation of the Forced Labour Ordinance :

‘ Compulsory paid labour for Government Departments is provided for under the Native Authority Amendment Ordinance. *By virtue of this law men who have not been employed for wages for a period of three months in the previous year can be compelled to work for a period of sixty days for wages for a public department.*’¹

The law, of course, says nothing of the kind, and any attempt to give such an interpretation is highly reprehensible. What, in practice, would such a law mean ? In the first place, no native would lay down plantations or economic gardens if he had hanging over his head the threat of conscription unless he had worked for a white man for three months, *for wages* ; thus, such a law would bar all native industrial progress. Next, a law penalizing every adult male who did not work for wages would throw upon the women so much of the heavy work of agriculture that food crops would be gravely reduced. Thirdly, in spite of Lord Milner’s timely warning that the Government should ‘ spare no pains to prevent abuses ’, the whole thing is an abuse which will propagate its species in every part of Kenya ; the system was bound to lead to abuses because the only means of exercising compulsion is by an uncivilized native soldiery operating under physical conditions which preclude white supervision. Britain tried it in Matabeleland and had a rebellion ; Leopold tried the sixty days’ compulsory expedient in the Congo and quickly found himself involved in atrocities. Natural laws cannot be defied upon the assumption that when danger appears we can cry out ‘ Thus far and no farther ’. Finally, it must be borne in mind that, throughout history, any

¹ Italics mine.—J. H. H.

attempt to force slavery upon Africans in their own homes has always led first to disaffection and war, and then, beaten and cowed, the wretched natives resort to what the European thinks a curious habit—they make their final protest by dying in their thousands, and the source of labour supply dries up.

We were thus confronted in East Africa with an ethical question of exceptional magnitude, namely, whether any colonizing power has any moral right to proclaim a vested interest in the person of the native. To admit this in East Africa would be to break away from Britain's traditional policy of trusteeship, to put our Colonial clock back 300 years, to re-introduce slavery ourselves, and thereby give a lead which, there is only too much reason to fear, would be followed by other colonizing powers.

Confronted with this situation, and in particular, the fact that the Ordinances as drafted were useless unless amended, Mr. Winston Churchill has given instructions for amendments to be prepared which should go far towards eliminating the objectionable features of the Ordinances.

Land Expropriation. Coincident with the attempt to force natives to labour for wages for white men rather than to encourage them to aim at a more scientific development of the land in their own interests, we have witnessed constant attempts to oust the natives from their lands; the most notable, and in many ways the most interesting eviction in Colonial history, has been that of Southern Rhodesia, where the 800,000 natives have lost, through the medium of a valueless concession, coupled with a filibustering invasion, the entire ownership to their lands, with the following result:

(a) No native in Rhodesia possesses to-day any ownership right to land; this extends to every acre of land in the country, to the kraals, gardens, cemeteries,

rivers, and forests. This dispossession is the most complete known to history. (Three natives own patches of land because they have bought them for cash from the Chartered Company.)

(b) The native reserves, though large in area, are in many parts quite uninhabitable, and the title to them is insecure.

The real objective of land expropriations was well set forth in certain evidence tendered by settlers in British East Africa (Kenya) in 1913. One of the most important witnesses, said :

‘ If the policy was to be continued that every native was to be a landholder of a sufficient area on which to establish himself, then the question of obtaining a satisfactory labour supply would never be settled.’

And another said :

‘ he did not favour the idea of natives being taught better methods of agriculture in the Reserves, on the grounds that, if they were taught to work in the Reserves, the tendency would be for them not to come out at all. In the event of the size of the Reserves being reduced, then the effect might be different.’¹

These two expressions, and many more of a similar kind made in the evidence, disclose, with a cynicism hard to beat, that the attitude of the ordinary settler towards the native inhabitant of the tropics is an attitude of selfishness so unalloyed that a so-called savage would blush to give utterance to such a gospel.

The war has greatly accentuated all these dangerous methods of exploitation. The scramble for the raw material of the tropics is open and unashamed ; Great Britain has actually imposed upon the natives of West Africa £2 per ton penalty, in the shape of a differential

¹ Native Labour Commission 1912-13. Evidence and Report.

duty, upon each ton of palm kernels they sell to manufacturers other than British. Again the concomitants of the war have led to a greatly increased emigration, in many cases at Government instigation, with the result that the natives of the tropics are feeling, as never before, the impact of conflicting interests. In East Africa the immigration of settlers, particularly under soldier settlement schemes, has led to land alienation on an immense scale—in fact it has been stated that these alienations are so extensive that their cultivation on a European scale and by European methods would require the employment of the entire male population of the Colony of Kenya!

These, then, are the prevailing features to-day, in what is called the exploitation of the tropics. None will assert that, taken as a whole, the picture is attractive, whilst some of the features are a disgrace to our civilization. We have to ask ourselves therefore—along what lines should reform proceed; what should be the aim of those who seek a reconstruction of our Colonial ideas and methods?

There is one guiding star in the Colonial firmament, which, if men would follow, none would go astray, whilst all would benefit, namely—a genuine and rigid adherence to the principle of trusteeship. Great Britain officially professes this to-day; the mandatory principle of the League of Nations also invokes the same policy, but unfortunately the practice of to-day is painfully remote from these professions. What do we mean by trusteeship? Neither more nor less than what we mean by trusteeship in domestic life. In the colonial sphere the administration of a tropical territory should seek to serve, not to exploit; should seek the welfare of the inhabitants as a whole, and not the material advantage of the subjects of the mother country; and above all, a trustee

administration should prepare the country and the people for the day when, reaching the full stature of manhood, the colonial ward can with safety emerge from a paternal trusteeship and assume self-government.

In practice, the first essential for the trustee is to recognize that the economic future of the country is in the hands of those best capable of developing the soil; thus, no matter how intense the tide of immigration, sufficient land should be earmarked for the indigenous inhabitants to maintain their economic independence. It is probable that a loyal adherence to native land laws would be sufficient in this respect, but unhappily, Europeans have ridden rough-shod over native customary law, and have not applied European systems of tenure until the expropriation of the inhabitants has been almost completed.

Subsidiary only to this general proposition are the twin elementary rights of purchase and compensation. In many tropical and sub-tropical areas to-day, the expropriated native is not allowed to purchase again the land of which he has been despoiled—this right must be extended to the indigenous inhabitants on the same terms as to the immigrant settler. In most areas, the expropriation of the native takes place without any compensation whatsoever; in Southern Rhodesia, quite recently, natives have been removed in thousands over an area of 6,000,000 acres, and yet not one penny of compensation has been paid, not even to cover the actual cost of transportation of the goods to new areas. It should surely be regarded as an elemental right, that compensation for expropriation should be allowed to the natives upon the same conditions as would apply in the case of the removal of immigrant occupiers.

The main lines of land reform are therefore security

and sufficiency, the right of purchase, with compensation for expropriation.

In the sphere of contract labour, the most urgent reform is that of making all labour contracts civil instruments, any breaches of which should be visited only with civil penalties; the day of the whip and the prison-house should be regarded as a relic of a past age in the treatment of native labour, no less than it is in the treatment of white labour forces. The time has surely come to abolish every form of forced labour: the tacit acquiescence of civilization in compulsory labour for general public works has been so shamefully exploited that the only reply should be a total abolition of every form of compulsory labour.

The third line of reform is that of insisting upon the right of the indigenous labourer to rise as high in the industrial scale as his capacity and application admit. The deplorable attitude of organized white labour in South Africa cannot be defended. To deny to any man, with a skin of a colour other than a somewhat mottled pink and white, the right to become a skilled artisan, and to relegate that man of colour (often the offspring of the white) for all time to the position of a helot, is not only the most absolute selfishness, but a defiance of both economic and moral law.

The indigenous inhabitant of the tropical and sub-tropical regions is fast awakening to the injustices imposed upon him; he is learning that the white man cannot do without him; he now knows that in literature, commerce, politics, and industry, there is no height to which he cannot ultimately attain, and he is demanding, with ever-increasing force and power, his place in the world—he does not ask in sentimental language for the place of a brother, but he is determined to reach, in every sphere, the full stature of a man.

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XI

MASTER AND MAN IN THE TROPICS

SIR SYDNEY OLIVIER

PSYCHOLOGY has become during recent years so popular a topic and study that in offering to discuss the relation of Master and Man in the tropics in its psychological aspect I feel that I expose myself to a withering cross-fire of demonstration of my ignorance and superstition in regard to that branch of science from experts of a younger generation newly graduated in the latest developments. But having, more than thirty years ago, when Psychology had few devotees—was, indeed, under the shadow of a suspicion similar to that expressed by Mistress Betsy Prig with regard to the renowned Mistress Harris—ventured an essay on the Psychology of Race, which still appears to me to have had the root of the matter in it, and which subsequently developed into a modest treatise on the interaction of White Capital and Coloured Labour, meeting with considerable acceptance from a number of highly qualified critics specially interested in its field of application, I may as well pluck up the courage, or, perhaps I should say, the impudence of my established opinions.

Auguste Comte was the first, I think, among modern philosophers of European repute to deny to Psychology any place at all in the list of the sciences, and to proscribe it as a vain pursuit. Psychology, under the ascendancy of Rationalism and 'positive' Science, and in the face of the extreme simplification of theory in regard to human life and all animated nature in the doctrine of the survival

of the fittest and best through competitive struggle, did, in fact, in the latter half of the nineteenth century languish and lose colour to such a degree that Mr. J. S. Macdougall (then Reader in Mental Science at Oxford), taking pity on the contempt and destitution into which so respectable a name had fallen (owing, doubtless, to its association with the figments of discredited religion), proposed to open a fresh career for it.

In his manual for students in the Home University Series he frankly repudiated the possibility of a Psychology in the traditional and etymological meaning of the term. He admitted that the name properly means the science or study of the soul or souls of man. But as, he said, the notion of the soul is a speculative hypothesis, one much too vague and uncertain to be made the essential notion in the definition of a large province of Natural Science, we (*viz.* the Oxford University Faculty of Psychology) had better not attempt to study Psychology in this sense, but use the word as meaning something else. Let us therefore define Psychology as the positive science of the behaviour of living things.

It appeared to me at the date when this was written not only that it was a rather quaintly cool sort of proposal for a presumed scholar to make, but that, whilst the behaviour of living things must indeed be an interesting and very important department of study, to call it Psychology was little short of a solecism. If we are uncertain or disagreed about the psychical constitution of man, that is rather, surely, a reason for fresh effort in Psychology—for fuller scientific research as to Soul; not a justification for dogmatizing that there can be no Psychology and for proposing to take that name and use it for something quite different from what as a counter of language it properly and necessarily means or has ever aimed at. Psychology did not at that time appear to

me or to thinkers of much higher intelligence than myself to be by any means so dead that its claim could be jumped in that fashion.

It is hardly necessary now to point out that Psychology, in the essential and proper sense of the term, has, since that time, completely eclipsed John Barleycorn in the surprising vitality of its resurrection as a branch of positive science, concerned with the study and recognizing the existence of the soul or souls of man, and it might be judged from Mr. Macdougall's later work that he would probably now admit that the limiting dogmatism of that little text-book was unfortunate. This revival has already had the wit to turn the tables on the adherents of that malversation of the term Psychology by labelling them with the name of 'Behaviourists' and their topic as 'Behaviourism', not even conceding to it the style of a science by calling it 'Behaviourology'.

I do not intend to elaborate my own views in Psychology; but I have thought this brief preamble expedient to indicate my own standpoint sufficiently to illuminate the meaning of what I desire to say about the relation of Master and Man.

Psychology in my conception deals with the psychical constitution of man; that is to say, with the analysis and distinction of the vital and active powers in him which produce his behaviour. It is not merely a scheduling analysis and critique of that behaviour.

Any commentary, however, on an industrial system may certainly with advantage begin with 'Behaviourism'; that is to say, with observation of the characteristic habits and reactions of social classes or races of men in the exercise of productive industry.

The relation of Master and Man in industry and the general characteristics of its behaviourism, exhibiting themselves everywhere and always in the primitive

institution of domestic slavery, reposing on sheer physical power of command over captives of bow and spear, have, in the course of social evolution, displayed progressive variations of which the principal types and general developments are familiar to all students of economic history. Domestic proprietary slavery does not hold so conspicuous a place in the world to-day as formerly. All European Powers ostensibly proscribe it in their dominions. The British Government progressively eliminates it from its African empire.

The first great variation of the relation of Master and Man from its primitive type of slavery arises after the establishment of agricultural civilization, through the appropriation of land in private ownership ; the second, in a more advanced stage of industrial evolution, with the accumulation, concentration, and monopoly in private hands of capital.

'Villeins and thralls', as Edward Carpenter puts it, 'become piece-men and day-tal men, and the bondsmen of the land become the bondsmen of machinery and Capital', and, thus educated, as he adds, 'the escaped convicts of Labour fit admiringly the bracelets of wealth round their own wrists'.

Each of these forms of master-and-manship has its own characteristic secular philosophy (to say nothing of the cant of its religions), which teaches that it is good because it conduces to happiness and especially to the happiness of the man. And yet, so perverse is our nature, that each of these forms breaks itself up from within, unless the master class can maintain it by physical force, because the man will not put up with it any longer than he can help.

An intelligent Behaviourist critique would therefore indicate that something is wrong with them ; but it fails to tell us what : and I pursue my discrimination between

a behaviourist and a psychological critique by recalling the old controversy as to the basis of Political Economy and as to the possibility of a science of 'Economics'.

That controversy was very much alive when I was a young man, both in the world of theory and in that of practice. I refer to the opposition between the 'orthodox' economists, whose greatest names were Ricardo, Bastiat, Mill, and Karl Marx, on the one hand, and the Humanist economists, whose greatest names were Comte, Robert Owen, Carlyle, F. D. Maurice, Ruskin, and William Morris. Except in so far as Neo-Marxism holds its ground in the world of theory to-day, or in so far as Bolshevist Marxism has contributed to the economic collapse of Russia, we might be disposed to say that the controversy had exhausted itself, that no intelligent man is now a pure utilitarian fatalist of the old school, and that the Humanists had won the pass. (Just at this moment there is, no doubt, from special temporary causes, a certain apparent reaction.)

The theory of motive power which formed the basis of the classical Political Economy or individualist economic science was associated with the philosophy of Utilitarianism. That philosophy, which in the sphere of dialectical argument was by no means contemptible and was not at all to be disposed of by mere roarings of Carlyle's Everlasting No, set forth that all men's actions were addressed to the pursuit of happiness, or well-being, that the free action of enlightened self-interest would produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number, that 'wealth', i. e. commodities and personal private property, was a universal requisite in a happy and tolerable life and that the most unfettered pursuit of it would produce the most wealthy community.

The opposition creed was that the true end of Man is to do the will of God, that if he seeks his own life he will lose it,

and that the wages of sin is death, or that, as Mr. Bernard Shaw expounds the same doctrine in his latest homily 'Back to Methuselah', he must do the will of the Life-force or the Life-force will scrap him and any civilization which he may have devised by seeking his own individualist utilities.

The genuine, typical economist of the competitive individualist system of private property, such as Bastiat or Nassau Senior, being entirely and sincerely under the illusion of reality produced by his concrete environment, and ignoring or being sincerely unaware of the realities which are manifest to the religious man and the artist and which are the never-failing source and spring of that inveterate recalcitrancy of the Man against his Masters' industrial systems to which I have referred, argued, 'This system of wealth-production by capitalist control and exploitation is the best possible system: see how admirably it works! The masses (anticipating and improving by several hours on the invention of Summer-time) rise early and hasten eagerly day by day to maintain the supremacy of their country as the workshop and mart of the world. The talented organizer of labour, trade, or finance, passes quickly into command and affluence, and the superior classes, enriched by his ingenuity and recruited by his cultured progeny, are endowed with leisure and means to guide, enlighten, ennoble and beautify the national life.'

This was quite sincerely believed by the school of Political Economy which in its second generation produced John Stuart Mill, whose privileged intellect imposed on him the doubt whether all the industrial inventions of the capitalist régime had ever lightened the toil of a single human being, and Karl Marx, who pronounced that that system must inevitably work out its own inherent damnation. It was nevertheless still quite sincerely

believed by such statesmen as Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, and by such publicists as Mr. Benjamin Kidd, and is the foundation of the faith of all those who talk widely and enthusiastically about the development of tropical dependencies of British industrial enterprise.

This industrial civilization of the capitalist system into which our enthusiasts for Imperial development on the grand scale have dreamed of bringing the resources and the labour force of the tropics, depends for its coherent working on what is classically known as the 'Cash Nexus'; that is its social cement. It assumes that if a capitalist employer is in a position to conduct a profitable productive enterprise, which can afford to pay reasonable wages, wage-workers will joyfully flock to accept employment in it, and that what Bastiat called an economic harmony of a pleasing type results. The economists of the utilitarian Utopia of the individualist property system argued, on grounds of behaviourism, that this was a sufficient motive force to maintain a prosperous and progressive society.

To them the Humanist economists, such as those I have named and all those who have maintained their attitude, insistently replied: 'You are under illusion, you are in the bonds of a false psychology. Man is not by his nature an economic animal and your economic man is a contradiction in terms.'

I mentioned Auguste Comte as one of the most vehement of these protesters, and that, curiously enough, he at the same time disallowed psychology as a science. The fact was that he dogmatized on a very methodical little psychology of his own; of any criticism or enlargement of which he was very jealous; but essentially he was on the right lines in insisting that love and not self-seeking is the characteristic activity of man; and that religion, the interpretation of which he assigned, not so well-advisedly,

to a Priesthood of Humanity, or Spiritual Power, must be the paramount authority in human affairs.

The Humanists, then, denounced the Utilitarian individualist philosophy, which was greatly reinforced by Neo-Darwinianism, as an illusion. They denied that it actually worked to the advantage of society. Marx accepted its platform and demonstrated to his own satisfaction that it led straight to the Social Revolution. I myself, an early student of Marx (Sidney Webb, Bernard Shaw, and some other inquirers formed a study-circle for the purpose nearly forty years ago), could never discover what he meant by that phrase. Lenin assured the world that he did know, and honestly endeavoured to give it a demonstration of his own interpretation, but the experiment has been so marred by the untoward recalcitrancy of an unteachable peasantry, who embarrassed him by dying on his hands, and by the frailty of town proletarian nature, that he now frankly abandons or at least postpones it.

But what such men as Ruskin, William Morris, Edward Carpenter, and the British Socialists generally, now numbering some millions, have repeated, till almost every one to-day recognizes it, has been not only that the Utilitarian psychology was false and that the Capitalist industrial system must collapse as the falsity worked itself outwards, but that that system was a purely ephemeral and unstable local synthesis, which could only maintain its appearance of coherency and success in the highly industrialized countries in which private land monopoly had prepared the ground and laid the foundations of the Industrial Revolution.

The motive of the cash nexus and its ostensible results in the material prosperity of a nation can only work in such circumstances.

It is true that we have the proletarians of some parts of

Europe and the United States packed so close and tied up so tight in the capitalist industrial system that the best chance any of them have of living a tolerable life and the only chance the mass of them have of living at all is to make money and to act as if they enjoyed making it. But man does not want to work for masters—as Mr. J. H. Harris has quoted Booker Washington—‘working’ is a very different thing from ‘being worked’—nor to work more than he need for himself—and outside of these congested industrial areas a master cannot rely on men to labour for him unless he reintroduces one of the old crude forms of slavery or can induce them to do so on terms of equality and by some force of genuine human influence.

And now let me transport you to Africa.

When the Boers in South Africa found the British Government interfering with their social institution of domestic and praedial slavery they said (much as the American slave-owners said later), ‘Let us trek to where every man can flog his own nigger without molestation’; and it is essential to remember, against any unqualified condemnation of Imperial expansion, that the beginnings of the current epoch of that expansion in Africa were Protectorates (Basutoland and Bechuanaland) assumed by the British Government for the definite purpose of heading off such further Boer trekking and the extension of such liberty of unmolested nigger-walloping. The Boers had their primitive patriarchal social system, for the philosophy of which they found a text-book in the Hebrew Pentateuch, and they based their corresponding social theory not only on empirical grounds of the psychology of native African peoples but also on the impregnable rock of Holy Scripture, which sanctioned the distinction between bond and free.

And the Boer civilization, typically incarnated in President Paul Kruger, disliked, distrusted, dreaded,

obstructed, resisted, and was finally forced to fight for its life against the incursion (which it believed, with good reason, threatened to destroy it) of the capitalized industrial civilization which the gold-mining enterprises of foreign syndicates, the economic Imperialism of Rhodes and the Chartered Company policy of the British Government, embodied and aimed at establishing. In fact, just as we had, from motives of general principle, restrained the extension of the more primitive economic system of the Boers into fresh territory, so now President Kruger fought to restrain the incursion of the much more menacing and, from the scriptural point of view, more pestilent and inhuman system of modern European industrialism into the heart of South Africa. Kruger was a Conservative, and he and the older Boers genuinely objected to capitalist civilization on much the same grounds as our Tories of a century or so earlier objected to it. He did not, however, disdain to take plentiful toll of it, any more than did our own Conservatives of our railway and mining enterprises.

And just as the Boers had desired to expand their economic civilization in South Africa by organized trekking into the great 'undeveloped' territories lying to the north and north-east, with no intention whatever of benefiting their existing inhabitants, and with the indubitable probability of doing very much the reverse, so, with a scarcely less cynical ignoring of the natives in practice, though with deprecatory professions (in England) of the most philanthropic intentions on their behalf, did that school of Imperialist policy of which Mr. Chamberlain, though by no means the originator, may be regarded as the most typical and sympathetic figurehead, aim at organizing a great trek of capitalist industrial civilization into those parts of Africa which had been salvaged from the primitivism of the Boers,

the militarism of France, or the bureaucratic exploitation of Germany.

Mr. Chamberlain had no disposition whatever towards sanctioning oppressive exploitation, nor any idea of producing it by Imperial development. He devoutly believed in the automatic efficiency of our great system of wealth-production by organized capital under the direction of the highest business ability ; but he did not conceive of this as involving any real interference with personal liberty ; he did not approve of, or contemplate, the expropriation of native African peoples from their land, and when he was at the Colonial Office he resolutely opposed the encroachment of any tendency to introduce forced labour of natives for white men. In short, as a good Industrial Liberal, he genuinely believed in the natural beneficence and sympathetic appeal of the youngest phase of industrial economy.

Now every one who has lived in tropical countries knows well enough that those who are accustomed to employ or to endeavour to employ negro labour are generally satisfied that as a matter of practice you cannot get your work done under the ordinary incentives which operate in the labour market in England. The native African or the West Indian African, living in free conditions, that is to say with access to land, will at the best work when he chooses and not when a master wants him, and even when he does so will too frequently work in a manner very disheartening to his employer. Hence arises the prevalent Colonial axiom that the negro is incorrigibly lazy, and that you cannot get work out of him to a degree which will enable you to get rich, or even to live on the profits except by some form of compulsion. And as it is an axiom of British industrial ethics that continuous hard work is virtuous and refusal of it an evidence of degraded barbarism (what sermons we have had lately on this text !),

it follows that the class which in colonized territories is expected to become the labouring class incurs the reputation of being a degraded and worthless kind of humanity. The Boer, and, speaking generally, the planting employer or overseer all over the world, is convinced that the nigger cannot be made to labour with sufficient intensity except by compulsion, and further that the only hope of improvement in his character is that he should be so compelled.

There are two principal methods by which this compulsion can be applied. One is that of forced labour, and the other that of land monopoly. The most primitive method of forced labour is that known specifically as slavery, and the Boer, like the United States slave-owner and our own West Indian slave-owners three generations ago, was definitely of opinion that slavery was the proper status for such people. But in our Empire we do not talk about slavery, we ignore the very conception that it can exist, or that the African can have any reason to imagine himself enslaved. The African, on the other hand, and the freed West Indian negro have no such blind spot in their eye. All Africa is saturated with the idea of slavery. Every one, man and woman, in Africa knows what slavery is—namely, the compulsion to work against your will for another's profit. In the West Indies this traditional consciousness of the character of slavery, enhanced by long experience of direct subjection to white employers, is most profoundly established, and it reacts in maintaining a disinclination to work regularly under an employer, even when there is no aversion to the work itself, and when the wage is acceptable. The man desires to feel his absolute independence of the master, and to keep the master reminded from time to time lest he should forget it too.

Moreover, every native in the established social system

of Africa, and every West Indian cultivator who, or whose family, owns or occupies land, has a great many other things to do and to think of than the earning of a day's wage by means of regular work. He sees no merit in this when its demands outrun his own convenience; and as a matter of fact any such habit would interfere with and destroy his own mode of life. It is only suitable to a landless proletariat, divorced from the instruments of industry, and which, after earning its living wage, has nothing else to do than to buy things with it in shops, to keep the family going till next pay-day. Any one who is familiar with the life of an independent small-holder even in this country will recognize that such a man's time is occupied much more fully, variously and interestingly, than that of a hand in a shoe factory, or even than that of an agricultural labourer working for wages, although the work of the latter is far more interesting and individual than the former. And further, that a small-holder could not possibly be expected to undertake regular work as an agricultural labourer. Yet it is not asserted that he is idle because he declines to do so.

But beneath these two factors, namely the suspicious apprehension of slavery and the competition of the indispensable calls of his own industrial and social life, which make the native African responsible for what is called 'labour shortage', there lies the more fundamental fact that he has been much less drilled than the European proletarian has been, out of the natural reactions of the nature of man. I began by saying that even under these industrial systems the man has not put up and will not put up any longer than he can help with the institution of mastery founded on property, and it is gratifying to realize that this is now becoming almost a commonplace in our own industrial discussions. But the European proletarian, like the negro slave, has under compulsion got

very much into the habit of inhibiting the working of his natural desire for liberty. He was, and is, in the strictest sense of the word, drilled. The African has had no such drilling; and the negro and negroid peoples all over the world are much more temperamental than the British workman. I do not say they really feel more quickly or deeply, but their action or proposals for action and conduct respond much more immediately to their feelings. (The war, it is true, has greatly released the temperament of our younger workers from this inhibition.) The facts as to the psychical constitution of man are on this account more obviously exhibited in the primitive peoples than they have been in the disciplined workers of our own country. Our populations have been more impaired and stunted in some branches of human character, in regard to some characteristic expressions of human nature, than the infinitely less elaborate, and in a utilitarian judgement less valuable, human beings of the African native world.

But for the very reason that he is more temperamental and responds less automatically to the economic incentives of the capitalist system, the African worker is in a degree a preferable human being in industrial relations.

The industrial behaviour of our disciplined proletariat is in many respects frankly villainous. As a phenomenon of human activity, the whole policy generically indicated by the phrase 'ca' canny' is despicable. It prevents any kind of human relation between the organizer of industry and those who work with him.

But the African, whilst he is less governed by economic motive, can be governed by two things, force and affection. The government by force may be slavery, it may be tribal authority. I am not rating it highly. But an employer who really knows how to deal sympathetically with Africans, will get admirable assistance from them if he does not consider it derogatory to his dignity to accept it

on friendly terms. It was asked in one of our discussions whether, in the case of public emergency, such as a fire or the breaking of a river bank, it was necessary to employ forced labour: whether the men would not come out to the offer of a sufficient wage. My answer from my own experience would be that neither is necessary. I should simply send word that the boys were wanted, and why. I would have a big fire built, and roast a pig and boil a cauldron of yam, and have a keg of rum to top up with. Where work against natural forces, such as flood or hurricane damage, is wanted, there is never the slightest difficulty in getting Africans to turn out and work with untiring vigour to fight it.

Mr. Harris has reviewed some of the results of native industry working in its own interest, and the fact is that where the African sees sufficient personal advantage in working for money for his own profit, he will do so. But as Mr. Harris also said, he is a very keen bargainer, and if any one dealing with him is doing so at a profit, he suspects that he himself is being got the better of. Consequently when he is invited to sell his labour he is very jealous of giving an employer more than enough work for his money. In this, of course, he is quite on the orthodox lines of trade union principles. And he is in so much better a position than the European worker is, to bilk his employer when he is working on time wages, that practically every kind of plantation work in the tropics, that can possibly be paid by the job or the piece, is so paid. This suits the African worker, because he likes to work in a gang, to take a job and work it as it suits him. A good overseer of tropical labour has an extremely elaborate repertoire of the prices of jobs, and when new methods are introduced, makes new discoveries. For example, when the method of green-manuring cane-fields by planting cow peas, which were subsequently hoed in,

was introduced, it was found that the gangs worked extraordinarily short time at the hoeing, generally knocking off at about eleven o'clock in the morning. The explanation was, that by that time their baskets were as full of the pea-pods as they could hold, and they had earned a very good day's wage in money and kind.

I have said that the policy of Imperial development as conceived by Mr. Chamberlain and his school did not aim at or contemplate the expropriation of natives from their land, or the imposition of any form of slavery on them. And in West Africa, where the Colonial Office was supreme, these policies were for long held at bay.

But when the B.S.A. Company got to work under Mr. Rhodes, who for his part took the South African view of the native, no such nonsense was allowed to affect policy. The ownership of all land was claimed by the Company, the natives were dealt with as having no claim to possession, and pressure was put upon them to work. Later, however, forced labour having been proved to have been one of the causes of the Matabele rebellion, it was expressly condemned by the Colonial Office, and has not since then been revived in Rhodesia.

But on the Eastern side of Africa, where protectorates were set up under the Foreign Office, the policy of land-alienation was freely accepted, this being quite accurately recognized as the essential and indispensable foundation of the development of these countries by syndicates and large grantees on the lines of capitalist civilization. Indeed, before our Protectorates were established native chiefs had alienated large areas of land. And those extracts which Mr. Harris has quoted from the evidence of two witnesses, put the matter with absolute clearness and in a nutshell. No one can raise any question whatever that the policy of development through large estates involves, if it is to succeed, the expropriation of natives,

not only because the grantees want themselves to have land and its produce, but because they want the natives to have none, in order that the natives may be forced to work for them, and because they know, as those people on this side who in their simplicity rely on the free attraction of wages do not presume, that they cannot get their labour on any other terms.

After the war the Government encouraged the emigration of a considerable number of ex-officers to take up planting in British East Africa. Most of them doubtless went out with the same innocence of any intention to introduce slavery as that in which Mr. Chamberlain preached his big development policy. But they found that their estates could not be worked and maintained with such poor labour-supply as was forthcoming at the wages they could offer. The local Government, in a quandary, made a strong effort to introduce forced labour, framed a drastic ordinance for the purpose of putting the necessary pressure on natives, and instructed public officials and chiefs to act as recruiting agents. Lord Milner, in the face of strong protests and condemnation, with which the Archbishop of Canterbury associated himself, upheld and defended this policy. Fortunately (since the date at which this paper was read as a lecture) Mr. Churchill has reversed his predecessor's action and directed the withdrawal of this instruction and the amendment of the labour law, insisting very wisely on the maintenance of those established principles of colonial government which were axiomatic when he himself was Under Secretary of State for the Colonies. This temporary divagation of the Colonial Office policy need not now therefore be further criticized; but it is perhaps still necessary to say something on the defence of the policy which apparently commended itself to certain missionaries and to Lord Milner—the theory, that is, that it is an

essential part of the necessary *education* of the African native that he should be taught to work : that compulsory education is a sound Liberal policy, and that the best schools available for him are the (private employer's) workshop and farm.

I have already spoken, and Mr. Harris has spoken, of the aversion of the African to compulsory labour, which would of itself strongly militate against any technical educational effect its imposition might produce ; but whilst it is perhaps astonishing that this defect in the forced labour programme should be ignored by officials—or would be astonishing if one did not realize the prevalent extreme deficiency of their own education in sociology—it might appear still more astonishing that missionaries who are presumed to have had some training as educationists, could seriously imagine that you can make any man or child *industrious* by forcing him to work. The administrative official may claim to be concerned only with the technical output ; and whilst, in the face of the facts Mr. Harris has set forth as to production, it is only an *ignoramus* in tropical administration that can imagine that forced labour will give a greater technical output than free labour, the missionary is, or should be, concerned with something deeper, with the soul or spiritual life of man. Even if he know nothing of the history of slavery and emancipation he ought to know that moral education—the conversion of the native, if he is slothful, from sloth to energy—is an enlargement of the spirit and the will, and cannot be effected by crushing the spirit and overbearing the will.

Moreover, the Colonial Office should have remembered what it learnt in the first half of the nineteenth century during the period of slave emancipation and the following generation. The axiom that on no pretext was forced tropical labour for an employer to be permitted, was not

an exalted fad ; it was the result of experience under the pressure of every kind of pretext for compulsion.

The apprenticeship system was advocated in the West Indies after emancipation on this precise plea of education, and it had to be abandoned because the taint of compulsion rendered it worse than useless. Nothing could remedy the destruction of industrial morale produced by slavery except an entire cutting loose from all trace of constraint. Industrial educationists had to begin again. The morality of wage slavery has to be built up by its own evolution ; it cannot be directly grafted on a society inured to chattel slavery. That root poisons it. The capitalist industrial relation of master and man is admittedly, by the testimony of its experts and admirers, very difficult to work satisfactorily in tropical countries. Immigrant labour, under indenture, is generally found to be called for. I personally have long been of the opinion, which extended observation strengthens, that it will never really succeed in taking hold of tropical communities, because it does not suit the psychical constitution of the African. The only place in the New World where it works is the island of Barbados, where there is a dense proletarian population and a strict land monopoly in the hands of a small employing class. And Barbados, one of these days, will explode.

The missionary and the enlightened administrator, whose field of tropical exploitation is, or should be, far wider than that of the planting employer of labour, being the province of human nature in the African, must learn to take longer views than those which regard the adjustment of the energies of the man to the economic interests of the master as the only or the most urgent problem of colonial development. They must learn patience. Economic and educational development by direct instruction and stimulus applied to the interests of the native on his own

land may be a slow process ; indeed, it must be ; but it has proved itself both in West Africa and in the West Indies to be sure. This is certain, that the tropical labourer will never become a good workman for an employer until he has learned to become a good workman for himself. Then he may be worth employing at a wage he may think worth working for.

Sense of justice, love of liberty, good will : these essentials of human nature are as pronounced and as powerful in the African as in the European. These are what the administrator and the missionary have to work on. The mere enforcement of a capitalist industrial 'development' will not do their educational work for them. But any one who knows a good workman at home to-day knows a man in whom these qualities are developed. To such manhood no mastership, in the industrial sense, is essential. I doubt if industrial mastership has much future awaiting it in the tropics. If it is to have, it can only be on terms far more human than have been arrived at among ourselves.

XII

MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIR SYDNEY OLIVIER

A MANDATE in the sense in which I have to discuss it may be described as a document of authority addressed to a Trustee by the creator of a Trust. The creator of the Trust in this instance is the League of Nations, the Trustee is one or other of the European Powers. The beneficiary of the Trust is a community occupying a territory formerly under the sovereignty of one of the Powers defeated by the Allies in the Great War and deprived of its sovereignty under the conditions of the Peace.

The provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations relating to such communities run as follows :

ARTICLE XXII

‘ To those Colonies and Territories which, as a consequence of the late War, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that THE WELL-BEING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH PEOPLES FORM A SACRED TRUST OF CIVILIZATION, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.

‘ The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing

to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

'The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

'Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory; and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

'There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

'In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

'The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

' A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates.'

ARTICLE XXIII

' Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League

' (a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organization ;

' (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control ;

' (c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs ;

' (d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest ;

' (e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connexion the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-18 shall be borne in mind ;

' (f) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.'

If I were to survey in full the history of the framing of these provisions, beginning with the preliminary statements of intention made by the British Government and by President Wilson as to how the Allies should deal with the territories in question, and following up to the present date the manner in which the provisions as settled have

been interpreted and applied, I should have to tell a story of considerable disappointment and disheartenment. I do not wish to dwell too much on these aspects, as I consider that the mandatory system as it at present survives, and may still be developed, is an exceedingly valuable contribution to the establishment of better government in the uncivilized parts of the world and constitutes a reinforcement of international law for which all those who are interested in the righteous treatment of weaker peoples may well be very thankful: I will, therefore, only briefly refer to these causes of dissatisfaction.

Before the conclusion of the war the intentions of the British and American Governments with regard to these territories were on several occasions announced, especially by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, and President Wilson. Mr. Lloyd George, speaking no doubt of what he believed the British Government would desire to arrange if it could, and President Wilson, subject doubtless to the same reservations as to the policy of the United States, both promised that if the Mandatory system, which they then contemplated, should be established, the communities to which it was to be applied should themselves have the right of determining to what Power their tutelage should be assigned. This was currently spoken of as 'the right of self-determination'. Mr. Lloyd George, with sound warrant, explained that even the uncivilized peoples of Africa were quite capable, through their native organs of government, of expressing a popular choice and decision on such a question. And with regard to the more civilized communities such as the Arab and Syrian States then forming part of the Turkish Empire, it was unnecessary to argue that such a popular or national will could be clearly ascertained.

When the Covenant of the League of Nations was

promulgated it was found to divide the communities concerned into three classes, the description of which I repeat :

- (A) Those formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire.
- (B) Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, commonly classed as uncivilized ; and
- (C) Territories such as South-West Africa, and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory.

In all subsequent developments the mandates applicable to these three classes are distinguished as of class (A), class (B), and class (C) respectively.

And it was observed that provision for self-determination, or any reference to that principle, was entirely absent in regard to classes (B) and (C), and in regard to class (A) appeared only in the very weak form 'The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory'.

The clause did not even provide that their wishes should be *the* principal consideration, and, in fact, in regard to Northern Syria the wishes of the community were overruled by other considerations, arising out of agreements between the Allies which in fact involved the British Government in a failure to make good its own antecedent undertakings with the representatives of certain communities concerned. Serious injury to the credit of the British Government has unquestionably resulted from this complication.

With regard to the territories in classes (B) and (C) there had been no explicit engagement between the British Government and their peoples that their option should be respected. More cannot be said than that, during the stress of the war, Great Britain and the United States had expressed very reasonable and acceptable intentions which it now appeared they had not been able to carry out.

This was especially the case in regard to the Cameroons and Togoland, whose peoples earnestly desired to be placed under British tutelage. In the Cameroons this had been a long-cherished desire, for, before Germany in 1884 assumed her authority over that territory, its chiefs had entreated Queen Victoria to take them under her protection, and the British Government had in fact, but as it proved too late, decided to do so.

When, however, in the early stages of the war the German power in these territories had been crushed by the joint military operations of England and France, an understanding between those Powers became unavoidable that the authority over those territories should be divided between the two. This was not disclosed at the time, and when it became known that such was to be the fate of the inhabitants, great distress and disappointment were felt, and many of the inhabitants migrated from the districts assigned to France into those taken over by British authority. Here again an impression of bad faith was created, which might have been avoided had the facts of the position been acknowledged, and the misleading utterances of Mr. Lloyd George and of President Wilson restrained accordingly. As the facts were, these utterances, when looked back upon, could only appear to have been insincerely or ignorantly made for the purpose of producing the best possible impression as to the intentions of the Allies in the event of their winning the war.

Further, both on behalf of the British Government and most explicitly in the oration delivered by President Wilson, when introducing the Covenant of the League of Nations at Versailles, the idea of the 'annexation' of any of these territories to the Dominions of the Mandatory Power, was profusely repudiated. Nevertheless, the provision with regard to territories of class (C), which, as quoted above, is clearly of quite unlimited interpretation, allows such territories to be dealt with by the mandatory as integral portions of *its* territory, a position which it would require considerable ingenuity to discriminate from the status of annexation. And in the outcome, not only territories in South-West Africa and the Pacific Islands, of sparse population or small size, have been so annexed, but those large and populous territories of the Cameroons and Togoland which had hitherto quite conveniently been administered as separate states, have been placed under mandates of class (C). The only territory that has been placed under a mandate of class (B) is what was formerly German East Africa, now known as Tanganyika territory. Moreover, the French Government in the mandate drafted for themselves for the Cameroon territory, actually speak of 'sovereignty' which they appear to attribute to the Mandatory Power.

Here again an appearance of bad faith and chicanery has been produced, which has created a considerable impression both in the African world as represented by its educated and articulate sections, and among the representatives in the Assembly of the League of Nations of those many other countries which are jealous or suspicious or critical of the great imperialist powers, England and France, whom they see, contrary to the professions at least of the former, and to the fair promises of President Wilson, absorbing vast new additions to their already enormous properties.

Two further matters in which the interpretation of the Covenant has departed from the promises made and expectations created as regarded the intentions of the victorious Powers must be referred to.

The professions made by President Wilson and others as to the principles which should be applied to such territories had been reasonably interpreted as meaning that the League of Nations itself—which was to be the authority under whose mandates these territories were to be governed (not as parts of the Dominions of annexing Powers, but as self-contained communities under tutelage)—should say, in accordance with their self-determination, what territory was to be assigned to what mandatory. There was nothing in the principles antecedently professed which would have precluded some neutral country being made a mandatory for one or more of these territories. But the question of the distribution of mandatory authorities was treated by the Supreme Council of the Allies as one of a division of spoils with which no one was concerned but the victors. They were distributed, in fact, on the basis of the theory that they were territorial acquisitions in the interest of a mandatory power.

Where no such interest, but rather an onerous obligation was involved, as in the case of Armenia, no power coveted or could be found to accept a mandate. When the distribution of territory in Mesopotamia and Northern Syria was criticized in the House of Commons, Mr. Lloyd George, with engaging frankness, forgot Mr. Balfour's professions that the territories were not to be dealt with as exploitable areas, and explained that France having made sacrifices in the war, it was right that she should receive "compensation" in Northern Syria, and that we having made sacrifices in Mesopotamia, it was right that we should be compensated by possession of the oil wells of Mosul. The doctrine of claims to compensation for

sacrifices in the war is no doubt an arguable one : I do not propose to criticize it : but appeal to that doctrine had in this case been expressly excluded from any weight in the determination as to the fate of these territories, which were to have been administered as a sacred trust in the interest of their own inhabitants and with prior consideration of the wishes of their own community.

The second particular in regard to which the proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Allies have been severely and generally charged with bad faith arises out of the following clause in the covenant :

‘ The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon *by the members of the League*, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.’

It would appear presumable, and this was the view taken by most of the representatives of Nations in the first Assembly of the League at Geneva, that unless the Council of the League had settled the terms of the Mandates, it would rest with the members of the League, as convened in the General Assembly, to define them. This, however, was not the view announced and adhered to on behalf of the principal Powers. The Supreme Council ruled that the words ‘ The Members of the League ’ meant those members of the League who had been concerned in the drafting of the Covenant, that is to say, that not only the assignment of mandates but the formulation of their terms rested with the principal Powers of the Allies who were dividing the spoils. The League was thus ousted from any authority, not only in the assignment of trustees for the communities of which it was to be the ultimate guardian, but also in the framing of the trust whose execution it was to supervise. For better or worse this evasion of the whole of the ostensible idea of the Covenant had to be swallowed by the League.

With regard to the terms of the mandates there were long conferences between the Powers concerned. At the date of the first assembly of the League the mandates had not been settled. They have now been settled, in more or less satisfactory form, but they have not yet been brought into force. The second Assembly of the League, which met in September 1921, was given to understand that the continued delay was due to the attitude of the United States, which, although it is not a party to the Covenant, claims to be consulted in the settlement of the mandates because it was one of the principal Powers of the Allies which assigned the mandates and were to agree upon their terms.

The demur of the Government of the United States is based on questions raised by them as to whether the mandatory powers are carrying out the understanding that they should secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League. America is not a 'member of the League', but, in accordance with the special interpretation of that phrase, which I have explained above, she is as much entitled to claim these equal opportunities as her Allies were to assign and frame the mandates. The mandated territories have, ever since the end of the war, been under the administration of the several mandatories to whom they have been assigned, and the best of the present inconclusive situation has been made, as was announced to the second Assembly, by those Powers undertaking consistently to administer them in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant, and of the drafted mandates, which have been approved by the Council, and to render to the Council the annual reports required by the Covenant in reference to those territories.

The terms of those British mandates which have been framed and published, provide quite as fully as can be expected for the observance of the principles insisted on

by the Covenant, and in reference to some of its provisions which are vaguely framed they go farther in the direction of precision. For example, whereas the provisions of the Covenant in regard to slavery and labour are vague, that particular danger of a tendency to introduce forced labour, with which I have dealt in my previous paper, has, in the mandate for Tanganyika territory (the only British (B) mandate), been satisfactorily guarded against by a requirement similar to that which Mr. Churchill has now prescribed for Kenya Colony, that there shall be no forced labour imposed except for really urgent public works, the execution of which cannot otherwise be provided for and that such labour shall, in all cases, be properly paid. So long as the British Colonial Office is firmly held to the principle re-established by Mr. Churchill—from which, as I explained in my former paper, it had temporarily lapsed—the principle of the Covenant, that native labour is not to be exploited for the profit of the white man, may be regarded as sufficiently provided for. It is not clear, however, that such precise safeguards exist in regard to other African territories which have been assigned to France, Belgium, Portugal, or Great Britain under mandates of Class (C).

The provision of the Covenant prohibiting military training of natives for other than police purposes and for the defence of territory, is still not properly safeguarded. The French Government has entirely refused to abjure the conscription of native Africans for purposes much wider than those of police and the defence of their own territory. It is obvious that a community under a (C) mandate, administered as an integral portion of French territory, is subject to the conscription of its natives for any military purpose of the French Republic, and the proviso referring to the interests of the indigenous population is not held to be operative.

I have thought it necessary to review very lightly and cursorily some of the grave blemishes which have appeared in the dealings of the Powers with the ostensible principles of the Covenant, and I do not desire farther to lay stress upon these. But the fact must be faced that these tergiversations have somewhat profoundly affected the sentiments both of Africans and of disinterested independent Powers with regard to the colonial imperialism of Great Britain and France. The confidence of African people and of their racial kindred in the New World in the integrity of the British Government has been distinctly shaken, whilst the cynicism of the great Powers in converting the Covenant into a mere instrument of annexation, directly contrary to President Wilson's introductory promise, however humane and reasonable that administration may be, and even if the promise of equal opportunities for trade and commerce is made good, have very disagreeably impressed the other nations. No one who has conversed with representatives of those nations or paid attention to their speeches in the Assemblies at Geneva and their committees, can feel any doubt as to this. The Powers concerned can yet clear themselves, by their administration of the mandates, from this reproach and suspicion.

Whilst all this must be taken account of, there are two things which must be said on the credit side: the first in excuse, the second as a matter of positive satisfaction and an augury of hope.

In the line of excuse, we must remember, and our experiences of the Peace have brought very much home to all of us, that good ideas will not work of themselves. Armenia has been abandoned because no mandatory power could be found to undertake the trouble and expense involved in a mandate for her. The financial difficulties of the great Powers, accumulating since the

war, and the military policy of France, make it in practice impossible to expect that they should administer mandatory territories as an act of pure philanthropy. If an entirely self-denying policy were demanded, mandates might be resigned or might have been refused, and the whole scheme would remain in the air ; for the League of Nations itself is not so constituted as to enable it to provide the finance for its working. The conscription of natives in the French mandated territories is doubtless conceived to strengthen the French military power ; and the French are convinced that their military power needs to be enhanced, at any rate for some time to come. Eulogists of the French policy on the other hand maintain that the conscription of the natives is beneficial and civilizing to them and, moreover, raises their racial pride by exhibiting them as equal members of the great French Commonwealth. I need not labour this point. President Wilson's ideas, and Mr. Lloyd George's ideas, as expressed during the war, were admirable beyond criticism. The Covenant is open to be interpreted in full satisfaction of these ideas ; it also need not be so interpreted. If its interpretation had been screwed up to the highest possible level it might not have got interpreted in practice at all.

The second point of hope and satisfaction is this. The idea of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the mandatory system of the League, was not a new idea of this century. It was quite explicitly formulated as the best safeguard of native peoples more than a generation ago at the time of the Partition of Africa. The Berlin Conference of 1885 was then convened by Bismarck for the purpose of arriving at international understandings as to freedom of trade and navigation on the Congo and Niger Rivers, authority over whose basins had recently been assumed by competing European powers and the Congo Company. But in the course of this Congress the

purposes of its proceedings were widened, principally under the influence of the British and American delegates, and the Berlin Act (which was promulgated 'in the name of Almighty God') asserted very much the same particular obligations in regard to the government of the annexed communities as are embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations relating to mandated areas. It did not, however, go so far as to assert that they were to be administered as a sacred trust in their own interests.

The terms of the Berlin Act are in many cases identical with those of the Covenant in this connexion. The Berlin Act set up a standard and it announced an obligation on the part of the signatory Powers to observe and enforce that standard. When the atrocities in the Congo Free State supervened, the existence of the Berlin Act formed a basis for intervention and remedy. It may have been obvious that whereas some of the signatories were sincere in their purpose, others had their tongue in their cheek. The principles and intentions of the Covenant of the League of Nations are exalted and distinct. Most certainly some of the signatories were sincere. Others possibly had their tongues in their cheeks. But that will not avail them against the censure of the world if they fail, as the Congo Free State failed, to carry out the obligations they have accepted. And there can be no exaggerating the enormous advance which the institution of the League of Nations constitutes, as an instrument of such criticism and such censure, over any instrument that persisted after the Berlin Congress as a means of enforcing the principles of the Berlin Act. Subsequent congresses were from time to time called to elaborate means for the enforcement of that Act's provisions. But now we have not only the annual Assembly of the League, a body of very vigilant and independent critics, but we have the Council to which the annual reports are submitted, and

we have the permanent Commission on Mandates, a very admirably constituted body. Our representative on this is in my opinion the best possible selection that our Government could have made, from the point of view of those who desire to see the interests of the natives vigilantly and sympathetically maintained.

British government has, in times past, had the highest reputation for its dealings with uncivilized peoples. It deserved that reputation and it enjoyed their confidence. During recent years it has, to a certain extent, fallen away from its former high record, showing a tendency to exploit native communities in the interests of its own nationals. I believe this to be a temporary aberration from which it will be recalled. If the principles of the Covenant, which are not higher than those that were formerly its own, are honestly applied by our Government under the League in mandated territories it cannot in any part of its own Empire continue to fall short of those principles. Further, as regards other nations: their systems of administration are different from ours; it is possible that in some respects some of them may be better. In some respects they are certainly worse. In so far as they are worse it is of immeasurable importance that a common standard should have been set up and sanctioned by the conscience of the world expressed in the Assembly of the League of Nations. That is a body full of high-minded men, who express themselves without reserve in a degree to which diplomatic correspondence never hitherto afforded any approach.

It is impossible for men of less enlightened standards to mix in such a body without at any rate doing lip-service to the highest ideas expressed; and they will not, after such association, relapse entirely to their former provincial levels. Mr. J. H. Harris would agree with me that this kind of contact has already helped to liberalize the

attitude of at least one European power in regard to the treatment of Natives in one of its Dependencies.'

All, therefore, who have been interested in the development of these uncivilized communities, and who were thankful for so much as was done by the Berlin Act, must recognize that the Covenant of the League of Nations has created an instrument of tenfold more promise, and that whilst the performance under it has been during these few years not yet very important or conspicuous, there can be no doubt that as the League of Nations grows in strength, the reaction of the mandatory system upon the relations of civilized to uncivilized nations must inevitably grow more effectual. And it may be hoped that those temporary ill effects on mutual confidence which have resulted from the disappointments of the initiatory peace period, may be remedied by the recognition of a genuine and increasing co-operation between the civilized and the undeveloped peoples.

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